

MIS 5121:Enterprise Resource Planning Systems Week 3: *Fraud, Procure to Pay Process Controls*



Control Failure: ACL Technologies, Inc.

Background:

- Subsidiary of United Industrial Corporation (UIC)
- ❖ 1990's Sought gov't contracts to build F-16 combat aircraft depots in Egypt
- Contracts: \$64 million in revenue, \$8.6 million in net profit 1999 and 2004
- Retained services of retired EAF General (the "EAF Agent") knowing that he had connections to EAF officers beneficiaries of depot

Control Failures: contract awarded in 2002

- 'Agent' and ACL President discussed funds to 'start give motivation'
- Front-end: Subsidiary head authorized large payments without meaningful substantiation, supporting documents (segregation of duties)
- Back-end: Paid 'Agent' for 'consulting' and 'marketing' services with no meaningful records documenting the services
- ❖ Agent due diligence: initially no contract, contract not reviewed by legal, used form submitted by agent without review
- Contractual Rights: contracts without gov't required audit rights to review 'agent' activities (e.g. no supervision of activities.





Control Failure: ACL Technologies, Inc.


Results / Outcomes:


- SEC books & records and internal controls charges against the parent company
 - Liability transferred to parent company: UIC routinely identified the ACL President as a member of UCI's senior management, indicating the degree of control it possessed
- ❖ SEC 'read between the lines' to charge with violating Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) anti-bribery provisions (SEC will imputed culpable knowledge or willful blindness to a parent corporation based on the internal control failures).
- ❖ UIC's settled out of court (2009):
 - "neither admitting nor denying" the allegations
 - Fine of approximately \$340,000 (from contract net profit of \$9,000,000)
 - Cease-and-desist order requiring to follow what the law requires anyway



References / Links:

* http://www.shearman.com/~/media/Files/NewsInsights/Publications/2009/06/Internal-Control-Failures-Lead-to-Parent-Liabili_/Files/Click-here-to-view-memo-Internal-Control-Failure__/FileAttachment/FCPA060209InternalControlFailuresLeadtoParentLia__.pdf






Fraud

Definition

'deception (misrepresentation or omission) deliberately practiced in order to secure unfair or unlawful gain'





Whom do you trust?

	A lot		Some	Not at all
Yourself	74%		21%	4%
Spouse or family members	64		23 11	
Financial adviser	15	48	33	
Labor unions	12	31	53	
National banks	8	43	45	
Elected officials in D.C.	6	45	47	
Major corporations	6	35	56	
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




Environment Favorable to Fraud

Framework for spotting high-risk situations

- Perceived opportunity (I can do it / conceal it and not get caught)
 - Poor internal controls
 - Lack of oversight
- Incentive or Pressure (Financial or emotional force pushing to commit fraud)
 - Meet expectations
 - Avoid criticism
 - Cover a mistake
 - Personal failures, needs
- Rationalization (Personal justification for dishonest actions)
 - Low compensation
 - Company is profitable



Fraud Triangle





The Fraud Diamond

Framework for spotting high-risk situations

Capability

Position / Organizational Authority

Knowledge of System (brains)

Confidence / ego

Persuasive / coercion skills

Deceptive nature (liar)

Resilient /immune to stress

Incentive /

Pressure

Rationalization

Occupational Fraud Categories

Asset Misappropriation:

Perpetrator steals or misuses an organization's resources

Corruption:

- Use his / her influence in business transactions
- Method violates duty to employer
- Obtains benefit for themselves or a partner)

<u>Financial Statement Fraud</u>:

Intentional misstatement or omission of material information in organizations financial reports


Source: Association of Certified Fraud Examiners – 2010 Report to the Nation



Most Common Fraud Techniques

- Improper revenue recognition (61% of cases vs. 50% in previous study)
- Overstatement of assets/capitalization of expenses (51%)

Number of Fraud Cases With Asset Accounts Misstated



Case Example – Employee Embezzlement

- Company with annual revenues of approximately \$20 30 million
- Payroll clerk develops a scheme to misappropriate cash through fraudulent expense reimbursements
 - Establishes fictitious employee names and links her checking account to the payroll records for direct deposit
 - The clerk submits fraudulent expense reimbursements
 - The misappropriated funds were moved out of the checking account via a series of transactions initiated to launder the cash
- Over five years she stole over \$5 million
- Pled guilty to grand larceny and money laundering. Received a three year prison sentence and was subsequently deported to her native Italy

Case Example – Employee Embezzlement

- Pressure / incentive
 - Gambling
 - Living beyond her means
 - Desire to keep up façade to family and friends
- Perceived opportunity
 - No internal controls
 - No oversight by management
 - No applicant screening program
 - No segregation of duties
- Rationalization
 - I deserve more than I am being paid
 - I am not hurting anyone







Case Example – Vendor Kickback

- Company with annual revenues of \$3 5 billion
- Facilities management members willfully participate in bribery scheme with two vendors for receiving contracts and approval of fictitious invoices
 - Vendors would inflate costs of materials by more than 1,000% and submit fictitious invoices to support costs. Contracts were for 0% markup on materials
 - Vendors would charge company prevailing wage for workers time and pay workers far less, pocketing the difference
 - Members of facilities management received cash, services on personal homes and gifts
- Loss to the company was approximately \$18 million for overbilling of services
- Vendors and management involved pled guilty to crimes including bribery, grand larceny, and money laundering; sentences ranged from probation to prison terms as well as restitution



Case Example – Vendor Kickback

- Pressure / incentive
 - Living beyond means
 - Requirement to lower costs
- Perceived opportunity
 - Weak internal controls
 - No oversight by management
 - Ignoring of red flags
 - No segregation of duties
- Rationalization
 - No harm, no foul



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




Fraud: Personal Knowledge Scenarios

Example 1

- Business Segment manager
 - Member of acquired company (~ 1 year prior)
 - Recently promoted to job with significant responsibility
 - Highly respected, future potential individual



- Fired and arrested for Fraud
 - Filed travel expense statements that included fictitious expenses
 - Many instances over several years (at current company and before acquisition)



Fraud: Personal Knowledge Scenarios

Example 2

- Regional Supply Chain Manager and his Assistant
 - Long tenure at company
 - Highly respected, feared manager
 - Lead supply chain network of 12+ plants in US, Canada

Fired

- Supposedly: in conjunctions with 1+ persons at plants included family members in part time pay
- Payments for no work

Example 3

- Senior IT Manager
 - Leader of largest project in company just promoted
 - Highly respected, influential leader

Fired and arrested for Fraud

- During large acquisition shared insider information about acquisition with stockbrokers
- Stockbroker along with family members used information to make stock positions
- Stock positions taken were in wrong direction (bet on stock increasing, it tanked)



Fraud: Great Real? Story

'When I was in law school, I learned about an ingenious fraud.



Someone placed an ad in all of the major newspapers on the East Coast. All it said was:

"Friday, March 31, is the last day to send in your dollar. P.O. Box 1234, New York, NY."

Many thousands of people sent in their dollars: they didn't want to miss the deadline.

The perpetrators of the scheme were prosecuted: what was the fraud? The court accepted the idea that the ad made an implicit representation that there was a benefit to be gained or an evil to be avoided by sending in one's dollar, but it was a pretty skinny case.'

Ref: http://www.powerlineblog.com/archives/2015/12/ the-enduring-popularity-of-fraud.php

Fraud: Real World Examples

Class:

- Have you ever been a victim of fraud?
- Do you have evidence of, suspicions of fraud occurring?
- Have you ever been pressured (e.g. by an employer)
 to commit an act that was morally or legally questionable?





Real World Examples – From Class

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
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Business Process Controls

Procure to Pay


Procurement Process



Procurement at GBI



C u s t o m e r s



The Many Flavors of Procurement

What Does Global Bike, Inc. Procure?



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- •
- •
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The Many Flavors of Procurement

- Materials / Raw Materials
- Labor Services
- Other Services
- Leases / Rentals
- Supplies (Office, Maintenance, Production, ...)
- Logistics
- Information Technology
- No PO
- Inter-company vs. 3rd Party
- Acquisitions

Class Exercise

- Small groups Assigned sub-process
 - 1. Vendor Selection and source determination
 - Purchase Order (PO) Processing
 - 3. Goods Receipt
 - 4. Invoice Verification / Payments
- Assignment:
 - List 5 Risks that might exist in assigned sub-process
 - For 1 of the risks define a control to minimize the risk
- 8 Minutes


Report Back



Procure to Pay: Common Risks

- Creation of fictitious vendors, purchase orders and service/good receipt
- Purchases not correctly Authorized
- Delivery address modification
- Import / export control violations
- Inadequate price negotiation
- Quality of goods / services received
- Inventory manipulation
- Modification of vendors payment information
- Records lost / destroyed
- Manipulation of client names and addresses on vouchers / refund
- Price increase in purchase orders (to establish a kickback program)
- Over / under charged workload / hours / costs
- Wrong payments / duplicate payments
- Approval of fictitious travel expenses

Controls: 3-way Match



Procure to Pay: Common Controls

- Segregation of Duties
- Purchasing policies (Written, taught, monitored)
- Contract / PO approvals
- Vendor / source / price Decisions Monitored
- Avoid Advance payments
- Invoices to A/P
- Monitor GR / IR Account
- Return Procedures (written, taught, monitored)
- Supplier / Procurement independence
- PO revisions monitored / controlled
- No PO payments avoided / controlled
- 3-way Match used where possible

Reference

- Checklist: Standards of Internal Control for Purchasing and Ordering (Institute of Finance & Management)
- Checklist: Standards of Internal Control for Supplier Selection (Institute of Finance & Management)

Break Time





Purchase-to-Pay Exercise



- Primary Learning objectives
 - Experience the steps in a typical purchasing transaction
 - See how an ERP system handles typical purchasing transactions
 - Work through the procedures involved in a test of transactions
 - Investigate related application controls in an ERP system
- Secondary learning objectives:
 - See the integration between materials management (MM) and financial accounting (FI) modules of SAP
 - View some basic FI module settings than enable proper system functions



Agenda

- Last Class (Jan 28): Logging On; Steps 1 6
- This Class (Feb 2): Steps 7 14
- Due Feb 5 11:59 PM: Assignment Submission





- Task 7 Create a Purchase Order to Buy the Trading Good
 - Menu: Logistics ➤ Materials Management ➤ Purchasing ➤
 Purchase Order ➤ Create ➤ Vendor/Supplying Plant Known
 - Transaction: **ME21N**
- Task 8 Check Status of Various Accounts
 - Check Inventory: MM Inventory Quantity
 Transaction: MMBE (Stock Overview)
 - Check GL Inventory, GL Cash, GL A/P, GR/IR (Goods Received / Invoice Received):
 Transaction: S_ALR_87012291 (Line Item Journal)
 - Check A/P Vendor sub-ledger:
 - Transaction: **FBL1N** (Vendor line item display)





- Task 9 Receive the Product from the Vendor
 - Menu: Logistics ➤ Materials Management ➤ Inventory Management
 ► Goods Movement ➤ Goods Receipt ➤ For Purchase Order ➤ PO
 Number Known
 - Transaction: **MIGO**
- Task 10 Check Status of Various Accounts
 - See details of Task 8
- Task 11 Receive the Invoice from the Vendor
 - Menu: Logistics ➤ Materials Management ➤ Purchasing ➤ Purchase
 Order ➤ Follow-on Functions ➤ Logistics Invoice Verification
 - Transaction: MIGO





- Task 12 Check Status of Various Accounts
 - See details of Task 8
- Task 13 Make the Payment to the Vendor
 - Menu: Accounting ► Financial Accounting ► Accounts Payable ►
 Document Entry ► Outgoing Payment ► Post
 - Transaction: F-53
- Task 14 Check Status of Various Accounts
 - See details of Task 8
- Task 15 Write down the system-generated journal entries
 - Non-SAP task

Extra Slides

Most Common Fraud Techniques

- Understatement of expenses/liabilities (31%)
- Other techniques such as acquisitions, JVs, netting of amounts (20%)
- Disguised through use of related parties (18%)
- Misappropriated assets (14%)



Asset Misappropriation Fraud Schemes

Category	Description	Examples	% cases
Billing	Causes employer to issue payment by submitting invoices for fictitious goods or services, inflated invoices or invoices for personal purchases	Employee creates a shell company and bills employer for services not actually rendered	26.0 %
Non-Cash	Employee steals or misuses non-cash assets of the organization	Employee steals or misuses non-cash assets of the Organization steals or misuses confidential customer financial information	16.3 %
Revenue Reimburse	Employee makes a claim for reimbursement of fictitious or inflated business expenses	Employee files fraudulent expense report, claiming personal travel, etc.	15.1 %
Skimming	Cash is stolen from an organization before it is recorded on the organization's books and records	Employee accepts payment a customer, but does not record the sale, and instead pockets the money	14.5 %
Check tampering	Person steals his employer's funds by intercepting, forging, or altering a check drawn on one of the organization's bank accounts	Employee steals blank company checks and makes them out to himself or an accomplice	13.4 %
Cash on Hand	Perpetrator misappropriates cash kept on hand at the victim organization's premises	Employee steals cash from a company vault	12.6 %
Cash Larceny	Cash is stolen from an organization <u>after</u> it is recorded on the organization's books / records.	Employee steals cash and checks from daily receipts before they can be deposited in the bank	9.8 %
Payroll	Employee causes his employer to issue a payment by making false claims for compensation	Employee claims overtime for hours not worked or adds ghost employees to the payroll	8.5 %
Cash Register	Person makes false entries on a cash register to conceal fraudulent removal of cash	Employee voids a sale on the cash register and steals the cash	3.0 %

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GREAT! THEY SHOWED US ALL SORTS OF WAYS TO MAKE MONEY.

Reading Assignment Questions:

- ➤ Which of the three factors of the fraud triangle is the one that leads people to perform unethical actions in a company?
- ➤ I confuse how SAP system detects fraud when it sets the authorizations to control the changes. It sounds to simple.
- Managers have power to employ control mechanisms, and auditor has special knowledge to identify control weakness Which one of those are legally responsible if a fraud happens?
- What types of fraud risks are highest priority for an organization?
- ➤ What are some ways to combat collusion among employees within an ERP system, if any?

Reading Assignment Questions:

- ➤ How can SAP processes decrease chance of fraud where we create vendors who are not vendors or someone credits the account for payments that were never actually received?
- Last class noted all purchasing orders cannot be deleted. Is that a preventative control to fraud because fictitious orders cannot be deleted and can be referred to in the future?





- Task 6 Check Status of Various Accounts
 - Check Inventory: MM Inventory Quantity
 Transaction: MMBE (Stock Overview)
 - Check GL Inventory, GL Cash, GL A/P, GR/IR (Goods Received / Invoice Received):
 Transaction: S_ALR_87012291 (Line Item Journal)
 - Check A/P Vendor sub-ledger:
 Transaction: FBL1N (Vendor line item display)