http://www.military.com/daily-news/2017/09/17/navys-most-advanced-subs-will-soon-use-xbox-controllers.html
For anyone who hasn’t worked in or with the military, the government acquisition and stock systems are constantly derided for the huge amount of time and expense added to any purchase. In an effort to combat this, the USS John Warner is going to use the XBOX 360 controllers for periscope controls. The obvious win here is that the Navy now has a cheap supply of replacement parts for when these parts are broken rather than needing to order an entirely new $38k controller.
The dangers to the navy are that 1) The Navy is advertising a specific product they’re using, which means that 2) An adversary could use a bug in the controller driver to compromise Navy machines or 3) an adversary could produce a similar controller with a USB Rubber Ducky or other compromising software inside, and find a way to provide the controller to the ships (either by selling them in stores near the port, or by doing the controller equivalent of dropping a USB flash drive in the parking lot)
Ian – Very interesting article. I think, Navy did a great job by asking the people that operate the systems on a daily basis for their input. It’s definitely a cheaper alternative and more suited for the task but there are defiantly security concerns. Where will the controllers be developed? If, they are developed in China or any other country, isn’t that a security concern? Also, how hard can it be to take control of the system?
The controllers will be COTS: Just normal controllers. The stock system might get them direct from the manufacturer, but if a replacement is needed, a sailor may just buy one in port. (See: Many articles about the sluggishness of the stock system).
As far as impact goes, that all depends on how heavily integrated this system is. Let’s assume (worst case) the attacker gained full control of the periscope system. There are three main scenarios:
1) Periscope System has no external connections: Attacker could either loop footage or just black out the screen/kill the system.
2) Periscope System is attached to machinery controls systems: Data could be collected, or commands could be sent out from the device.
3) Periscope System is attached to ship network: Data could either be exfiltrated if the system was connected to the internet, and could serve as a command and control center.
Unless #3 gives the attacker access to the device via the ship’s network, it is very unlikely that an attacker without sufficient knowledge of the system could do very much.
The controllers will be COTS: Just normal controllers. The stock system might get them direct from the manufacturer, but if a replacement is needed, a sailor may just buy one in port. (See: Many articles about the sluggishness of the stock system).
As far as impact goes, that all depends on how heavily integrated this system is. Let’s assume (worst case) the attacker gained full control of the periscope system. There are three main scenarios:
1) Periscope System has no external connections: Attacker could either loop footage or just black out the screen/kill the system.
2) Periscope System is attached to machinery controls systems: Data could be collected, or commands could be sent out from the device.
3) Periscope System is attached to ship network: Data could either be exfiltrated if the system was connected to the internet, and could serve as a command and control center.
Unless #3 gives the attacker access to the device via the ship’s network, it is very unlikely that an attacker without sufficient knowledge of the system could do very much.