Managing Enterprise Cybersecurity MIS 4596

Unit #11

Agenda

- Public Key Infrastructure
- Digital Certificate
- Public key Certificates
- Roles in PKI: Certificate Authority (CA)
- Roles in PKI: Registration Authority (RA)
- PKI Steps
- Chain of Trust
- Root Programs
- Certificate Revocation List (CRL)
- PKI Roles / Workflows...

Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)

Public key cryptography enables entities previously unknown to each other to verify the identity of each other, validate the information being transferred, and securely communicate on an insecure public network

Public key infrastructure

- Enables online activities requiring more trust and proof of identity than simple passwords
- Provides a hierarchy of trust relationships that:
 - Enable knowing a public key really belongs to the person/system you want to communicate with
 - Are necessary for hybrid cryptography
 - Facilitate secure electronic transfer of information for a range of network activities such as e-commerce, internet banking and confidential email

Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)

Is a system for creating, storing, distributing, validating, revoking and managing **digital certificates** used to verify the identity the owner of a public key contained within the certificate

- Assumes
 - Receiver's and Sender's identities can be positively ensured through digital certificates
 - Asymmetric algorithm will automatically carry out the process of key exchange
- Contains components that
 - Identify users
 - Creates and distributes certificates
 - Maintains and revokes certificates
 - Distributes and maintains encryption keys
 - Enables information technologies to communicate and work together to achieve confidentiality, authentication, integrity, and non-repudiation

Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)


Consists of:

- Public key certificates ("digital certificates") are electronic documents used to prove the ownership of public keys
- Roles
 - Certificate Authorities (CA) store, issue and sign the digital certificates
 - Registration Authorities (RA) verify identities of entities requesting their digital certificates be stored at the CA
- Technologies
 - Central directory provides a secure location in which keys are stored and indexed
 - Certificate management system
 - Creates and delivers new certificates to be issued
 - Searches, retrieves and accesses to stored certificates
- Certificate policy states procedures for allowing outsiders to analyze the PKI's trustworthiness

Digital Certificate

One of the most important pieces of a PKI

 Associates a public key with information for uniquely identifying its owner



 X.509 standard defines the format of public key certificates used in many Internet cryptographic protocols for HTTPS for servers & clients, secure email, code signing, digital signatures...

Public Key Certificate

Electronic documents used to prove ownership of a public key

A certificate includes the following common fields:

- Information about the certificate
 - **Serial Number:** Used to uniquely identify the certificate
 - Issuer: Entity that verified the information and signed the certificate
 - Signature Algorithm: The algorithm used to sign the public key certificate
 - **Signature**: A signature of the certificate body by the issuer's private key
- Information about the public key
 - Not Before: Earliest time and date on which the certificate is valid.
 - Not After: Time and date past which the certificate is no longer valid
 - **Key Usage**: Valid cryptographic uses of the certificate's public key, e.g. digital signature validation, key encipherment, and certificate signing
 - Extended Key Usage: Applications the certificate may be used for, e.g. TLS server authentication, email protection, code signing, or electronic signature
- Information about the identity of its owner (called the subject)
 - Subject: Entity a certificate belongs to, e.g. individual, machine, or organization








Figure 3-47 Each certificate has a structure with all the necessary identifying information in it.

Certificate





























https://cryptii.com/

Types of Certificates: Different cryptographic protocols ("applications")

X.509 is a standard of the International Telecommunications Union which defines the format of public key certificates used in many Internet cryptographic protocols, including:

1. Transport Layer Security (TLS/SSL) HTTPS protocol for securely browsing the web Certificate's subject is typically a computer or other device, but may also identify organizations or individuals

- Server certificate
 - A server is required to present a certificate as part of the initial connection setup. A client connecting to that server will validate the certificate by checking that
 - 1. The certificate's subject matches the hostname (i.e. domain name) to which the client is trying to connect
 - 2. The certificate is signed by a trusted certificate authority
- Client certificate (less common than server certificates)
 - Used to authenticate the client connecting to a TLS service (e.g. for access control)
 - Most client certificates contain an email address or personal name rather than a hostname

2. Email encryption certificate

- A certificate's subject is typically a person or organization
- For secure email, senders use an email certificate to discover which public key to use for any given recipient

3. Code signing certificate

 A code signing certificate is used to validate signatures on programs to ensure they were not tampered with during delivery

4. Qualified digital certificate

• A "Qualified digital certificate" identifies an individual for electronic signature purposes

Roles in PKI - Certificate Authority (CA)

Serves as a trusted third party responsible for verifying identities and signing digital certificates of identity ("digital signature") which are exchanged between two parties introducing themselves to each other

Each person wanting to participate in a PKI requires a digital certificate

Digital certificate is a credential containing the public key for that individual along with other identifying information

A CA is a trusted organization (or server) responsible for:

- Issuing (creating and handing) out digital certificates
- Maintaining digital certificates
- Revoking digital certificates

Use of PKI and exchanging digital certificates is intended to block Man-in-the-Middle attacks where 2 users are not working in PKI environment do not truly know the identity of the owners of public keys

Roles in PKI - Certificate Authority (CA)

Each person wanting to participate in a PKI requires a digital certificate

• Digital certificate is a credential containing the public key for that individual, computer or organization along with other identifying information

When a CA signs the certificate, it binds the individual's, computer's or organization' identity to the public key


The CA takes liability for the authenticity of the identity

• Making a CA the "trusted 3rd party" that allows people who have never met to use their public keys to authenticate each other and

communicate in a secure way

Certificate Revocation Information

CA's are also responsible for maintaining up-to-date revocation information about certificates they have issued, indicating when certificates of identity are no longer valid




Roles in PKI – Certificate Authority (CA)

New Certificate Requests

A CA processes requests from people or organizations requesting certificates (called "subscribers")

- 1. Verifies the subscriber's information
- 2. Potentially signs an end-entity certificate based on the subscriber's information



Registration Authority (RA)

When a user needs a new certificate, the user makes a request to the RA RA serves as a broker between the user and the CA, and performs certain certification registration tasks

- Performs the certificate life-cycle management functions
- Establishes and confirms the identity of the individual
 - The RA verifies all the necessary identification information before allowing a request to go to the CA
- Initiates the certification process with the CA for the end user


RA cannot issue certificates

PKI Steps

Suppose: John needs to obtain a digital certificate to participate in PKI

- 1. John requests a digital certificate from a RA
- 2. The RA requests John's identification information
 - E.g. driver's license, address, phone number, email, ...
- 3. RA receives John's information, verifies it, and sends his certificate request to CA
- 4. CA creates a certificate with John's public key and embedded identity information
 - Private/Public key pair is generated on John's machine or by the CA (depends on system configuration)
 - Usually user generates this pair and sends his public key in as part of registration process
 - If CA creates key pair, John's private key needs to be sent to him via secure means

Now John is registered and is able to participate in PKI




Token, Credential = Public Key

PKI Steps

John and Diane decide to communicate securely using PKI...

- 1. John requests Diane's public key form a public directory
- 2. The directory (a.k.a. repository) sends Diane's digital certificate
- 3. John verifies the digital certificate...
 - extracts her public key, uses the public key to encrypt a session key that will be used to encrypt their messages
 - John sends the encrypted session key to Diane
 - John also sends his certificate, containing his public key to Diane
- 4. Diane browser receives John's certificate, <u>looks to see if it</u> <u>trusts the CA</u> that digitally signed the certificate
 - Diane's browser trusts this CA
 - After verifying the certificate, both John and Diane can communicate using encryption



Root certificate

Self-signed certificate used to sign other certificates

Intermediate certificate


- A certificate used to sign other certificates.
- Must be signed by either a root certificate or another intermediate certificate

End-entity ("leaf") certificate


- Cannot be used to sign other certificates
- Include:
 - TLS/SSL server and client certificates
 - Email certificates
 - Code signing certificates
 - Qualified certificates


A PKI is often set up with multiple levels of CAs, for practical reasons:


- There is a top-level CA, called the root, which issues certificates on the keys of lower-level CAs, which in turn certify the user keys
- The system of identity validation still behaves in the same way, but now Diane has to check two certificates to verify John's key





Recall... Temple.edu's certificate...





















To perform its role effectively, a CA needs to have one or more broadly trusted <u>root certificates</u> or intermediate certificates and the corresponding private keys



A CA may achieve broad trust by:

Having its root certificates included in popular software
Obtaining a cross-signature from another CA delegating trust

Or a CA may be trusted within a relatively small community, like a business In which its root certificates are distributed by other mechanisms like Windows Group Policy


Owner's name Owner's public key Issuer's (CA's) name Issuer's signature Owner's public key Issuer's (CA's) name Owner's public key Issuer's reference Issuer's signature Root CA's name Root CA's public key Root CA's signature

Root programs:

- Some major software products contain a list of certificate authorities that are trusted by default
- This makes it easier for end-users to validate certificates, and easier for people or organizations that request certificates to know which certificate authorities can issue a certificate that will be broadly trusted
- This is particularly important in HTTPS, where a web site operator generally wants to get a certificate that is trusted by nearly all potential visitors to their web site

The most influential root programs are:

- Microsoft Root Program
- Apple Root Program
- Mozilla Root Program
- Oracle Java root program
- Adobe Approved Trust List and EUTL root programs (used for document signing)




Root programs:

Browsers generally use the operating system's facilities to decide which certificate authorities are trusted:


- Google Chrome on Windows trusts certificate authorities included in Microsoft Root Program
- Google Chrome on macOS or iOS trusts certificate authorities in Apple Root Program
- Edge and Safari use their respective operating system trust stores as well, but each is only available on a single OS.
- Firefox, in contrast, uses the Mozilla Root Program trust store on all platforms

Microsoft Windows Root Program's Trust Stores

- 1. Run **mmc.exe**
- 2. Select File -> Add/Remove Snap-in
- 3. Select Certificates, click Add
- 4. Select Computer Account, click next, click Finish
- 5. Expand the Certificates node -> Trusted Root Certificate Authorities Store




Microsoft Windows Root Program's Trust Stores



| Issued To | Issued By | Expiration Date | Intended Purposes | Friendly Name | ^ |
|---|--|-------------------------|---|---|---|
| AAA Certificate Services | AAA Certificate Services | 12/31/2028 | Server Authenticatio | Sectigo (AAA) | |
| AddTrust External CA Root | AddTrust External CA Root | 5/30/2020 | Server Authenticatio | Sectigo (AddTrust) | |
| AffirmTrust Commercial | AffirmTrust Commercial | 12/31/2030 | Server Authenticatio | AffirmTrust Commer | |
| Amazon Root CA 1 | Amazon Root CA 1 | 1/16/2038 | Server Authenticatio | Amazon Root CA 1 | |
| ■ Baltimore CyberTrust Root | Baltimore CyberTrust Root | 5/12/2025 | Server Authenticatio | DigiCert Baltimore R | |
| Certum CA | Certum CA | 6/11/2027 | Server Authenticatio | Certum | |
| Certum Trusted Network CA | Certum Trusted Network CA | 12/31/2029 | Server Authenticatio | Certum Trusted Net | |
| Class 3 Public Primary Certificati | Class 3 Public Primary Certification | 8/1/2028 | Server Authenticatio | VeriSign Class 3 Pub | |
| COMODO RSA Certification Aut | COMODO RSA Certification Autho | 1/18/2038 | Server Authenticatio | Sectigo (formerly Co | |
| Copyright (c) 1997 Microsoft Corp. | Copyright (c) 1997 Microsoft Corp. | 12/30/1999 | Time Stamping | Microsoft Timestam | |
| DigiCert Assured ID Root CA | DigiCert Assured ID Root CA | 11/9/2031 | Server Authenticatio | DigiCert | |
| DigiCert Global Root CA | DigiCert Global Root CA | 11/9/2031 | Server Authenticatio | DigiCert | |
| DigiCert Global Root G2 | DigiCert Global Root G2 | 1/15/2038 | Server Authenticatio | DigiCert Global Roo | |
| DigiCert Global Root G3 | DigiCert Global Root G3 | 1/15/2038 | Server Authenticatio | DigiCert Global Roo | |
| DigiCert High Assurance EV Roo | DigiCert High Assurance EV Root CA | 11/9/2031 | Server Authenticatio | DigiCert | |
| DST Root CA X3 | DST Root CA X3 | 9/30/2021 | Secure Email, Server | DST Root CA X3 | |
| Entrust Root Certification Autho | | 11/27/2026 | Server Authenticatio | Entrust | |
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| Equifax Secure Certificate Autho | Equifax Secure Certificate Authority | 8/22/2018 | Secure Email, Server | GeoTrust | |
| GeoTrust Global CA | GeoTrust Global CA | 5/20/2022 | Server Authenticatio | GeoTrust Global CA | н |
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| GlobalSign Root CA | GlobalSign Root CA | 1/28/2028 | Server Authenticatio | GlobalSign Root CA | н |
| Go Daddy Class 2 Certification A | Go Daddy Class 2 Certification Aut | 6/29/2034 | Server Authenticatio | Go Daddy Class 2 C | н |
| Go Daddy Root Certificate Auth | Go Daddy Root Certificate Authori | 12/31/2037 | Server Authenticatio | Go Daddy Root Cert | н |
| GTE CyberTrust Global Root | GTE CyberTrust Global Root | 8/13/2018 | Secure Email, Client | DigiCert Global Root | н |
| □ Hotspot 2.0 Trust Root CA - 03 | Hotspot 2.0 Trust Root CA - 03 | 12/8/2043 | Server Authenticatio | Hotspot 2.0 Trust Ro | н |
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| Microsoft Root Certificate Autho | Microsoft Root Certificate Authorit | 3/22/2036 | <all></all> | Microsoft Root Certi | н |
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| QuoVadis Root CA 2 G3 | QuoVadis Root CA 2 G3 | 1/12/2042 | Server Authenticatio | QuoVadis Root CA 2 | |
| QuoVadis Root Certification Aut | QuoVadis Root Certification Autho | 3/17/2021 | Server Authenticatio | QuoVadis Root Certi | |
| SecureTrust CA | SecureTrust CA | 12/31/2029 | Server Authenticatio | Trustwave | |
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| T-TeleSec GlobalRoot Class 2 | T-TeleSec GlobalRoot Class 2 | 10/1/2033 | Server Authenticatio | T-TeleSec GlobalRo | |
| USERTrust RSA Certification Auth | USERTrust RSA Certification Author | 1/18/2038 | Server Authenticatio | Sectigo | |
| UTN-USERFirst-Object | UTN-USERFirst-Object | 7/9/2019 | Encrypting File Syst | Sectigo (UTN Object) | |
| VeriSign Class 3 Public Primary C | VeriSign Class 3 Public Primary Cert | 7/16/2036 | Server Authenticatio | VeriSign | |
| VeriSign Universal Root Certifica | VeriSign Universal Root Certificatio | 12/1/2037 | <all></all> | <none></none> | |
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Microsoft Windows Root Program's Trust Stores



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|---|--|-------------------------|---|---|---|
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| Certum CA | Certum CA | 6/11/2027 | Server Authenticatio | Certum | |
| Certum Trusted Network CA | Certum Trusted Network CA | 12/31/2029 | Server Authenticatio | Certum Trusted Net | |
| Class 3 Public Primary Certificati | Class 3 Public Primary Certification | 8/1/2028 | Server Authenticatio | VeriSign Class 3 Pub | |
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| Copyright (c) 1997 Microsoft Corp. | Copyright (c) 1997 Microsoft Corp. | 12/30/1999 | Time Stamping | Microsoft Timestam | |
| DigiCert Assured ID Root CA | DigiCert Assured ID Root CA | 11/9/2031 | Server Authenticatio | DigiCert | |
| DigiCert Global Root CA | DigiCert Global Root CA | 11/9/2031 | Server Authenticatio | DigiCert | |
| DigiCert Global Root G2 | DigiCert Global Root G2 | 1/15/2038 | Server Authenticatio | DigiCert Global Roo | |
| DigiCert Global Root G3 | DigiCert Global Root G3 | 1/15/2038 | Server Authenticatio | DigiCert Global Roo | |
| DigiCert High Assurance EV Roo | DigiCert High Assurance EV Root CA | 11/9/2031 | Server Authenticatio | DigiCert | |
| DST Root CA X3 | DST Root CA X3 | 9/30/2021 | Secure Email, Server | DST Root CA X3 | |
| Entrust Root Certification Autho | | 11/27/2026 | Server Authenticatio | Entrust | |
| Entrust Root Certification Autho | | 12/7/2030 | Server Authenticatio | Entrust.net | |
| Entrust.net Certification Authorit | and the same and the same of the same state of t | 7/24/2029 | Server Authenticatio | Entrust (2048) | |
| Equifax Secure Certificate Autho | Equifax Secure Certificate Authority | 8/22/2018 | Secure Email, Server | GeoTrust | |
| GeoTrust Global CA | GeoTrust Global CA | 5/20/2022 | Server Authenticatio | GeoTrust Global CA | н |
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| GlobalSign | GeoTrust Primary Certification Aut | 12/1/2037 | Server Authenticatio | GeoTrust Primary Ce GlobalSign Root CA | н |
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| GlobalSign Root CA | GlobalSign Root CA | 1/28/2028 | Server Authenticatio | GlobalSign Root CA | н |
| Go Daddy Class 2 Certification A | Go Daddy Class 2 Certification Aut | 6/29/2034 | Server Authenticatio | Go Daddy Class 2 C | н |
| Go Daddy Root Certificate Auth | Go Daddy Root Certificate Authori | 12/31/2037 | Server Authenticatio | Go Daddy Root Cert | н |
| GTE CyberTrust Global Root | GTE CyberTrust Global Root | 8/13/2018 | Secure Email, Client | DigiCert Global Root | н |
| □ Hotspot 2.0 Trust Root CA - 03 | Hotspot 2.0 Trust Root CA - 03 | 12/8/2043 | Server Authenticatio | Hotspot 2.0 Trust Ro | н |
| Intel(R) Technology Access | Intel(R) Technology Access | 12/1/2022 | <all></all> | <none></none> | |
| Microsoft Authenticode(tm) Roo | Microsoft Authenticode(tm) Root | 12/31/1999 | Secure Email, Code | Microsoft Authentic | |
| Microsoft ECC Product Root Cert | Microsoft ECC Product Root Certifi | 2/27/2043 | <all></all> | Microsoft ECC Prod | н |
| Microsoft ECC Product Root Cert | Microsoft ECC Product Root Certifi | 2/27/2043 | <all></all> | Microsoft ECC Prod | н |
| Microsoft ECC TS Root Certificat | Microsoft ECC TS Root Certificate | 2/27/2043 | <all></all> | Microsoft ECC TS Ro | н |
| Microsoft Root Authority | Microsoft Root Authority | 12/31/2020 | <all></all> | Microsoft Root Aut | н |
| Microsoft Root Certificate Autho | Microsoft Root Certificate Authority | 5/9/2021 | <all></all> | Microsoft Root Certi | н |
| Microsoft Root Certificate Autho | Microsoft Root Certificate Authorit | 6/23/2035 | <all></all> | Microsoft Root Certi | н |
| Microsoft Root Certificate Autho | Microsoft Root Certificate Authorit | 3/22/2036 | <all></all> | Microsoft Root Certi | н |
| Microsoft Time Stamp Root Cert | Microsoft Time Stamp Root Certifi | 10/22/2039 | <all></all> | Microsoft Time Sta | н |
| NetLock Arany (Class Gold) Főta | NetLock Arany (Class Gold) Főtanú | 12/6/2028 | Server Authenticatio | NetLock Arany (Clas | П |
| NO LIABILITY ACCEPTED, (c)97 Ve | NO LIABILITY ACCEPTED, (c)97 VeriS | 1/7/2004 | Time Stamping | VeriSign Time Stam | |
| QuoVadis Root CA 2 | QuoVadis Root CA 2 | 11/24/2031 | Server Authenticatio | QuoVadis Root CA 2 | |
| QuoVadis Root CA 2 G3 | QuoVadis Root CA 2 G3 | 1/12/2042 | Server Authenticatio | QuoVadis Root CA 2 | |
| QuoVadis Root Certification Aut | QuoVadis Root Certification Autho | 3/17/2021 | Server Authenticatio | QuoVadis Root Certi | |
| SecureTrust CA | SecureTrust CA | 12/31/2029 | Server Authenticatio | Trustwave | |
| Security Communication RootCA1 | The state of the s | 9/29/2023 | Server Authenticatio | SECOM Trust Syste | |
| Starfield Class 2 Certification Aut | | 6/29/2034 | Server Authenticatio | Starfield Class 2 Cert | н |
| Starfield Root Certificate Authori | Symantec Enterprise Mobile Root f | 12/31/2037 3/14/2032 | Server Authenticatio | Starfield Root Certifi <none></none> | н |
| Symantec Enterprise Mobile Ro Thawte Premium Server CA | Thawte Premium Server CA | | Code Signing Server Authenticatio | | н |
| thawte Primary Root CA | thawte Primary Root CA | 12/31/2020 7/16/2036 | Server Authenticatio | thawte | |
| thawte Primary Root CA - G3 | thawte Primary Root CA - G3 | 12/1/2037 | Server Authenticatio | thawte Primary Root | н |
| Thawte Timestamping CA | Thawte Timestamping CA | 12/31/2020 | Time Stamping | Thawte Timestampi | |
| T-TeleSec GlobalRoot Class 2 | T-TeleSec GlobalRoot Class 2 | 10/1/2033 | Server Authenticatio | T-TeleSec GlobalRo | |
| USERTrust RSA Certification Auth | USERTrust RSA Certification Author | 1/18/2038 | Server Authenticatio | Sectigo | |
| UTN-USERFirst-Object | UTN-USERFirst-Object | 7/9/2019 | Encrypting File Syst | Sectigo (UTN Object) | |
| VeriSign Class 3 Public Primary C | VeriSign Class 3 Public Primary Cert | 7/16/2036 | Server Authenticatio | VeriSign | |
| VeriSign Universal Root Certifica | VeriSign Universal Root Certificatio | 12/1/2037 | <all></all> | <none></none> | |
| VeriSign Universal Root Certifica | VeriSign Universal Root Certificatio | 12/1/2037 | Server Authenticatio | VeriSign Universal R | ~ |
| < | <i>a</i> | | | > | |
| | | | | | |

Mac OS X

The root store is in the Keychain.app

- 1. Search Finder (Spotlight) for "keychain"
- 2. Double-click Keychain Access app
- 3. Select "System Roots" in the left-hand pane

Certificate Revocation List (CRL) — in principal

CRL is the mechanism for the CA to let others know that a certificate has become invalid for some reason


A certificate may be revoked because


- The key holder's private key was compromised
- CA discovered the Certificate was issued to the wrong person
- The certificate expired
- The certificate became invalid for other reasons...


The CA handles revocation by putting the revoked certificate's information on a certificate revocation list (CRL)

- The CRL is a list of every certificate that has been revoked
- The CRL is maintained and updated

Microsoft Windows Root Program's Trust Stores







Examples of Browsers Rejecting Revoked Certificates


• Safari: Generic This Connection is Not Private message. If you click the Show Details button and then the view the certificate link, you can confirm that the certificate is, in fact, revoked.

• Chrome: NET::ERR_CERT_REVOKED

Your connection is not private

Attackers might be trying to steal your information from **revoked-ecc-dv.ssl.com** (for example, passwords, messages, or credit cards). <u>Learn more</u>

NET::ERR_CERT_REVOKED



• Edge: ERROR_INTERNET_SEC_CERT_REVOKED (visible after clicking Details link on This site is not secure message).



Certificate Revocation List (CRL) — in practice

CRLs are problematic in many PKI implementations for many reasons

- Either user's browser must check a central CRL to find out if a certificate has been revoked
- …or the CA must continually push out CRL values to clients to ensure they have an updated CRL

By default, web browsers do not check a CRL to ensure that a certificate is not revoked


• So when you are setting up a SSL connection to do e-Commerce over the Internet, you may be relying on a revoked certificate and not know it

Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) is increasingly being used...

- If OCSP is implemented, it works automatically
- OCSP does real-time certificate validation
 - Checks the CRL maintained by the CA
 - Notifies user if certificate is valid, invalid, or unknown
- Publicly trusted CAs (e.g. SSL.com) maintain HTTP servers called OCSP responders
 - OCSP responders sign their responses with the CA's private signing key so browsers can verify that the received revocation status was generated by the actual CA

Example of "invalid" certificate: https://www.iad.gov/nietp/caerequirements.cfm

PKI Roles and Workflows



Token, Credential = Public Key

Basic Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP)

- 1. Alice and Bob have public key certificates issued by Carol, the certificate authority (CA)
- 2. Alice wishes to perform a transaction with Bob and sends him her public key certificate
- 3. Bob, concerned that Alice's public key may have been compromised, creates an 'OCSP request' that contains Alice's certificate serial number and sends it to Carol
- 4. Carol's OCSP responder reads the certificate serial number from Bob's request. The OCSP responder uses the certificate serial number to look up the revocation status of Alice's certificate. The OCSP responder looks in a CA database that Carol maintains. In this scenario, Carol's CA database is the only trusted location where a compromise to Alice's certificate would be recorded
- Carol's OCSP responder confirms that Alice's certificate is still OK, and returns a signed, successful 'OCSP response' to Bob
- 6. Bob cryptographically verifies Carol's signed response. Bob has stored Carol's public key sometime before this transaction. Bob uses Carol's public key to verify Carol's response
- 7. Bob completes the transaction with Alice

Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) – In Practice

Contacting a responder and waiting for a response for every certificate encountered by a browser encounters adds perceptible network overhead, especially in pages containing third-party content stored in remote content-distribution servers

• Amazon calculated that a delay of one second can cost them about \$1.6 billion yearly

This motivated browsers and other client software to implement OCSP checking in soft-fail mode

If an OCSP server cannot be reached or times out while giving its response, browsers consider the certificate valid and proceed with the HTTPS connection anyway

Man-in-the-middle (MITM) attackers can exploit this behavior by blocking all connections to OCSP responders, and then can use a stolen certificate and key pair for a malicious site, regardless of the certificate's revocation status

OCSP Stapling Solution

Servers include (or **staple**) the cached OCSP response in their HTTPS responses alongside the SSL certificate

- This enables browsers before the secure connection is established to verify the CAs signature on the OCSP response and be assured that the certificate has not been revoked
- OCSP stapling enables servers to retrieve cached OCSP responses in non-real-time and remove performance overhead imposed by CRLs and OCSP
- OCSP stapling does not completely solve OCSP's soft-fail security issue, since stapling
 is implemented in the server and browsers cannot know if a server actually supports
 Stapling or not
- OCSP Must-Staple (extension of SSL Certificates: <u>RFC 7633</u>)
 - Mandates OCSP stapling for the certificate
 - If a browser encounters a certificate with this extension that is used without OCSP Stapling, then it will be rejected
 - Enabling OCSP stapling on servers improves security and performance for your web site at the same time

https://www.ssl.com/article/page-load-optimization-ocsp-stapling/

Agenda

- ✓ Public Key Infrastructure
- ✓ Digital Certificate
- ✓ Public key Certificates
- ✓ Roles in PKI: Certificate Authority (CA)
- ✓ Roles in PKI: Registration Authority (RA)
- ✓ PKI Steps
- √ Chain of Trust
- ✓ Root Programs
- ✓ Certificate Revocation List (CRL)
- ✓ PKI Roles / Workflows...