## Unit - #1 MIS5214 – Security Architecture



- Welcome and Introductions
- Course Introduction Goals
- Introductory Terminology
- The Threat Environment
- •Next Week...

## Course Goals – Security Architecture

#### Learn about how organizations

- Align their IT security capabilities with their business goals and strategy
- Plan, design and develop enterprise security architectures
- Assess IT system security architectures and capabilities

#### Objectives


- 1. Learn key Enterprise Security Architecture concepts
- 2. Develop an understanding of contextual, conceptual, logical, component, and physical levels of security architectures and how they relate to one another
- 3. Learn how security architectures are planned, designed and documented
- 4. Gain an overview of how security architectures are evaluated and assessed
- 5. Gain experience working as part of a team, developing and delivering a professional presentation

#### Course Web Site

			Security Architecture 214.004 Spring 2020 David Lanter				
HOMEPAGE INST	TRUCTOR	SYLLABUS	SCHEDULE	DELIVERABLES	HARVARD COURSEPACK	GRADEBOOK	
Welcor	ne to	Secu	rity Arc	hitectu	re	WEEKLY D	DISCUSSIONS
Course						> 01 – Introduction (1)	
enterprise securi	In this course you will study and learn about how organizations plan, design and develop enterprise security architecture, align their IT security capabilities with its business goals and strategy, and assess IT system security architectures and capabilities.					<ul> <li>01 – Threat Environment (2)</li> </ul>	
Objectives						T Fox School TEMPLE UNIVERSIT	ol of Business
2. Develop an levels or se 3. Learn how 4 4. Gain an ove	understand curity archite security arch erview of how ence workin	ing of context ectures and h hitectures are v security arch	ow they relate t planned, desig nitectures are e	l, logical, physical	ited issed		

#### https://community.mis.temple.edu/mis5214sec004spring2020/welcome-to-security-architecture/

#### Instructor



#### Contact Information

Office Hours Wednesdays 1-3 PM, and before and

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after classes and by appointment.

#### DAVID LANTER PhD GISP CISA

Director – Information Technology Auditing and Cyber Security (ITACS) Master of Science program Management Information Systems Fox School of Business, Temple University 209C Speakman Hall 1810 North 13th Street Philadelphia, PA 19122-6083 Phone: +1.215.204.3077 Email: David.Lanter@Temple.edu ABOUT A pioneering inventor of data provenance/lineage metadata and geospatial data management and quality assurance, Prof. Lanter was vice president at CDM Smith where he routinely led teams of software engineers, computer scientists data specialists and subject matter events in defining developing and serving here

assurance, Prof. Lanter was vice president at CDM Smith where he routinely led teams of software engineers, computer scientists, data specialists, and subject matter experts in designing, developing and securing highperformance applications, decision support systems, and enterprise data architectures for public and private sector organizations from the interactional to the municipal level. As research director et Rand McNally, Prof. Lanter led global and domestic data research and development teams, As software design engineer at Microsoft – Prof. Lanter led GeoModeling quality assurance for the firm's geography products, and president of Geographic Designs inc. - where he developed commercial of the shelf and custom artificial intelligence metadata processing capabilities for government agencies, utility and private organizations enabling them to visualize and analyze big datasets and manage quality in their enterprise information systems. As a systems analyzet at Grumman Data Systems he designed a reusable software library for cartographic applications for tactical and strategic systems, cartographic design and production, and applications programming.


#### RECENT PUBLICATIONS

Lanter, D.P. and R. Essinger, 2017, "User Centered Design", in International Encyclopedia of Geography: People, the Earth, Environment and Technology, New York: John Wiley and Sons.

Lanter, D.P., Durden, S., Baker, C., and Dunning, C.M., 2017, "Social Vulnerability eXplorer (SV-X)", in Proceedings of the Coastal Structures & Solutions to Coastal Disasters Joint Conference; Coasts, Oceans, Ports and Rivers Institute (COPRI); American Society of Civil Engineers.

Tullis, J.A., J.D. Cothren, D.P. Lanter, X. Shi, W.F. Limp, R.F. Linck, S.G. Young and T. Alsumaiti, 2016, "Geoprocessing, Workflows, and Provenance", in Remote Sensing Handbook: Remotely Sensed Data Characterization, Classification, and Accuracies, edited by P. Thenkabail, Vol. 1., pp. 401-422, Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press.

#### Syllabus



INSTRUCTOR

SYLLABUS


SCHEDULE

DELIVERABLES


HARVARD COURSEPACK

GRADEBOOK


HOMEPAGE



#### Organization of textbook




# How is this book organized?



MIS 5214 Security Architecture

### Harvard Business Publishing Course Pack




- 1 Reading
- 2 Case Studies

### **Class Schedule**

Unit #	Topics	Date	
1	Introduction	1/15	
1	The Threat Environment	1/15	
2	System Security Plan	1/22	
3	Planning and Policy	1/29	
	Case Study 1 "A High-Performance Computing Cluster		
4	Under Attack: The Titan Incident"	2/5	
	Cryptography		
5	Secure Networks	2/12	
6	Firewalls, Intrusion Detection and Protection Systems	2/19	
7	Mid-Term Exam	2/26	
	Spring Break	3/4	
	Case Study 2 "Cyberattack: The Maersk Global Supply-		
8	Chain Meltdown"	3/11	
	Access Control		
9	Host Hardening	3/18	
10	Application Security	3/25	
11	Data Protection	4/1	
12	Incident and Disaster Response	4/8	
13	Team Project Presentations	4/15	
14	Team Project Presentations	4/22	
15	Final Exam		

## Readings listed under SCHEDULE



**T** Fox School of Business

#### Unit 02 – System Security Plan

Readings

- NIST SP 800-100 "Information Security Handbook: A Guide for Managers", Chapter 10 Risk Management, pp.84-95
- NIST SP 800-18r1 "Guide for Developing Security Plans for Federal Information Systems"
- "FedRAMP System Security Plan (SSP) High Baseline Template"

## Grading

ltem	Weight
Assignments	20%
Participation (in class and online)	20%
Case Studies	20%
Team Project	20%
Exams	20%
	100%

1. One Key Point Taken from Each Assigned Reading

Post one or two sentences of thoughtful analysis about one key point you took from each assigned reading by **midnight Sunday** the week they are due

- 2. One Question You Would Ask Your Fellow Students to Facilitate Discussion
- 3. Problem Solving Assignments

#### Grading - Participation

- 1. Comment on your classmates' discussion questions and/or key points they wrote about taking away from the readings *Contribute at least three (3) substantive posts that include your thoughtful answers to their discussion questions and/or comments on the key points made by your classmates about the readings. Your posting of your three comments is due Tuesday by noon.*
- 2. Post an "In the News" article (link and brief summary)

Be prepared to discuss in class an article you found about a current event in the Information Security arena. An ideal article would be tied thematically to the topic of the week. However, any article you find interesting and would like to share is welcome. The deadline for posting is **Tuesday by noon**.

#### Grading - Case Studie

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IIT071

Journal of Information Technology Teaching Cases (2015) 5, 1-7 © 2015 (ITTC Palgrave Macmillan Al rights reserved 2043-8869/15

pal grave journals.com/litto/

under attack: the Titan incident

Mark-David J McLaughlin<sup>1,2</sup>, W Alec Cram<sup>1</sup>, Janis L Gogan<sup>1</sup>

Correspondence: MDJ McLaughlin, Bentley University, 175 Forest St, Smith Technology Center, Waltham, MA 03452, USA.

A high performance computing cluster

	HOMEPAGE	INSTRUCTOR	SYLLABUS	SCHEDULE	DELIVERABLES	HARVA	RD COURSEPACK	GRADEBO
20					Assignments			
23	Wel	come to	o Secu	rity Arc	Participation			
	Course				Case Studies	6	Case Study 1 – A Performance Cor	
	In this cou	rse you will study	/ and learn abc	ut how organiza	Team Project	2	Cluster Under Att Titan Incident	• • •
Publishing D'Amo	School of Business re-McKim tern University	security archited nd assess IT syst	0	2 1	abilities with its bu capabilities.	isiness ge	Case Study 2 – Cyberattack: The	Maersk
	W19132						Global Supply-Cl Meltdown	nain D
ACK: THE MAERSK GLOBAL SUPPLY-CHAIN 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	or class discussion. The nors may have disguised y any means without the any reproduction rights usiness School Western n. Our goal is to publish Version: 2019-04-10 scheduled to speak trade, energy price hownst to Snabe, an trions of risk. From his slumber by ock on his bedside, wondered. <sup>2</sup> own for the entire	Ca	1.   2. (	, ndivic Group	inalysi lual pre discus liscussi	epai sior		
SNABE be was born in the small Danish commune of Egedal, approximately r but spent his early childhood in Nuuk, a remote outpost in Greenla idot. If was a lonely and isolated existence in a place where it took from the outside world. Returning to Denmark for his high-school solace in the "cold logic" of computers, on which he programmed sin herd," Snabe attended Aarhus University in the late 1980s, where he s his main love continued to be computers, and he secured part-time von technology department. "Mathematics is a lonely enterprise," exi d by three people, including my mother, and she did it out of courtesy s master's degree in 1990, Snabe became a trainee at SAP for IBM bi	and where his father a week or longer to I education was not pple games. <sup>3</sup> tudied mathematical work in the business plained Snabe. "My "" nt SAP, Germany's							

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#### Abstract

Correspon

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Teaching Case

<sup>1</sup>Bentley University, Waltham, USA <sup>2</sup>Cisco Systems, San Jose, USA

At the University of Oslo (UiO), CERT manager Margrete Reaum learned of a network attack on Titan, a high-performance computing cluster that supported research conducted by scientists at CERT and other research institutions across Europe. The case describes the incident response, investigation, and clarification of the information security events that took place. As soon as Raaum learned of the attack, she ordered that the system be disconnected from the Internet to contain the damage. Next, she launched an investigation, which over a few days pieced together logs from previous weeks to identify suspicious activity and locate the attack vector. Reaum hopes to soon return Titan to its prior safe condition. In order to do so, she must decide what tasks still need to be completed to validate the systems and determine if it is safe to reconnect it to the Internet. She must also consider further steps to improve her team's ability to prevent, detect, and respond to similar incidents in the future. This case is designed for an undergraduate or graduate information security (infosec) class that includes students with varied technical and business backgrounds. The case supports discussion of technical and managerial infosec issues in interorganizational systems - a topic that is currently underrepresented in major case collections. Journal of Information Technology Teaching Cases (2015) 5, 1-7. doi:10.1057/jittc.2015.1; published online 17 March 2015

Keywords: information security; incident response; risk management; inter-organizational collaboration; IT governance; high performance computing

n the morning of 12 August, Margrete Raaum, Computing Emergency Response Team (CERT) manager at the University of Oslo (Universitetet i Oslo, UiO), sat down to drink a cup of strong coffee and reflect on the events of the previous two and a half days. Around 5 o clock in the evening on 9 August, Raaum had returned to Norway after attending the annual DefCon security conference in Las Vegas1 with several colleagues. She was drowsy from jet-lag when her phone had rung and an engineer in UiO's research computing operations group told her, 'Um, I think there might have been a break-in on the Titan cluster."

Raaum now thought, "That may have been the understatement of the year,' as she took another sip of coffee. UiO was a member of the Nordic DataGrid Facility (NDGF) of the European Grid Infrastructure (EGI). Titan, a high-performance computing cluster, was a shared resource that supported ophysics research and other scientific initiatives sponsored by NDGF and/or EGL The computational power supplied by

Titan was essential to molecular biology research, DNA sequencing analysis, and petroleum reservoir simulations. Many scientists took advantage of Titan's extensive computational power by writing their own custom applications for their research. Ensuring the security of the Titan cluster was one of Raaum's many responsibilities, and she was well aware of a troubling worldwide trend: cybercriminals frequently broke into various organizations' networks to steal username and password combinations (credentials) and then (capitalizing on the knowledge that many users re-used their passwords on other sites) used the stolen credentials to attack higher value targets. So, instead of catching up on her sleep the evening of 9 August, Margrete Raaum was jolted into com-

mand mode. News of the attack had triggered a maelstrom of international activity as Raaum and her team tried to determine what happened, contain the damage, and plan an orderly return to full operation. At Raaum's direction, the Titan master node

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CYBERATTAC MELTDOWN<sup>1</sup>

David Wesley and Profes authors do not intend to certain names and other

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On June 26, 2017, Ji the next morning or skimmed the partici fluctuations, monetar event unfolding half

That night, while fas an incoming call on which read "4:00 a.m

"We've suffered a company-every sys Maersk, which accou

#### JIM HAGEMANN SN

**VEV** 

Jim Hagemann Snab the Swedish border b was a helicopter pilo receive a message fro easy, but he found sol

A self-described "ner proofs. However, his school's information thesis was only read

Upon receiving his i second-largest company after Siemens.5 In the mid-1990s, Snabe left SAP for IBM, but returned less than two years later after being offered a position as regional manager for SAP's Nordic region. "At that time,

15

#### Grading - Team Projects

By class 4, students will be organized into teams that work together on case studies and on the Team Project

Each team will be responsible for researching, developing and presenting a system security plan (SSP) for a cloud-based enterprise information system

SSP will include technical specifications and diagrams illustrating the logical network architecture and security architecture of an information system

Teams will develop and deliver a 15-minute presentation on the system's security architecture, followed by questioning by the other project teams

Unit #	Team Project Schedule	Due
8	1 <sup>st</sup> Draft System Security Plan (SSP)	3/11
10	2 <sup>nd</sup> Draft SSP	3/25
12	3 <sup>rd</sup> Draft SSP	4/8
13	Presentation of Final Deliverables	4/15
14	Presentation of Final Deliverables	4/22

#### Grading - Exams

Unit #	Exam	Date
7	Mid-Term	2/26
	Final	4/29

## Weekly Cycle

When Actor		Task	Туре
Thursday	Instructor	Post readings & assignment questions	Assignment
Sunday midnight	Student	Post key points, question, (& answers)	Assignment
Sunday midnight	Student	Case study answers	Assignment
Tuesday noon	Student	Post 3 comments and In The News article	Participation
Wednesday	Both of Us	Class meeting	Participation

Agenda

## ✓ Welcome and Introductions

#### ✓ Course Introduction Goals

- Introductory Terminology
- The Threat Environment
- •Next Week...

## Introductory Terminology

#### "Information security" is protection of...

- Confidentiality, integrity, and availability ("CIA") of data and information
- Data, information and information systems from unauthorized...
  - Access, use, disclosure
  - Modification
  - Disruption or destruction

- = Confidentiality
- = Integrity
- = Availability



## Terminology: Security Goals



Confidentiality

Confidentiality means that people cannot read sensitive information, either while it is on a computer or while it is traveling across a network

### Terminology: Security Goals

Integrity



- Integrity means that attackers cannot change or diminish information, either while it is on a computer or while it is traveling across a network
- ➤...if information is changed or diminished, then the receiver can detect the change and possibly restore the data

### Terminology: Security Goals



Availability

People who are authorized to use information are not prevented from doing so

## Terminology: Compromises




- Successful attacks
- Also called incidents
- Also called breaches (not breeches)

### Terminology: Countermeasures

- Tools used to thwart attacks
- Also called safeguards, protections, and controls
- Types of countermeasures
  - Preventative
  - Detective
  - Corrective

#### Threat Environment





Breaches


Figure 3. What tactics are utilized?

#### Threat Environment


2019 Data Breach Investigations Report







Based on "analysis of 41,686 security incidents, of which 2,013 were confirmed data breaches." Security architects think about the interactions among threats, vulnerabilities, impacts and risks



### The Threat Environment

#### NIST SP 800-30r1 "Guide for Conducting Risk Assessments", page 66

Type of Threat Source	Description	Characteristics
ADVERSARIAL - Individual - Outsider - Insider - Trusted Insider - Trusted Insider - Group - Ad hoc - Established - Organization - Competitor - Supplier - Partner - Customer - Nation-State	Individuals, groups, organizations, or states that seek to exploit the organization's dependence on cyber resources (i.e., information in electronic form, information and communications technologies, and the communications and information-handling capabilities provided by those technologies).	Capability, Intent, Targeting
ACCIDENTAL - User - Privileged User/Administrator	Erroneous actions taken by individuals in the course of executing their everyday responsibilities.	Range of effects
STRUCTURAL - Information Technology (IT) Equipment - Storage - Processing - Communications - Display - Sensor - Controller - Environmental Controls - Temperature/Humidity Controls - Temperature/Humidity Controls - Power Supply - Software - Operating System - Networking - General-Purpose Application - Mission-Specific Application	Failures of equipment, environmental controls, or software due to aging, resource depletion, or other circumstances which exceed expected operating parameters.	Range of effects
ENVIRONMENTAL - Natural or man-made disaster - Fire - Flood/Tsunami - Windstorm/Tornado - Hurricane - Earthquake - Bombing - Overrun - Unusual Natural Event (e.g., sunspots) - Infrastructure Failure/Outage - Telecommunications - Electrical Power	Natural disasters and failures of critical infrastructures on which the organization depends, but which are outside the control of the organization. Note: Natural and man-made disasters can also be characterized in terms of their severity and/or duration. However, because the threat source and the threat event are strongly identified, severity and duration can be included in the description of the threat event (e.g., Category 5 hurricane causes extensive damage to the facilities housing mission-critical systems, making those systems unavailable for three weeks).	Range of effects

#### Adversarial (i.e. purposeful) threat sources

Type of Threat Source	Description	Characteristics
ADVERSARIAL - Individual - Outsider - Insider - Trusted Insider - Privileged Insider - Group - Ad hoc - Established - Organization - Competitor - Supplier - Partner - Customer - Nation-State	Individuals, groups, organizations, or states that seek to exploit the organization's dependence on cyber resources (i.e., information in electronic form, information and communications technologies, and the communications and information-handling capabilities provided by those technologies).	Capability, Intent, Targeting

NIST SP 800-30r1 "Guide for Conducting Risk Assessments", page 66

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#### What type of Hacker are you?



"You need to decide if you're going to aspire to safeguarding the common good or settle for pettier goals. Do you want to be a mischievous, criminal hacker or a righteous, powerful defender?

...the best and most intelligent hackers work for the good side. They get to exercise their minds, grow intellectually, and not have to worry about being arrested. They get to work on the forefront of computer security, gain the admiration of their peers, further human advancement in the name of all that is good, and get well paid for it."

Grimes, R. (2017), Hacking the Hacker, John Wiley and Sons

#### Most Hackers Aren't Geniuses



"...readers often assume" bad-guy hackers are super smart, "...because they appear to be practicing some advanced black magic that the rest of the world does not know. In the collective psyche of the world, it's as if 'malicious hacker' and 'super-intelligence' have to go together.

A few are smart, most are average, and some aren't very bright at all, just like the rest of the world. Hackers simply know some facts and processes that other people don't, just like a carpenter, plumber, or electrician."

Grimes, R. (2017), <u>Hacking the Hacker</u>, John Wiley and Sons

#### Defenders are Hackers Plus



"If we do an intellectual comparison alone, the defenders on average are smarter than the attackers. A defender has to know everything a malicious hacker does plus how to stop the attack. And that defense won't work unless it has almost no end-user involvement, works silently behind the scenes, and works perfectly (or almost perfectly) all the time.

Show me a malicious hacker with a particular technique, and I'll show you more defenders that are smarter and better. It's just that the attacker usually gets more press." It's time for equal time for the defender!

Grimes, R. (2017), <u>Hacking the Hacker</u>, John Wiley and Sons

#### Hackers are Special

While not all are super-smart, "they all share a few common traits:"

- Broad intellectual curiosity
- Willingness to try things outside the given interface or boundary
- Not afraid to make their own way
- Usually they are life hackers:
  - Hacking all sorts of things beyond computers
  - Questioning the status quo and exploring all the time
- Most useful trait:
  - Persistence
  - Malicious hackers look for defensive weaknesses
  - Both malicious hackers and defenders are looking for weaknesses, just from opposite sides of the system
  - Both sides participate in an ongoing war with many battles, wins and losses. The most persistent side wins

Grimes, R. (2017), Hacking the Hacker, John Wiley and Sons

MIS 5214 Security Architecture

#### The Secret to Hacking


"If there is a secret to how hackers hack, it's that there is no secret to how they hack. It's a process of learning the right methods and using the right tools for the job.... There isn't even one way to do it. There is, however, a definitive set of steps that describe the larger, encompassing process"

#### **Hacking Methodology Model**

- 1. Information gathering ("reconnaissance")
- 2. Penetration
- 3. Optional: Guaranteeing future easier access
- 4. Internal reconnaissance
- 5. Optional: Movement
- 6. Intended action execution (e.g. data exfiltration)
- 7. Optional: Covering Tracks

Grimes, R. (2017), <u>Hacking the Hacker</u>, John Wiley and Sons

MIS 5214 Security Architecture



#### C2 = Command & Control malware

DoS				
		•		
Loss				
•				
C2				
•				
Misdelivery				
•				
Phishing				
•				
Use of stolen cre	eds			
•				
Ransomware				
•				
Privilege abuse				
•				
Backdoor				
Use of backdoo	r or C2			
Spyware/Keylo	gger			
Pretexting				
Data mishandlin	g			
Adminware				
Adware				
	4094	004	0.04/	4000
% 20%	40%	60%	80%	1009

Phishing				
Use of stolen cre	eds			
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Backdoor				
•				
C2				
•				
Use of backdoor	or C2			
•				
Privilege abuse				
•				
Spyware/Keylog	gger			
•				
Misdelivery				
Capture app dat	a			
Data mishandlin	g			
Adminware				
•				
Publishing error				
Pretexting				
Exploit vuln				
Misconfiguration	ı			
•				
0% 20% Breaches	40%	<sup>60%</sup> 36	80%	100%
Figure 12. Top threat	action varieti		s (n=1,774)	

- 1. Attacker sends spear phishing e-mail
- 2. Victim opens attachment
  - Custom malware is installed

# "Anatomy of an Attack

(MANDIANT, 2015)

- 3. Custom malware communicates to control web site
  - Pulls down additional malware
- 4. Attacker establishes multiple backdoors

#### **Threat landscape**

#### 5. Attacker accesses system

- Dumps account names and passwords from domain controller
- 6. Attacker cracks passwords
  - Has legitimate user accounts to continue attack undetected
- 7. Attacker reconnaissance
  - Identifies and gathers data
- 8. Data collected on staging server
- 9. Data ex-filtrated

MIS 5214 Security Architecture

#### **10. Attacker covers tracts**

- Deletes files
- Can return any time


#### Advanced persistent threats (APT) usually

maintain remote access to target environments for 6-18 months before being detected (i.e. they are persistent)

(Holcomb & Stapf, 2014)

# What is a Vulnerability?

Any unaddressed susceptibility to a physical, technical or administrative information security threat



Your department or agency may require further implementation guidelines

triggered by a threat source.

# Vulnerabilities can be classified by asset class

- Physical examples
  - Buildings in environmental hazard zones (e.g. low floor in flood zone)
  - Unlocked and unprotected doors to data center
  - Unreliable power sources
- Technical examples
  - Hardware susceptibility to humidity, dust, soiling, unprotected storage
  - Software insufficient testing, lack of audit trail, poor or missing user authentication and access control
  - Data unencrypted transfer or storage, lack of backup
  - Network Unprotected communication lines, insecure architecture
- Organizational examples
  - Inadequate screening and recruiting process, lack of security awareness and training
  - Lack of regular audits
  - Lack of security and IT related business continuity plans



http://www.infosightinc.com/collaterals/CVA-PT\_March2016.pdf

#### What is a Risk?

#### A measure of threat

Potential loss resulting from unauthorized:

- Access, use, disclosure
- Modification
- Disruption or destruction

... of an enterprises' information

Can be expresses in **quantitative** and **qualitative** terms

#### Steps in a risk assessment methodology

- 1. What are the business assets ?
- 2. What possible threats put the business assets at risk ?
- 3. Which vulnerabilities and weaknesses may allow a threat to exploit the assets ?
- 4. For each threat, if it materialized, what would be the business impact on the assets ?

Server - Mail				
User Dev - Des	ktop			
•				
Server - Web a	pplication			
•				
Server - Databa	ase			
Media - Docum	ents			
•				
Person - End-u	ser			
•				
User Dev - Lap	top			
÷				
Server - POS c	ontroller			
ł				
User Dev - POS	6 terminal			
Person - Finand	се			
0% 20% Breaches	40%	60%	80%	100%
Figure 25. Top asse	t varieties in b	reaches (n=1.	699)	

### Assessing risk – <u>quantitative method</u>

- 1. Estimate potential losses (SLE)—This step involves determining the single loss expectancy (SLE). SLE is calculated as follows:
  - Single loss expectancy (SLE) = Asset value X Exposure factor

Items to consider when calculating the SLE include the physical destruction or theft of assets, the loss of data, the theft of information, and threats that might cause a delay in processing. The exposure factor is the measure or percent of damage that a realized threat would have on a specific asset.

- 2. Conduct a threat analysis (ARO)—The purpose of a threat analysis is to determine the likelihood of an unwanted event. The goal is to estimate the annual rate of occurrence (ARO). Simply stated, how many times is this expected to happen in one year?
- 3. Determine annual loss expectancy (ALE)—This third and final step of the quantitative assessment seeks to combine the potential loss and rate per year to determine the magnitude of the risk. This is expressed as annual loss expectancy (ALE). ALE is calculated as follows:
  - Annualized loss expectancy (ALE) = Single loss expectancy (SLE) X Annualized rate of occurrence (ARO)

#### Assessing risk – qualitative method

FIPS PUB 199

FEDERAL INFORMATION PROCESSING STANDARDS PUBLICATION

Standards for Security Categorization of Federal Information and Information Systems

Computer Security Division Information Technology Laboratory National Institute of Standards and Technology Gaithersburg, MD 20899-8900

February 2004



U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE Donald L. Evans, Secretary

TECHNOLOGY ADMINISTRATION Phillip J. Bond, Under Secretary for Technology NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY Arden L. Benent, Jr., Director

#### FIPS PUB 199

FEDERAL INFORMATION PROCESSING STANDARDS PUBLICATION

#### Standards for Security Categorization of Federal Information and Information Systems

# **FIPS 199**: Risk assessment based on security objectives and impact ratings

#### FIPS PUB 199

FEDERAL INFORMATION PROCESSING STANDARDS PUBLICATION

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		POTENTIAL IMPACT	
Security Objective	LOW	MODERATE	HIGH
<i>Confidentiality</i> Preserving authorized restrictions on information access and disclosure, including means for protecting personal privacy and proprietary information. [44 U.S.C., SEC. 3542]	The unauthorized disclosure of information could be expected to have a <b>limited</b> adverse effect on organizational operations, organizational assets, or individuals.	The unauthorized disclosure of information could be expected to have a <b>serious</b> adverse effect on organizational operations, organizational assets, or individuals.	The unauthorized disclosure of information could be expected to have a <b>severe or catastrophic</b> adverse effect on organizational operations, organizational assets, or individuals.
<i>Integrity</i> Guarding against improper information modification or destruction, and includes ensuring information non- repudiation and authenticity. [44 U.S.C., SEC. 3542]	The unauthorized modification or destruction of information could be expected to have a <b>limited</b> adverse effect on organizational operations, organizational assets, or individuals.	The unauthorized modification or destruction of information could be expected to have a <b>serious</b> adverse effect on organizational operations, organizational assets, or individuals.	The unauthorized modification or destruction of information could be expected to have a <b>severe or catastrophic</b> adverse effect on organizational operations, organizational assets, or individuals.
<i>Availability</i> Ensuring timely and reliable access to and use of information. [44 U.S.C., SEC. 3542]	The disruption of access to or use of information or an information system could be expected to have a <b>limited</b> adverse effect on organizational operations, organizational assets, or individuals.	The disruption of access to or use of information or an information system could be expected to have a <b>serious</b> adverse effect on organizational operations, organizational assets, or individuals.	The disruption of access to or use of information or an information system could be expected to have a <b>severe or catastrophic</b> adverse effect on organizational operations, organizational assets, or individuals.

### Security Architecture

A comprehensive and rigorous method to plan, design and describe current and desired future structure and behavior of an organization's:

- Business sub-units
- Processes and Personnel
- Information security systems

# ...so they align with the organization's core goals and strategic direction

Wikipedia: <u>https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Enterprise\_information\_security\_architecture</u>

# Security Architecture

"...the art and science of designing and supervising the construction of business systems, usually business information systems, which are:

- Free from danger, damage, etc.
- Free from fear, care, etc.
- In safe custody
- Not likely to fail
- Able to be relied upon
- Safe from attack"

Sherwood et al. (2005) Enterprise Security Architecture: A Business-Driven Approach

#### Defenders must be perfect

"One mistake by the defender essentially renders the whole defense worthless"


...every computer and software program must be patched, every configuration appropriately secure, and every end-user perfectly trained. Or at least that is the goal.

The defender knows that applied defenses may not always work or be applied as instructed, so they create "defense-in-depth" layers."

Grimes, R. (2017), <u>Hacking the Hacker</u>, John Wiley and Sons

# Security Architecture


Thinking about security architecture enables understanding enterprise information systems the way attackers do – as large diverse attack surfaces



https://graquantum.com/blog/cyber-basics-cyber-attack-surface/


# Defense in Depth


- Also known as:
  - Layered Security
  - Castle Approach to Security



Critical

### Enterprise Information and Security Architecture





Sherwood et al. (2005) Enterprise Security Architecture: A Business-Driven Approach

#### Security architecture questions

- 1. What is the system that is/has being/been built?
- 2. What can go wrong with it once it is built?
- 3. What should be done about those things that can go wrong?
- 4. Did you do a good job in your analysis?

Threat Modeling: Designing for Security, Adam Shostack, 2014

# Security architecture framework


- 1. Model the system that is being built, deployed, or changed
- 2. Find threats using that model
- 3. Address (i.e. mitigate/control) the threats
- 4. Validate the mitigations for completeness and effectiveness



Threat Modeling: Designing for Security, Adam Shostack, 2014

## What is the system that is/has being/been built?

- Draw a picture...
- What can go wrong here?




Threat Modeling: Designing for Security, Adam Shostack, 2014


# Draw and identify trust boundaries ("attack surfaces") in the system diagram

...these are found wherever different people can access and control different parts of the system

- Organizational boundaries
- Different physical computers or virtual machines
- Different subsystems
- Different access points or network interfaces
- Almost anywhere there will/should be different privileges




#### What can go wrong? Where are the attack surfaces in this system?




## What can go wrong? Where are the trust boundaries in this system? STRIDE

- Model of threats developed by Microsoft for identifying security architecture threats
- Is a mnemonic for 6 categories of threats:

Threat	Desired property
Spoofing	Authenticity
Tampering	Integrity
Repudiation	Non-repudiability
Information disclosure	Confidentiality
Denial of Service	Availability
Elevation of Privilege	Authorization



- <u>Spoofing</u> is pretending to be something or someone you are not
- Tampering is modifying something you are not supposed to modify
  - E.g. data packets in motion on the network, bits on disk, bits in memory...
- <u>Repudiation</u> means claiming you did not do something (regardless of whether you did or did not)
- Information Disclosure is exposing information to people who are not authorized to see it
- <u>Denial of Service</u> are attacks design to prevent the system's service availability
  - E.g. Crashing it, making it unusably slow, filling all of its storage, ...




- How do you know the web browser is used by the person you expect?
- Is it OK for data to go from one box to the next without being encrypted?
- What happens if someone modified data in the database?

# STRIDE – What can go wrong?

- **Spoofing:** Someone might pretend to be a customer, is there a way to authenticate users?
- Tampering: Can someone tamper with the data in the system's backend?
- **Repudiation:** Any preceding actions might require figuring out what happened
  - Are there system logs? Is the right information being logged? Are the logs protected against tampering?
- Information Disclosure: Can anyone connect to the database and read/write data?
- **Denial of Service:** What happens if 300,000 customers show up a once at the website?
  - What if the system goes down?

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- Elevation of Privileges: Perhaps the web front end is the only place customers should access, but what enforces that?
  - What prevents them from connecting directly to the business logic server, or uploading new code?
  - What controls access to the database? What happens in an employee wants to edit the system files or makes a mistake?



#### Managing threats (i.e. managing risk)

- Avoid
- Accept
- Transfer
- Mitigate

### Readings for next week...

#### Unit 02 – System Security Plan

Readings

- <u>NIST SP 800-100 "Information Security Handbook: A Guide for Managers"</u>, Chapter 10 Risk Management, pp.84-95
- <u>NIST SP 800-18r1 "Guide for Developing Security Plans for Federal Information</u> <u>Systems"</u>
- "FedRAMP System Security Plan (SSP) High Baseline Template"

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#### A useful tool for the course

#### **Microsoft Azure education site**

$\equiv$ Microsoft Azure	Search resources, services, and docs (G+/)	区 <b>1</b> 号 Q 袋	?   tue87168@temple.e TEMPLE UNIVER
Home > Education - Software			
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🞓 Overview	Team Foundation Server Office Integr Productivity Tools     64 b	it	English
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Student FAQ	Visual Studio Enterprise 2017 Developer Tools 64 b	it	Multilanguage
	Visual Studio 2017 for Mac Developer Tools 64 b	it	Multilanguage
	Visual Studio 2019 for Mac Developer Tools 64 b	it	Multilanguage
	Visual Studio Team Foundation Serve Developer Tools 64 b	it	English
	Windows 10 Assessment and Deploy Operating System 64 b	it	English
	Windows 10 Assessment and Deploy Operating System 64 b	it	English
	Windows 10 Education N, Version 18 Operating System 64 b	it	English

#### Questions for next week...

#### One Key Point Taken from Each Assigned Reading -

HOMEPAGE	INSTRUCTOR	SYLLABUS	SCHEDULE	DELIVERABLES	HARVARD COURSEPACK	GRADEBOOK	
	em Security Pl		SCHEDOLL	DELIVERIBLES			DISCUSSION
			Chapte	er 10 "Ri	sk	> 01 - Introduction	
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Post your	thoughtful analy:	sis about one k	ey point you to	ok from this assigr	ed reading.	> 02 – System Sec	unty Plan (
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FILED UNDER: 02 - SYSTEM SECURITY PLAN TAGGED WITH:

Agenda

✓ Welcome and Introductions
 ✓ Course Introduction Goals
 ✓ Introductory Terminology
 ✓ The Threat Environment
 ✓ Next Week...

# Unit - #1

MIS5214 – Security Architecture