MIS 5206 Protection of Information Assets - Unit #3 -

Risk Evaluation

Agenda

- In The News...
- Categorizing Information for IT Risk Management
- Revisit Risk & Controls of Publicly Shared Geographic Information
- More on Confidentiality: Linked & Linkable PII
- Risk Evaluation
- Risk Management Techniques, a brief review
- Test taking tip
- Quiz

In the News



SEPTEMBER 9, 2023 AT 4:07 PM

(Edit)

Jeff Sullivan MIS 5206 In the news Week 2 Temple University

CPPA publishes new draft regulations addressing AI, risk assessments, cyber audits | Consumer Finance Monitor

I was expecting to keep up with technology being in this program and working in the tech field, but this article goes to show how much you really do need to stay up to date. The California Privacy Protection Agency (CPPA) has drafted two new sets of draft regulations addressing a range of data protection issues. The two foundations responsible for moving this forward are the draft cybersecurity audit regulations and draft risk assessment regulations. This discussion will be brought up in the September 8th meeting. These proposed regulations are" proposed definition of AI that differentiates the technology from automated decision-making and transparency obligations for companies that train AI to be used by consumers or other businesses.

The Draft Cybersecurity Audit regulations also have a high level of modification and actions to other CCPA regulations. Some of those regulations are: Propose new definitions for AI and AI decision making technologies, identify specific processing activities that present a significant risk of harm to customers, and request a risk assessment. Some of those activities include selling or sharing personal info, processing personal information of consumers in publicly accessible places, proposing standards for stakeholders etc.

As you can see it is important to stay up to date on both sides of the AUDIT and Cyber worlds. It also makes me think who in the program could possibly be on one of these boards one day.

https://www.consumerfinancemonitor.com/2023/09/07/cppa-publishes-new-draft-regulations-addressing-ai-risk-assessments-cyber-audits/


Agenda


- ✓ In The News...
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- Test taking tip
- Quiz

Cyber Security Risk Management


Terminology:

- Risk Capacity = "objective magnitude or amount of loss than an enterprise can tolerate without risking its continued existence"
- Risk Appetite "generally reflects a management decision regarding how much risk is desirable"





- Risk appetite is lower than risk capacity
- Actual risk exceeds risk appetite, but
 MIS 52 remainst below risk capacity






Diagram show an unsustainable situation

- Risk appetite is defined by management as a level beyond risk capacity (i.e. management is OK to accept risk and absorb loss)
- Actual risk routinely exceeds risk capacity, despite remaining below risk appetite level most of the time

NIST Cybersecurity Framework


Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification (CMMC) levels

Function Unique Identifier	Function	Category Unique Identifier	Category		
ID	Identify	ID.AM	Asset Management	1	
		ID.BE	Business Environment	1	. = . /=
		ID.GV	Governance	1	LEVEL 2
		ID.RA	Risk Assessment	LEVEL 1	DOCUMENTED
		ID.RM	Risk Management Strategy	PERFORMED	
		ID.SC	Supply Chain Risk Management		2 PROCESSES
PR	Protect	PR.AC	Identity Management and Access Control	0 PROCESSES	Each practice
		PR.AT	Awareness and Training	✓ Select practices are	documented,
			PR.DS	Data Security	documented where
		PR.IP	Information Protection Processes and Procedures	required.	A policy exist
		PR.MA	Maintenance	1	includes all a
		PR.PT	Protective Technology]	
DE	Detect	DE.AE	Anomalies and Events	1	
		DE.CM	Security Continuous Monitoring	1	
		DE.DP	Detection Processes	1	
RS	Respond	RS.RP	Response Planning	1	
		RS.CO	Communications	1	
		RS.AN	Analysis]	L
		RS.MI	Mitigation	Is usea i	to asses.
		RS.IM	Improvements	a a na hili	itu matu
RC	Recover	RC.RP	Recovery Planning	ј саравін	ty matu
		RC.IM	Improvements	capabili improve	mont
		RC.CO	Communications	IIIIpiove	THEIL



Is used to assess an organization's cybersecurity capability maturity level, and recommend steps for improvement

Information inventory, categorization and risk evaluation form the first step in information systems security...



- A holistic and comprehensive risk management process
- Provides a framework for managing risk throughout the information system development lifecycle

Supporting Publications

Control Contro

Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS)

- FIPS 199 Standards for Security Categorization
- FIPS 200 Minimum Security Requirements

Special Publications (SPs)

- SP 800-18 Guide for System Security Plan Development
- SP 800-30 Guide for Conducting Risk Assessments
- SP 800-34 Guide for Contingency Plan development
- SP 800-37 Guide for Applying the Risk Management Framework
- SP 800-39 Managing Information Security Risk
- SP 800-53/53A Security Controls Catalog and Assessment Procedures
- SP 800-60 Mapping Information Types to Security Categories
- SP 800-128 Security-focused Configuration Management
- SP 800-137 Information Security Continuous Monitoring
- Many others for operational and technical implementations

https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-37r1.pdf

Information Categorization is part of Risk Evaluation



Why is data categorization important?

- It focuses attention on the identification and valuation of information assets
- It is the basis for access and other control policies and processes

Where information and IT asset inventory, categorization & risk evaluation fit in information systems security...





NIST Risk Management Framework

Function	Category Unique Identifier	Category					
	ID.AM	Asset Management					
	ID.BE	Business Environment					
Identify	ID.GV	Governance					
	ID.RA	Risk Assessment					
	ID.RM	Risk Management Strategy					
	PR.AC	Access Control					
	PR.AT	Awareness and Training					
Protect	PR.DS	Data Security					
Trotect	PR.IP	Information Protection Processes and Procedures					
	PR.MA	Maintenance					
	PR.PT	Protective Technology					
	DE.AE	Anomalies and Events					
Detect	DE.CM	Security Continuous Monitoring					
	DE.DP	Detection Processes					
	RS.RP	Response Planning					
	RS.CO	Communications					
Respond	RS.AN	Analysis					
	RS.MI	Mitigation					
	RS.IM	Improvements					
	RC.RP	Recovery Planning					
Recover	RC.IM	Improvements					
	RC.CO	Communications					

NIST Cybersecurity Framework


Different views of the NIST Risk Management Framework







A systematic qualitative guide for categorizing information and

information systems...







NIST Special Publication 800-60 Volume I Revision 1

National Institute of Standards and Technology U.S. Department of Commerce Volume I: Guide for Mapping Types of Information and Information Systems to Security Categories

Kevin Stine Rich Kissel William C. Barker Jim Fahlsing Jessica Gulick

INFORMATION SECURITY

Computer Security Division Information Technology Laboratory National Institute of Standards and Technology Gaithersburg, MD 20899-8930

August 2008



U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
Carlos M. Gutierrez, Secretary

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http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-60v1r1.pdf




Figure 2: SP 800-60 Security Categorization Process Execution

2 Broad types of Information and Information Systems

1. Mission-based Information & Information Systems

2. Management and Support Information & Information

Volume I:
Guide for Mapping Types of Information and Information

National Institute of
Standards and Technology
U.S. Department of Commerce
William C. Barker
Jim Fahlsing

NIST Special Publication 800-60 Volume I

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Jessica Gulick

Computer Security Division Information Technology Laboratory National Institute of Standards and Technology Gaithersburg, MD 20899-8930

Systems to Security Categories

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NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY James M. Turner, Deputy Director



Mission-based Information and Information Systems

- 1. Defense and National Security
- **Homeland Security**
- 3. Intelligence Operations
- Disaster Management
- 5. International Affairs and Commerce 18. Federal Correctional Activities
- Natural Resources
- Energy
- **Environmental Management**
- **Economic Development**
- 10. Community and Social Services
- 11. Transportation
- 12. Education
- 13. Workforce Management

- 14. Health
- 15. Income Security
- 16. Law Enforcement
- 17. Litigation and Judicial Activities
- 19. General Sciences and Innovation
- 20. Knowledge Creation and Management
- 21. Regulatory Compliance and Enforcement
- 22. Public Goods Creation and Management
- 23. Federal Financial Assistance
- 24. Credit and Insurance
- 25. Transfers to State/Local Governments
- 26. Direct Services for Citizens

Disaster Management Information Types

Table 4: Mission-Based Information

Mission Areas and Information

D.1 Defense & National Security

Strategic National & Theater Defense Operational Defense Tactical Defense

D.2 Homeland Security

Border and Transportation Security Key Asset and Critical Infrastructure Protection

Catastrophic Defense

Executive Functions of the Executive Office of the President (EOP)

D.3 Intelligence Operations

Intelligence Planning

Intelligence Collection

Intelligence Analysis & Production Intelligence Dissemination

D.4 Disaster Management

Disaster Monitoring and Prediction Disaster Preparedness and Planning Disaster Repair and Restoration Emergency Response

D.S International Atlairs &

Commerce

Foreign Affairs International Development and Humanitarian Aid Global Trade

D.6 Natural Resources

Water Resource Management Conservation, Marine and Land Management

Recreational Resource Management and Tourism

Agricultural Innovation and Services

D.7 Enc

Energy Supply Energy Conservation a Energy Resource Man Energy Production

D.8 Environmenta

Environmental Monito Forecasting

Environmental Remed Pollution Prevention a

D.9 Economic D

Business and Industry Intellectual Property P Financial Sector Overs

Industry Sector Income Stabilization

D.10 Community & Social Services

Homeownership Promotion

Community and Regional Development

Social Services

Postal Services

D.11 Transportation

Ground Transportation

Water Transportation

Air Transportation Space Operations

D.12 Education Elementary, Secondary, and Vocational

Education Higher Education

Cultural and Historic Preservation

Cultural and Historic Exhibition D.13 Workforce Management

Training and Employment Labor Rights Management Worker Safety

D.4 Disaster Management

Disaster Monitoring and Prediction Disaster Preparedness and Planning Disaster Repair and Restoration Emergency Response

Mode of Delivery

D.24 Credit and Insurance

Direct Loans

Loan Guarantees

General Insurance

D.25 Transfers to State/ Local

Governments

Formula Grants

Project/Competitive Grants

Earmarked Grants

State Loans

D.26 Direct Services for Citizens

Military Operations Civilian Operations

D.16 Law Enforcement

Criminal Apprehension

Criminal Investigation and Surveillance

Citizen Protection

Leadership Protection

Property Protection

Substance Control Crime Prevention

Trade Law Enforcement

D.17 Litigation & Judicial Activities

Judicial Hearings

Legal Defense Legal Investigation

Legal Prosecution and Litigation

Resolution Facilitation

D.18 Federal Correctional Activities

Criminal Incarceration Criminal Rehabilitation

D.19 General Sciences & Innovation

Scientific and Technological Research and Innovation

Space Exploration and Innovation

NIST

Guide for Mapping Types of Systems to Security Categories


Rich Kissel William C. Barker

INFORMATION SECURITY



Disaster Management Information System Example

Levees of The Nation •



16

NIST Special Publication 800-60 Volume II

National Institute of Standards and Technology U.S. Department of Commerce Volume II: Appendices to Guide for Mapping Types of Information and Information Systems to Security Categories

Kevin Stine Rich Kissel William C. Barker Annabelle Lee Jim Fahlsing

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James M. Turner, Deputy Director

2. Select Provisional Impact Levels for the identified information system




Figure 2: SP 800-60 Security Categorization Process Execution

NIST Special Publication 800-60 Volume II Revision 1

National Institute of Standards and Technology U.S. Department of Commerce Volume II: Appendices to Guide for Mapping Types of Information and Information Systems to Security Categories

Kevin Stine Rich Kissel William C. Barker Annabelle Lee Jim Fahlsing

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Disaster Management Information Types

APPENDIX D: IMPACT DETERMINATION FOR MISSION-BASED INFORMATION AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS	103
INFORMATION AND INFORMATION SISTEMS	102
D.1 Defense and National Security	107
D.2 Homeland Security	108
D.2.1 Border and Transportation Security Information Type	
D.2.2 Key Asset and Critical Infrastructure Protection Information Type	
D.2.3 Catastrophic Defense Information Type	111
D.2.4 Executive Functions of the Executive Office of the President (EOP) Information	
Туре	112
D.3 Intelligence Operations	113
D.4 Disaster Management	115
D.4.1 Disaster Monitoring and Prediction Information Type	
D.4.2 Disaster Preparedness and Planning Information Type	
D.4.3 Disaster Repair and Restoration Information Type	
D.4.4 Emergency Response Information Type	

Disaster Management Information Impact

D.4 Disaster Management


Disaster management involves the activities required to prepare for, mitigate, respond to, and repair the effects of all physical and humanitarian disasters whether natural or man-made. Compromise of much information associated with any of the missions within the disaster management mission area may seriously impact the security of a broad range of critical infrastructures and key national assets.

A spreadsheet is a useful way to organize datasets to categorize an information system

Information Types	Confidentiality	Integrity	Availability
Disaster Monitoring and Prediction			
Disaster Preparedness and Planning			
Disaster Repair and Restoration			
Emergency Response Information Type			

• <u>NIST SP 800-60 V.2 R1</u> is helpful for determining a preliminary impact level categorization of Disaster Information Types

Disaster Management Information Types



D.4.1 Disaster Monitoring and Prediction Information Type

Disaster monitoring and prediction involves the actions taken to predict when and where a disaster may take place and communicate that information to affected parties. [Some disaster management information occurs in humanitarian aid systems under the International Affairs and Commerce line of business (e.g., State Department disaster preparedness and planning).] The recommended provisional categorization of the disaster monitoring and protection information type follows:

Security Category = {(confidentiality, Low), (integrity, High), (availability, High)}

D.4.2 Disaster Preparedness and Planning Information Type

Disaster preparedness and planning involves the development of response programs to be used in case of a disaster. This involves the development of emergency management programs and activities as well as staffing and equipping regional response centers. The recommended provisional categorization of the disaster preparedness and planning information type follows:

Security Category = {(confidentiality, Low), (integrity, Low), (availability, Low)}


D.4.3 Disaster Repair and Restoration Information Type

Disaster repair and restoration involves the cleanup and restoration activities that take place after a disaster. This involves the cleanup and rebuilding of any homes, buildings, roads, environmental resources, or infrastructure that may be damaged due to a disaster. The recommended provisional categorization of the disaster repair and restoration information type follows:

MIS 5206 Protecting Information Assets

Security Category = {(confidentiality, Low), (integrity, Low), (availability, Low)}

Disaster Management Information Types



D.4.4 Emergency Response Information Type

Emergency Response involves the immediate actions taken to respond to a disaster (e.g., wildfire management). These actions include providing mobile telecommunications, operational support, power generation, search and rescue, and medical life saving actions. Impacts to emergency response information and the information systems that process and store emergency response information could result in negative impacts on cross-jurisdictional coordination within the critical emergency services infrastructure and the general effectiveness of organizations tasked with emergency response missions. The recommended provisional categorization of the emergency response information type follows:

Security Category = {(confidentiality, Low), (integrity, High), (availability, High)}

Can you recall...

 How to determine the Summary Impact Levels for the Disaster Information Types

Disaster Management Information Systems							
				Summary Impact			
Information Types	Confidentiality	Integrity	Availability	Level			
Disaster Monitoring and Prediction	Low	High	High	?			
Disaster Preparedness and Planning	Low	Low	Low	Ş			
Disaster Repair and Restoration	Low	Low	Low				
Emergency Response Information Type	Low	High	High	?			

Can you determine the impact level categorization of an information system based on categorizations of the types of information it contains?

Disaster Management Information Systems						
				Summary		
Information Types	Confidentiality	Integrity	Availability	Impact Level		
Disaster Monitoring and Prediction	Low	High	High	High		
Disaster Preparedness and Planning	Low	Low	Low	Low		
Disaster Repair and Restoration	Low	Low	Low	Low		
Emergency Response Information Type	Low	High	High	High		
Information System Impact Ratings:	?	?	?			

Can you determine the overall security categorization of a Disaster Information System?

				Summary Impact
Information Types	Confidentiality	Integrity	Availability	Level
Disaster Monitoring and Prediction	Low	High	High	High
Disaster Preparedness and Planning	Low	Low	Low	Low
Disaster Repair and Restoration	Low	Low	Low	Low
Emergency Response Information Type	Low	High	High	High
Information System Impact Ratings:	Low	High	High	?

Overall security categorization of a Disaster Information System

Disaster Management Information Systems

				Summary
				Impact
Information Types	Confidentiality	Integrity	Availability	Level
Disaster Monitoring and Prediction	Low	High	High	High
Disaster Preparedness and Planning	Low	Low	Low	Low
Disaster Repair and Restoration	Low	Low	Low	Low
Emergency Response Information Type	Low	High	High	High
Information System Impact Ratings:	Low	High	High	High



National Institute of Standards and Technology U.S. Department of Commerce Volume I: Guide for Mapping Types of Information and Information Systems to Security Categories

Kevin Stine Rich Kissel William C. Barker Jim Fahlsing Jessica Gulick

INFORMATION SECURITY

Computer Security Division Information Technology Laboratory National Institute of Standards and Technology Gaithersburg, MD 20899-8930

August 2008



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Once categorized, select security control baseline for the information system





Figure 2: SP 800-60 Security Categorization Process Execution

Selecting cybersecurity risk controls



NIST Special Publication 800-53 Revision 5

Security and Privacy Controls for Information Systems and Organizations

JOINT TASK FORCE

This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

September 2020

INCLUDES UPDATES AS OF 12-10-2020; SEE PAGE XVII



U.S. Department of Commerce Wilbur L. Ross, Jr., Secretary

National Institute of Standards and Technology Walter Copan, NIST Director and Under Secretary of Commerce for Standards and Technology

FIPS PUB 200

FEDERAL INFORMATION PROCESSING STANDARDS PUBLICATION

Minimum Security Requirements for Federal Information and Information Systems

Computer Security Division Information Technology Laboratory National Institute of Standards and Technology Gaithersburg, MD 20899-8930


March 2006



U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE Carlos M. Gutierrez, Secretary

NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY William Jeffeny, Director

FIPS 199 categorization is used to select among 3 security control baselines of security controls



No. CONTROL NAME Examples CONTROL NAME CONTROL NAME				•	•	•	
Awareness and Training		CONTROL NAME	RITY	INITIA	L CONTROL BASI	ELINES	
AT-1 Security Awareness and Training Policy and P1 AT-1 AT-1 AT-1 AT-2 AT-2 Security Awareness Training P1 AT-2 AT-2 (2) AT-2 (2) AT-2 (2) AT-3 AT-3 AT-3 AT-3 AT-3 AT-3 AT-3 AT-3 AT-3 AT-4 Security Training P1 AT-3 AT-4 AT-4 AT-4 AT-4 AT-4 AT-4 AT-4 AT-5 Withdrawn	NO.	CONTROL NAME		LOW	MOD	HIGH	
Procedures		Awarenes	s and	Training			
AT-3 Role-Based Security Training	AT-1		P1	AT-1	AT-1	AT-1	
AT-4 Security Training Records	AT-2	Security Awareness Training	P1	AT-2	AT-2 (2)	AT-2 (2)	
AU-1	AT-3	Role-Based Security Training	P1	AT-3	AT-3	AT-3	
Audit and Accountability	AT-4	Security Training Records	P3	AT-4	AT-4	AT-4	
AU-1	AT-5	Withdrawn					
Procedures		Audit and	Accou	intability			
AU-3 Content of Audit Records	AU-1		P1	AU-1	AU-1	AU-1	
AU-4 Audit Storage Capacity	AU-2	Audit Events	P1	AU-2	AU-2 (3)	AU-2 (3)	
AU-5 Response to Audit Processing Failures P1 AU-5 AU-6 AU-6 (1) (3) AU-7 (1) AU-7 (1) AU-7 (1) AU-7 (1) AU-7 (1) AU-8 AU-8 AU-8 (1) AU-8 (1) AU-8 AU-8 (1) AU-8 (1) AU-9 AU-9 (1) AU-9 AU-9 (1) AU-8 (1) AU-9 AU-9 (1) AU-8 (1) AU-10 AU-10 Non-repudiation P1 AU-9 AU-9 (1) AU-10 AU-11 AU-11 AU-11 AU-11 AU-11 AU-11 AU-11 AU-12 AU-13 Monitoring for Information Disclosure P0 Not Selected Not Selected Not Selected AU-16 AU-16 Alternate Audit Capability P0 Not Selected Not Selected Not Selected AU-16 AU-16 Au-16 Au-16 Au-16 Au-17 Au-17 Au-17 Au-17 Au-18 Au-18 Au-18 Au-19 Au-19	AU-3	Content of Audit Records	P1	AU-3	AU-3 (1)	AU-3 (1) (2)	
AU-8 Audit Review, Analysis, and Reporting	AU-4	Audit Storage Capacity	P1	AU-4	AU-4	AU-4	
AU-7 Audit Reduction and Report Generation P2 Not Selected AU-7 (1) AU-7 (1)	AU-5	Response to Audit Processing Failures	P1	AU-5	AU-5	AU-5 (1) (2)	
AU-8 Time Stamps	AU-6	Audit Review, Analysis, and Reporting	P1	AU-6	AU-6 (1) (3)		
AU-9 Protection of Audit Information P1 AU-9 AU-9 (4) AU-9 (2) (3) (4)	AU-7	Audit Reduction and Report Generation	P2	Not Selected	AU-7 (1)	AU-7 (1)	
AU-10 Non-repudiation	AU-8	Time Stamps	P1	AU-8	AU-8 (1)	AU-8 (1)	
AU-11 Audit Record Retention P3 AU-11 AU-12 AU-12 AU-12 AU-12 AU-12 AU-12 AU-12 (1) (3) AU-13 Monitoring for Information Disclosure P0 Not Selected Security Authorization All Milestones P3 CA-5 CA-5 CA-5 CA-6 CA-6 CA-6 </td <td>AU-9</td> <td>Protection of Audit Information</td> <td>P1</td> <td>AU-9</td> <td>AU-9 (4)</td> <td>AU-9 (2) (3) (4)</td>	AU-9	Protection of Audit Information	P1	AU-9	AU-9 (4)	AU-9 (2) (3) (4)	
AU-12 Audit Generation P1 AU-12 AU-12 AU-12 AU-12 (1) (3) AU-13 Monitoring for Information Disclosure P0 Not Selected	AU-10	Non-repudiation	P2	Not Selected	Not Selected	AU-10	
AU-13 Monitoring for Information Disclosure P0 Not Selected Not Selected Not Selected AU-14 Session Audit P0 Not Selected Not Selected Not Selected AU-15 Alternate Audit Capability P0 Not Selected Not Selected Not Selected AU-16 Cross-Organizational Auditing P0 Not Selected Not Selected AU-18 Security Assessment and Authorization P1 CA-1 CA-1 CA-2 Security Assessments P2 CA-2 CA-2 (1) (2) CA-3 System Interconnections P1 CA-3 CA-3 (5) CA-3 (5) CA-3 System Interconnections P1 CA-3 CA-3 (5) CA-3 (5) CA-4 Withdrawn CA-5 Plan of Action and Milestones P3 CA-5 CA-5 CA-5 CA-6 Security Authorization P2 CA-6 CA-6 CA-6 CA-7 Configuration Testing P2 CA-7 CA-7 (1)	AU-11	Audit Record Retention	P3	AU-11	AU-11	AU-11	
AU-14 Session Audit	AU-12	Audit Generation	P1	AU-12	AU-12	AU-12 (1) (3)	
AU-15	AU-13	Monitoring for Information Disclosure	P0	Not Selected	Not Selected	Not Selected	
Not Selected Not Selected Not Selected Not Selected Not Selected	AU-14	Session Audit	P0	Not Selected	Not Selected	Not Selected	
Security Assessment and Authorization	AU-15	Alternate Audit Capability	P0	Not Selected	Not Selected	Not Selected	
CA-1 Security Assessment and Authorization Policies and Procedures P1 CA-1 CA-1 CA-1 CA-2 Security Assessments P2 CA-2 CA-2 (1) CA-2 (1) (2) CA-3 System Interconnections P1 CA-3 CA-3 (5) CA-3 (5) CA-4 Withdrawn CA-5 Plan of Action and Milestones P3 CA-5 CA-5 CA-5 CA-6 Security Authorization P2 CA-6 CA-6 CA-6 CA-7 Continuous Monitoring P2 CA-7 CA-7 (1) CA-7 (1) CA-8 Penetration Testing P2 Not Selected Not Selected CA-8 CA-9 Internal System Connections P2 CA-9 CA-9 CA-9 CM-1 Configuration Management P1 CM-1 CM-1 CM-1 CM-2 Baseline Configuration P1 CM-2 CM-2 (1) (3) (7) CM-2 (1) (2) (3) (7) CM-3 Configuration Change Control P1	AU-16	Cross-Organizational Auditing	P0	Not Selected	Not Selected	Not Selected	
Policies and Procedures		Security Assessn	nent ar	nd Authorization			
CA-3 System Interconnections P1 CA-3 CA-3 (5) CA-3 (5) CA-4 Withdrawn CA-5 Plan of Action and Milestones P3 CA-5 CA-5 CA-5 CA-6 Security Authorization P2 CA-6 CA-6 CA-6 CA-7 Continuous Monitoring P2 CA-7 CA-7 (1) CA-7 (1) CA-8 Penetration Testing P2 Not Selected Not Selected CA-8 CA-9 Internal System Connections P2 CA-9 CA-9 CA-9 Configuration Management CM-1 Configuration Management P1 CM-1 CM-1 CM-1 CM-2 Baseline Configuration P1 CM-2 CM-2 (1) (3) (7) CM-2 (1) (2) (3) (7) CM-3 Configuration Change Control P1 Not Selected CM-3 (2) CM-3 (1) (2) CM-4 Security Impact Analysis P2 CM-4 CM-4 CM-4 (1)	CA-1	Security Assessment and Authorization Policies and Procedures	P1	CA-1	CA-1	CA-1	
CA-4 Withdrawn	CA-2	Security Assessments	P2	CA-2	CA-2 (1)	CA-2 (1) (2)	
CA-5 Plan of Action and Milestones P3 CA-5 CA-5 CA-5 CA-6 Security Authorization P2 CA-6 CA-6 CA-6 CA-7 Continuous Monitoring P2 CA-7 CA-7 (1) CA-7 (1) CA-8 Penetration Testing P2 Not Selected Not Selected CA-8 CA-9 Internal System Connections P2 CA-9 CA-9 CA-9 Configuration Management CM-1 CM-1 CM-1 CM-1 CM-2 Baseline Configuration P1 CM-2 CM-2 (1) (3) (7) CM-2 (1) (2) (3) (7) CM-3 Configuration Change Control P1 Not Selected CM-3 (2) CM-3 (1) (2) CM-4 Security Impact Analysis P2 CM-4 CM-4 CM-4 (1)	CA-3	System Interconnections	P1	CA-3	CA-3 (5)	CA-3 (5)	
CA-6 Security Authorization P2 CA-6 CA-6 CA-6 CA-7 Continuous Monitoring P2 CA-7 CA-7 (1) CA-7 (1) CA-8 Penetration Testing P2 Not Selected Not Selected CA-8 CA-9 Internal System Connections P2 CA-9 CA-9 CA-9 Configuration Management CM-1 CM-1 CM-1 CM-1 P1 CM-1 CM-1 CM-1 CM-2 Baseline Configuration P1 CM-2 CM-2 (1) (3) (7) CM-2 (1) (2) (3) (7) CM-3 Configuration Change Control P1 Not Selected CM-3 (2) CM-3 (1) (2) CM-4 Security Impact Analysis P2 CM-4 CM-4 CM-4 (1)	CA-4	Withdrawn					
CA-7 Continuous Monitoring P2 CA-7 CA-7 (1) CA-7 (1) CA-8 Penetration Testing P2 Not Selected Not Selected CA-8 CA-9 Internal System Connections P2 CA-9 CA-9 CA-9 Configuration Management CM-1 CM-1 CM-1 CM-1 CM-2 Baseline Configuration P1 CM-2 CM-2 (1) (3) (7) CM-2 (1) (2) (3) (7) CM-3 Configuration Change Control P1 Not Selected CM-3 (2) CM-3 (1) (2) CM-4 Security Impact Analysis P2 CM-4 CM-4 CM-4 (1)	CA-5	Plan of Action and Milestones	P3	CA-5	CA-5	CA-5	
CA-8 Penetration Testing P2 Not Selected Not Selected CA-8 CA-9 Internal System Connections P2 CA-9 CA-9 CA-9 Configuration Management CM-1 Configuration Management Policy and Procedures P1 CM-1 CM-1 CM-1 CM-2 Baseline Configuration P1 CM-2 CM-2 (1) (3) (7) CM-2 (1) (2) (3) (7) CM-3 Configuration Change Control P1 Not Selected CM-3 (2) CM-3 (1) (2) CM-4 Security Impact Analysis P2 CM-4 CM-4 CM-4 (1)	CA-6	Security Authorization	P2	CA-6	CA-6	CA-6	
CA-9 Internal System Connections P2 CA-9 CA-9 CA-9 Configuration Management CM-1 Configuration Management Policy and Procedures P1 CM-1 CM-1 CM-1 CM-2 Baseline Configuration P1 CM-2 CM-2 (1) (3) (7) CM-2 (1) (2) (3) (7) CM-3 Configuration Change Control P1 Not Selected CM-3 (2) CM-3 (1) (2) CM-4 Security Impact Analysis P2 CM-4 CM-4 CM-4 (1)	CA-7	Continuous Monitoring	P2	CA-7	CA-7 (1)	CA-7 (1)	
Configuration Management CM-1 Configuration Management Policy and Procedures P1 CM-1 CM-1 CM-1 CM-2 Baseline Configuration P1 CM-2 CM-2 (1) (3) (7) CM-2 (1) (2) (3) (7) CM-3 Configuration Change Control P1 Not Selected CM-3 (2) CM-3 (1) (2) CM-4 Security Impact Analysis P2 CM-4 CM-4 CM-4 (1)	CA-8	Penetration Testing	P2	Not Selected	Not Selected	CA-8	
CM-1 Configuration Management Policy and Procedures P1 CM-1 CM-1 CM-1 CM-2 Baseline Configuration P1 CM-2 CM-2 (1) (3) (7) CM-2 (1) (2) (3) (7) CM-3 Configuration Change Control P1 Not Selected CM-3 (2) CM-3 (1) (2) CM-4 Security Impact Analysis P2 CM-4 CM-4 CM-4 (1)	CA-9	Internal System Connections	P2	CA-9	CA-9	CA-9	
Procedures P1 CM-2 CM-2 (1) (3) (7) CM-2 (1) (2) (3) (7) CM-3 Configuration Change Control P1 Not Selected CM-3 (2) CM-3 (1) (2) CM-4 Security Impact Analysis P2 CM-4 CM-4 CM-4 (1)		Configuration Management					
CM-3 Configuration Change Control P1 Not Selected CM-3 (2) CM-3 (1) (2) CM-4 Security Impact Analysis P2 CM-4 CM-4 CM-4 (1)	CM-1		P1	CM-1	CM-1	CM-1	
CM-4 Security Impact Analysis P2 CM-4 CM-4 CM-4 (1)	CM-2	Baseline Configuration	P1	CM-2	CM-2 (1) (3) (7)		
	CM-3	Configuration Change Control	P1	Not Selected	CM-3 (2)	CM-3 (1) (2)	
CM-5 Access Restrictions for Change P1 Not Selected CM-5 CM-5 (1) (2) (3)	CM-4	Security Impact Analysis	P2	CM-4	CM-4	CM-4 (1)	
	CM-5	Access Restrictions for Change	P1	Not Selected	CM-5	CM-5 (1) (2) (3)	

MIS 5206 Protecting Information Assets


Agenda

- ✓ In The News
- ✓ Categorizing Information for IT Risk Management
- Revisit Risk & Controls of Publicly Shared Geographic Information
- More on Confidentiality: Linked & Linkable PII
- Risk Evaluation
- Risk Management Techniques, a brief review
- Test taking tip
- Quiz

Geographic information, for example, is important

Free flow of geographic information between government and public is recognized as essential to the Nation

- Informs public for participation in democratic decision making
- Private businesses reuse the public's investment in government information




Disseminating public geospatial data is central to the missions of many public, private and non-profit organizations

From ESRI Marketing material

Geographic data's role in government

Geographic location is a key element of 80-90% of all governmental data

Data produced with Geographic Information Systems (GIS) are essential to >50% of U.S. domestic economic activities



National Spatial Data Infrastructure

1994 Executive Order instructed Federal Geographic Data Committee (FGDC) to create National Spatial Data Infrastructure (NSDI), and...

- Address \$ billions wasted
 - Redundant collection of undocumented hard to find geospatial data stored in incompatible formats
- Encourage Agencies to stand-up NSDI Clearing House nodes (i.e. websites on Internet)
 - Populated with geospatial data and their descriptive metadata

Andrine Title: Executive Order 12908: Coordinating Geographic Data Access Author: The White House THE WHITE HOUSE Office of the Press Secretary For Immediate Release April 11, 1994 EXECUTIVE ORDER 12906 COORDINATING GEOGRAPHIC DATA ACQUISITION AND ACCESS: THE NATIONAL SPATIAL DATA INFRASTRUCTURE Geographic information is critical to promote economic development, improve our stewardship of natural resources, and protect the environment. Modern technology now permits improved acquisition, distribution, and utilization of geographic (or geospatial) data and mapping. The National Performance Review has recommended that the executive branch develop, in cooperation with State, local, and tribal governments, and the private sector, a coordinated National Spatial Data Infrastructure to support public and private sector applications of geospecial data in such areas as transportation, community development, agriculture, emergency response, environmental management, and information technology, NOW, THEREFORE, by the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America; and to implement the recommendations of the National Performance Review; to advance the soals of the National Information infrastructure, and to avoid wasteful displication of effect and primate effective and economical management of resources by Fisheral, State, local, and tribal governments, it is ordered as follows: Section 1. Definitions (a) "National Spatial Data Infrastructure" ("NSDI") means the technology, policies, standards, and human resources necessary to accurre, process. store, distribute, and improve utilization of geospatial data. (b) "Geospatial data" means information that identifies the geographic location and characteristics of natural or constructed features and boundaries on the earth. This information may be derived from, among other things, remote sensing, magging, and surveying technologies. Statistical data may be included in this definition at the discretion of the collecting agency. (c) The "National Georgatical Data Chearinghouse" means a distributed network of georgatical data producers, managers, and users binked electronically.


Public GIS data are shared and distributed via the Internetbased National Spatial Data Infrastructure




National Spatial Data Infrastructure

Provides a searchable metadata-enabled online clearinghouse for finding, downloading and

resusing GIS datasets





NSDI: A data source for terrorists?


After attacks on USS Cole in 2000 and the 9/11/2001 attacks, attention focused again on protecting critical infrastructure U.S. advisories might seek to attack

... GIS data made available through NSDI websites became recognized as at risk of being exploited by those seeking to attack U.S. major cities and critical infrastructure





RAND Corporation...



1946

The First Satellite Design

More than 11 years before Sputnik, RAND released its first report while still at Douglas Aircraft, Preliminary Design of an Experimental World-Circling Spaceship. At the time, it was the most comprehensive engineering study of the nuts-andbolts realities of a satellite spacecraft.



1948

The JOHNNIAC

When the need for solutions to complex analytic studies outstripped the computing power of the time, RAND decided to build its own computer. Named after mathematician John von Neumann, the JOHNNIAC was one of the first mainframe computers with stored memory.



1954

Selection and Use of Strategic Air Bases

The report by a team led by Albert Wohlstetter shook the foundation of nuclear deterrence policy by shifting the United States from a first-strike to a second-strike posture. It suggested placing air bases closer to the United States and relying on long-range bombers and aerial refueling aircraft, eventually saving the Air Force billions of dollars.



1957

Artificial Intelligence


The first successful Artificial Intelligence program that used Information Processing Languages (IPLs) was developed in RAND's Systems Research Laboratory. IPLs were the precursors of popular contemporary languages such as LISP.



061

The RAND Tablet

The tablet was one of the first devices permitting the input of handwritten text and freehand drawings into a computer. While limited in its capabilities and far too expensive for commercial use, the RAND Tablet nonetheless showed the way for PalmPilots, Tablet PCs, and iPads.



196

Packet Switching: Seed of the Internet

Paul Baran developed a plan for a communication network that would withstand a nuclear attack. This notion of distributed communications, or packet switching, eventually became the foundation of the Internet.



1974

Improving Computer Security

RAND's expertise in defense-related computer security issues was extended to the private sector during the 1970s. Willis Ware chaired a government committee that studied the problems arising from the application of computer technology to record keeping about people. This work guided the DoD computer configurations and eventually became the foundation of the Federal Privacy Act of 1974.

MIS 5206 Protectin

http://www.rand.org/about/history.html

Risks from public geospatial information

In 2003, Director of U.S. National Imagery and Mapping Agency asked RAND Corporation for a:

Framework to "guide public and private decision makers in weighing homeland security implications related to release of geospatial information"

Mapping the Risks

Assessing the Homeland Security Implications of Publicly Available Geospatial Information

JOHN C. BAKER, BETH E. LACHMAN, DAVID R. FRELINGER, KEVIN M. O'CONNELL, ALEXANDER C. HOU, MICHAEL S. TSENG, DAVID ORLETSKY, CHARLES YOST

Prepared for the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency Approved for public release, distribution unlimited



Today the National Imagery and Mapping Agency is called the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency

Risks from public geospatial information

RAND's 2004 deliverable included a survey and analysis of

- 465 programs/offices/initiatives at 30 agencies and departments identified as providing geospatial information to the public
 - 628 public datasets sampled from NSDI Clearinghouse websites
 - 37 (~6%) found to be useful in helping an attacker select a target or plan an attack against a site
 - None were considered so critical that an "attacker could not perform the attack without" them

Conclusions

- Publically available geospatial "information needed for identifying and locating potential targets is widely accessible"
- "...detailed and up-to-date information required for attack planning against a particular target is much less readily available"

RAND's assessment of risks posed by GIS data shared publically over the Internet is focused by 3 "filters"

Framework for Analyzing the Homeland Security Sensitivity of Geospatial Data and Information Sources

Filter	Key Questions for Decisionmakers			
Usefulness	 Is the information useful for target selection or location purposes? 			
	 Is the information useful for attack planning purposes? 			
Uniqueness	 Is the information readily available from other geospatial information sources? 			
	 Is the information available from direct observation or other nongeospatial information types? 			
Societal benefits and costs	 What are the expected security benefits of restricting public access to the source? 			
	 What are the expected societal costs of restricting public access to the source? 			

Federal Geographic Data Committee's risk assessment and control guidelines for...

- Identifying sensitive information contents of geospatial data that pose a risk to security
- Making information security decisions and applying safeguards to sensitive geospatial data contents

"Does knowledge of the location and purpose of a feature as described in the data, have the potential to significantly compromise the security of persons, property, or systems?"

FGDC 2005, based on RAND's 2004 study



Guidelines for Providing Appropriate Access to Geospatial Data in Response to Security Concerns

What is the purpose of the guidelines?

Many public, private, and non-profit organizations originate and publicly disseminate geospatial data. Dissemination is essential to the massions of many organizations and the majority of these data are appropriate for public release. However, a small portion of these data could pose risks to security and may therefore require safeguarding. Although there is not much publicly available geospatial information that is sensitive (Baker and others, 2004, page 123), managers of geospatial information have safeguarded information using different decision procedures and criteria.

The guidelines provide standard procedures to:

- Identify sensitive information content of geospatial data that pose a risk to security.
- Review decisions about sensitive information content during reassessments of safeguards on geospatial data.

Additionally, the guidelines provide a method for balancing security risks and the benefits of geospatial data dissemination. If safeguarding is justified, the guidelines help organizations select appropriate risk-based safeguards that provide access to geospatial data and still protect semistive information content.

The guidelines do not grant any new authority and are to be carried out within existing authorities available to organizations. They apply to geospatial data irrespective of the means of data access or delivery method, or the format.

How are the guidelines organized?

The guidelines provide a procedure consisting of a sequence of decisions (see Figure 1) that an originating organization should make about geospatial data. Each decision is accompanied by related instructions and discussion. The decision sequence is organized using the following rationale:

- I. Do the geospatial data originate in the organization? If not, the organization is instructed to follow the instructions related to safeguarding that accompany the data
- II. If the geospatial data originate in the organization, do the data need to be safeguarded? This decision is
 - Risk to security: Are the data useful for selecting one or more specific potential targets, and/or for planning and executing an attack on a potential target?
 - Uniqueness of information: If the data contain information that pose a security risk, is this sensitive information difficult to observe and not available from open sources?
 - Net benefit of disseminating data: If the sensitive information poses a risk to security and is unique to the geographial data, do the security costs of disseminating the data outweigh the societal benefits of data dissemination?


Safeguarding is justified only for data that contain sensitive information, that are the unique source of the sensitive information, and for which the security risk outweights the societal benefit of dissemination.


- III. If the data need to be safeguarded, what safeguards are justified? The sindelines offer two options:
 - Change the data. Change the data to remove or modify the sensitive information and then make the changed data available without further safeguards. Organizations are advised to review the changed data to ensure that the change(s) dealt effectively with the security concern.


PEDERAL GEOGRAPHIC DATA COMMITTEE

U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, 590 NATIONAL CENTER.
RESTOR VIRGINIA 10092

PHONE: 205-848-3314 FAX: 203-648-5755 ENAIL: fgdc@fgdc.gov








Guidelines for Providing Appropriate Access to Geospatial Data in Response

to Security Concerns

MIS 5206 Protecting Information Assets

Decision Tree for Providing Appropriate Access to Geospatial Data in Response to Security Concerns




...risk assessment...

4. Are these data useful for selecting specific target(s), and/or for planning and executing an attack on a potential target?

"Sensitivity" of geospatial data is based on usefulness to terrorists

Do the data show "choke points to increase effectiveness of an attack?"




...risk assessment...

¥


4. Are these data useful for selecting specific target(s), and/or for planning and executing an attack on a potential target?

"Sensitivity" of geospatial data is based on usefulness to terrorists


Do the data "provide relevant current (real-time, near real-time, or very recent) security-related data" that can help an attacker "find the best way to cause catastrophic failure?"




Assess the risk...



...control/mitigate the risk...



...control/mitigate the confidentiality risk...



...control/mitigate the risk...

If security risks outweigh benefits of releasing the data to the public, agency can choose to safeguard data by:


Modifying data

- Remove or reduce detail in offending data elements
 - either in the attributes, spatial representations, or both



Restricting access to data

 If agency lacks authority to change data, or believes modifying data will undermine its value to the public, then agency can restrict access




...control/mitigate risk...




To remove or reduce detail in offending data elements apply techniques of *Cartographic Generalization*



- 1. Selective Omission
- 2. Simplification
- 3. Combination
- 4. Exaggeration
- 5. Displacement



FIPS 199's and FGDC Guidelines' share a mutual security objective...




Integrity

Guarding against improper information modification or destruction, and includes ensuring information non-repudiation and authenticity.

Availability

Ensuring timely and reliable access to and use of information.




What FIPS 199 security objectives are at risk by implementing the FGDC's Guidelines?

Metadata enables communicating data classification information




2 examples of metadata standards that include security categorization information for geographic datasets





Decision Tree for Providing Appropriate Access to Geospatial Data in Response to Security Concerns



Appendix 2: Documenting Use of the Guidelines in Metadata Accompanying Geospatial Data

This appendix identifies data elements in the "Content Standard for Digital Geospatial Metadata" (Federal Geographic Data Committee, 1998) that are available for documenting the use of the guidelines in the metadata.

Four types of information should be encoded in metadata:
(1) the fact that the geospatial data and metadata were reviewed using the guidelines. (2) decisions that were

If your organization has a formal classification system you also can report the classification level of the geospatial data by category under "Security Information" (element 1.12).


Geospatial metadata can also be subject to safeguarding. To document the details of restrictions on access, use, or dissemination of the metadata:


 Report restrictions on access to the geospatial metadata under "Metadata Access Constraints" (element 7.8).


· Principles of the Principles


3. Document your use of the decision procedure.


Four types of information should be encoded in metadata:
(1) the fact that the geospatial data and metadata were reviewed using the guidelines, (2) decisions that were made, (3) the date of the decisions, and (4) the safeguards (changes to the geospatial data or restrictions on access, use, or dissemination of the geospatial data and metadata) that were applied.















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Communicating risk classification and controls...



Note: Be wary of metadata with undefined or free text domains which block use in automated controls...

1.7 Access Constraints -- restrictions and legal prerequisites for accessing the data set. These include any access constraints applied to assure the protection of privacy or intellectual property, and any special restrictions or limitations on obtaining the data set.

Type: text
Domain: "None" free text
Short Name: accounst

1.8 Use Constraints -- restrictions and legal prerequisites for using the data set after access is granted. These include any use constraints applied to assure the protection of privacy or intellectual property, and any special restrictions or limitations on using the data set.

Type: text

Domain: "None" free text

Short Name: useconst

1.12 Security Information — handling restrictions imposed on the data set because of national security, privacy, or other concerns.

Type: compound Short Name: secinfo

1.12.1 Security Classification System -- name of the classification system.

Type: text

Domain: free text

Short Name: secsys

1.12.2 Security Classification -- name of the handling restrictions on the data set.

Type: text
Domain: "Top secret" "Secret" "Confidential" "Restricted" "Unclassified" "Sensitive"

free text
Short Name: secclass


1.12.3 Security Handling Description -- additional information about the restrictions on handling the data set.

Type: text


Domain: free text

Short Name: sechandl

...security classification for geospatial data...



ISO19115-1 Geospatial metadata standard



Department of Defense' Information Assurance (IA)

...also categorizes information systems and data in terms


of CIA...

Confidentiality Levels

LEVEL	DEFINITION				
High	Classified Information				
Medium	Sensitive Information, Not Cleared for Public Release				
Basic	Information Cleared for Public Release				

Mission Assurance Categories

 MAC I – vital to operational readiness or mission effectiveness of deployed or contingency forces. Loss of integrity or availability unacceptable. Requires most stringent protective measures.



 MAC III – necessary to conduct of day-to-day business. <u>Protection</u> <u>commensurate with commercial</u> <u>best practices</u>.



NUMBER 8580.1 July 9, 2004

ASD(NII)

SUBJECT: Information Assurance (IA) in the Defense Acquisition System

References: (a) Chapter 25 of title 40, United States Code

- (b) DoD Directive 8500.1, "Information Assurance," October 24, 2002
- (c) DoD Instruction 8500.2, "Information Assurance (IA) Implementation," February 6, 2003
- (d) DoD Directive 5000.1, "The Defense Acquisition System," May 12, 2003
- (e) through (k), see enclosure 1

1. PURPOSE

This Instruction:

- 1.1. Implements policy, assigns responsibilities, and prescribes procedures under references (a), (b), and (c) necessary to integrate information assurance (IA) into the Defense Acquisition System described in reference (d) and DoD Instruction 5000.2 (reference (e)).
- 1.2. Describes required and recommended levels of IA activities relative to the acquisition of systems and services.
- 1.3. Describes the essential elements of an Acquisition IA Strategy, its applicability, and prescribes an Acquisition IA Strategy submission and review process.

2. APPLICABILITY AND SCOPE

This Instruction:

2.1. Applies to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Military Departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Office of the


Agenda

- ✓ In The News
- ✓ Categorizing Information for IT Risk Management
- ✓ Revisit Risk & Controls of Publicly Shared Geographic Information
- More on Confidentiality: Linked & Linkable PII
- Risk Evaluation
- Risk Management Techniques, a brief review
- Test taking tip
- Quiz

NIST SP 800-122 – Guide to Protecting Confidentiality of PII

- Specifically focused on:
 - Identifying PII
 - Determining PII confidentiality impact level needed to supplement the FIPS 199 confidentiality impact

level of an information system




Personally Identifiable Information (PII)

Any information about an individual maintained by an agency, including:

- 1. Any information that can be used to distinguish (i.e. identify) or trace an individual's identity, such as:
 - Name
 - Identifying number
 - Address
 - Asset identifier
 - Telephone number
 - Personal characteristics
 - Personally owned property identifiers

- 2. Any other information that is <u>linked</u> or <u>linkable</u> to the identifiers listed in #1:
 - Date of birth
 - Place of birth
 - Race
 - Religion
 - Weight
 - Geographic indicators
 - Medical information
 - Educational information
 - Financial information
 - Employment information
 - ..

Linked information



Linkable information

Property ("Parcel") Data Table

Shape	ID	PIN	Area	Addr	Code
	1	334-1626-001	7,342	341 Cherry Ct.	SFR
	2	334-1626-002	8,020	343 Cherry Ct.	UND
	3	334-1626-003	10,031	345 Cherry Ct.	SFR
	4	334-1626-004	9,254	347 Cherry Ct.	SFR =
	5	334-1626-005	8,856	348 Cherry Ct.	UND
	6	334-1626-006	9,975	346 Cherry Ct.	SFR
	7	334-1626-007	8,230	344 Cherry Ct.	SFR
	8	334-1626-008	8,645	342 Cherry Ct.	SFR

PIN ("Property Identity
Number") is a common
identifying attribute that
can serve as a "foreign
key" to link the data tables
together

Owner Tax Data Table

PIN	Owner	Acq.Date	Assessed	TaxStat
334-1626-001	G. Hall	1995/10/20	\$115,500.00	02
334-1626-002	H. L Holmes	1993/10/06	\$24,375.00	01
334-1626-003	W. Rodgers	1980/09/24	\$175,500.00	02
334-1626-004	J. Williamson	1974/09/20	\$135,750.00	02
334-1626-005	P. Goodman	1966/06/06	\$30,350.00	02
334-1626-006	K. Staley	1942/10/24	\$120,750.00	02
334-1626-007	J. Dormandy	1996/01/27	\$110,650.00	01
334-1626-008	S. Gooley	2000/05/31	\$145,750.00	02

Is this PII?

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
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Risk Evaluation

MIS 5206 Protecti



Risk evaluation is the process of identifying risk scenarios and describing their potential business impact

Risk Evaluation - Key Components



Collect Data Identify relevant data to enable effective IT-related risk identification, analysis and reporting

Analyze Risk Develop useful information to support risk decisions that take into account the business impact of risk factors


Maintain Risk Profile Maintain and up-to-date and complete inventory of known risks and attributes as understood in the context of IT controls and business processes

Risk Evaluation - Collect Data (RE-1)

 Goal: Ensure IT-related risks are identified, analyzed and presented in business terms

Metrics:


- # of loss events with key characteristics not captured or measured
- Degree to which collected data support
 - Visibility and understanding of the threat landscape
 - Analyzing scenarios and reporting trends
 - Visibility and understanding of the control state





Risk Evaluation - Collect Data (RE1)


- Existence of a documented risk data collection model
 - —# of data sources
 - -# of data items with identified risk factors
 - Completeness of
 - Risk event data
 - Affected assets
 - Impact data
 - Threats
 - Controls
 - Measures of the effectiveness of controls
 - Historical data on risk factors



Risk Evaluation - Collect Data: Governance Roles

RACI Chart Key Activities	Roles	Air. 23	\	0,0	Co ₀	Site	Busing Risk Com	Busin Managam	Pist C Pocess Q.	HP Function	Competione and Audit
RE1.1 Establish and maintain a model for data collection.	1	1	A/R	C	С	C	С	C	С		С
RE1.2 Collect data on the operating environment.		1	A/R	С	Ī		С				С
RE1.3 Collect data on risk events.		I	Α	R	С	Ī		С	С		I
RE1.4 Identify risk factors.			A	R	I	1	С	С	R	C	С

A RACI chart identifies who is Responsible, Accountable, Consulted and/or Informed.



Risk Evaluation - Key Components



Collect Data Identify relevant data to enable effective IT-related risk identification, analysis and reporting

Analyze Risk Develop useful information to support risk decisions that take into account the business impact of risk factors

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The City of New York

CITYWIDE INFORMATION SECURITY POLICY

Data Classification Policy

The Policy

The Agency head or designee has responsibility for ensuring agency information assets are appropriately categorized and the appropriate degree of protection is applied based on its valuation.

Background

To ensure that business information assets receive an appropriate level of protection, the value of the information must be assessed to determine the requirements for security protection. Business information assets are those that affect and are integral to the City's ability to provide business services with integrity, comply with laws and regulations, and meet public trust.

Scope

This policy applies to all information written, stored electronically, copied New York general business, inform customers.

Information Classification

All information at the City of New Yo four levels; public, sensitive, private

- Public—This information mig damage.
- Sensitive—This information re inappropriate disclosure.
- Private—This information is to public trust placed in the agent
- Confidential—This is the hig damage to the agency's abilit containing information whose danger to public safety, or lea

Information Valuation and Categorization

- Ensure that business information assets receive an appropriate level of protection.
 The value of the information must be assessed to determine the requirements for security protection.
- All information assets must be valued and categorized.
- Information assets must be evaluated, valued and categorized by the Data Steward on a regular basis.
- 4) To ensure that appropriate protection is provided, the value of information should be determined before transmission over any communications network.

Information Valuation and Categorization


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Updated September 9, 2014 Version 1.5

Question:

How to approach prioritizing an enterprise's data for protection?

Let's set up an information security categorization for an example: Health Catalyst's product line data



Determine the overall information security categorization of the different datasets



Datasets	Confidentiality	Integrity	Availability	"Overall" Impact Rating
Financial Management				
Accountable Care				
Population Health Management				
Operational and Workflow Improvement				
Patient Injury Prevention				

Remember the application of FIPS 199 to derive overall categorization of the Dean's laptop:

Synonyms: impact rating, security categorization, ...

Impact to Categorization Confidentiality Availability Asset Staff Salary Data High Medium Low High Student Data High Low Low High **Fundraising** Medium Medium High High **Presentations** Dean's Personal Low Medium Low Medium Data

MIS 5206 Protecting Information Assets

How can you find a way to transform the ordinal FIPS 199 impact ratings to ratio data to conduct a quantitative risk analysis?

Datasets	Impact	Likelihood	Risk
Financial Management	High	High	?
Accountable Care	High	Moderate	?
Population Health Management	Moderate	Moderate	?
Operational and Workflow Improvement	Low	Moderate	?
Patient Injury Prevention	Low	Low	?

Analyze risk to prioritize protection

An authoritative lookup table for transforming ordinal to ratio risk data...

Likelihood RSK Impact	,	Impact	
Threat Likelihood	Low (10)	Moderate (50)	High (100)
High (1.0)	10 x 1.0 = 10	50 x 1.0 = 50	100 x 1.0 = 100
Moderate (0.5)	10 x 0.5 = 5	50 x 0.5 = 25	100 x 0.5 = 50
Low (0.1)	10 x 0.1 = 1	50 x 0.1 = 5	100 x 0.1 = 10

Risk Scale: High (>50 to 100)

Moderate (>10 to 50)

Low (1 to 10)

NIST SP 800-100 "Information Security Handbook: A Guide for Managers", page 90 found via SCHEDULE menu item in MIS Community site

01527a

Analyze risk to prioritize protection

Likelihood RSK Impact		Impact	
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Risk Scale: High (>50 to 100)

Moderate (>10 to 50)

Low (1 to 10)

01527a

Transforming ordinal risk rankings to interval risk measures

Datasets	Impact	Likelihood	Risk
Financial Management	High	High	?
Accountable Care	High	Moderate	?
Population Health Management	Moderate	Moderate	?
Operational and Workflow Improvement	Low	Moderate	?
Patient Injury Prevention	Low	Low	?

Datasets	Impact	Likelihood	Risk
Financial Management	100	1.0	100
Accountable Care	100	0.5	50
Population Health Management	50	0.5	25
Operational and Workflow Improvement	10	0.5	5
Patient Injury Prevention	10	0.1	1



The City of New York

CITYWIDE INFORMATION SECURITY POLICY

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- 4) To ensure that appropriate protection is provided, the value of information should be determined before transmission over any communications network.
- Public—This information might not need to be disclosed, but if it is, it shouldn't cause any damage.
- Sensitive—This information requires a greater level of protection to prevent loss of inappropriate disclosure.
- Private—This information is for agency use only, and its disclosure would damage the
 public trust placed in the agency.
- Confidential—This is the highest level of sensitivity, and disclosure could cause extreme
 damage to the agency's ability to perform its primary business function. Datasets
 containing information whose disclosure could lead directly to massive financial loss,
 danger to public safety, or lead to loss of life is classified as confidential.

Information Valuation and Categorization

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How do you assess the value of information to an organization?

MIS 5206 Pro

Updated September 9, 2014 Version 1.5

Data Classification Policy

PUBLIC Use pursuant to City of New York guidelines

Quantitative Risk Assessment

Expected losses can be weighed against the costs of counter-measures and provides a basis for trading Information Security ("InfoSec") costs and benefits

 One simple assessment technique calculates the annual loss expectancy (ALE) as a product of the cost of a single event (single loss expectancy, SLE) and the annualized rate of occurrence (ARO)

```
Annual Loss Expectancy = Single Loss Expectancy × Annualized Rate of Occurrence annual rate of occurrence (ARO)= how many times is this expected to happen in one year?
```

 NOTE: The calculation assumes total loss of an asset. If an asset retains part of its useful value, the SLE should be adjusted by an appropriate amount.

Single loss expectancy (SLE) = Asset value X Exposure factor

Problem

How would you determine the Annual Loss Expectance (ALE) for the theft of the Dean's laptop from the Case Study 'Snowfall and a stolen laptop'?

Annual Loss Expectancy Calculation example

Annual Loss Expectancy Calculation

Note the assumptions of:

- Credit monitoring service for 1,000 individuals
- 5% probability of annual rate of occurrence

greatly influence the results...

Annual Loss Expectancy Calculation Credit Monitoring Service (1000 records):	\$15,000
Dean's Lost Productivity (assume \$300,000 salary): 10 hours restoring data from various sources 10 hours re-doing lost work	\$ 3,000 \$ 3,000
Replacement Device: IT investigation:	\$ 1,000 \$ 200
Single Loss Expectancy:	\$22,200
Annualized Rate of Occurrence: 0.05 Annual Loss Expectancy:	\$ 1,100


Risk management decision

Decision:

- Mitigate expected loss of a dean's laptop through purchase of security countermeasures
 - Avoid
 - Accept
 - Transfer
 - ✓ Mitigate

Annual Loss Expectancy Calculation Credit Monitoring Service (1000 records): Dean's Lost Productivity (assume \$300,000 salary):	\$15,000
10 hours restoring data from various sources 10 hours re-doing lost work Replacement Device: IT investigation: Single Loss Expectancy:	\$ 3,000 \$ 3,000 \$ 1,000 \$ 200 \$22,200
Annualized Rate of Occurrence: 0.05 Annual Loss Expectancy:	\$ 1,110
Annual Cost of Countermeasures (per device) Automatic Backups: Managed Device Service: Annual Cost of Countermeasures:	\$ 300 \$ 100 \$ 400


Analyze Risk



A RACI chart identifies who is Responsible, Accountable, Consulted and/or Informed.

But... who really knows the value and impact a breach implies for the business?







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Scope

This policy applies to all information. Information is defined as anything spoken, overheard, written, stored electronically, copied, transmitted or held intellectually concerning the City of New York general business, information systems, employees, business partners, or customers.

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The City of New York

CITYWIDE INFORMATION SECURITY POLICY

Data Steward

- 5) The Data Steward is normally someone who is responsible for or dependent on the business process associated with the information asset, and who is knowledgeable about how the information is acquired, transmitted, stored, deleted, and otherwise processed.
- 6) The Data Steward is responsible for determining the appropriate value and categorization of the information generated by the owner or the Agency.
- The Data Steward must communicate the information value and categorization when the information is released or provided to another entity.
- 8) The Data Steward is responsible for controlling access to his/her information and must be consulted when other entities wish to extend access authority.

The City of New York

CITYWIDE INFORMATION SECURITY POLICY

Data Steward

Information

Technology &

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Updated September 9, 2014 Version 1.5


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
Data Classification Policy

Page 1 of 3


MIS 5206 Protect

Where are the people who really know the value of the information and impact a breach implies for the business?





Maintain Risk Profile



A RACI chart identifies who is Responsible, Accountable, Consulted and/or Informed.



The City of New York

CITYWIDE INFORMATION SECURITY POLICY


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
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Review: Risk Management Techniques

Once threats and risks are identified, each risk can be managed by:

- 1. Avoidance
- 2. Acceptance
- 3. Transfer
- 4. Mitigation ("Controls")





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- Eliminate any "probably wrong" answers first -

Focus on the "highest likelihood" answers for test taking efficiency

Here's why:

- Some of the answers use unfamiliar terms and stand out as unlikely and can therefore be discarded immediately
- Some answers are clearly wrong and you can recognize them based on your familiarity with the subject
- The correct answer may require a careful reading of the wording of the question and eliminating the unlikely answers early in the evaluation process helps you focus on key concepts for making the choice

Example:

The promotion manager of Northeast Electronics has been made the owner of the department's printers and other resources. The manager can now designate who in the department can use the large format printer. What term is used to describe this type of access control?

- A. Mandatory
- B. Role-Based
- C. Discretionary
- D. Distributed



Example:

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A. Mandatory

Nothing seems mandatory about this scenario

- B. Role-Based
- C. Discretionary
- D. Distributed



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- A. Mandatory
- B. Role-Based

Nothing about roles other than manager in the question

- C. Discretionary
- D. Distributed



Example:

The promotion manager of Northeast Electronics has been made the owner of the department's printers and other resources. The manager can now designate who in the department can use the large format printer. What term is used to describe this type of access control?

- A. Mandatory
- B. Role-Based
- C. Discretionary
- D. Distributed Distributed is not relevant to the information in the question



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Answer: C

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An entitlement is a provision made in accordance with a legal framework of a society. Typically, entitlements are based on concepts of principle which are themselves based in concepts of social equality or enfranchisement. Wikipedia

A risk analysis should:

- A. limit the scope to a benchmark of similar companies
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Quiz – Bonus question

A year ago when Sam carried out a risk analysis, he determined that the company was at too much of a risk when it came to potentially loosing trade secrets.

The countermeasures his team implemented reduced this risk, and Sam determined that the annualized loss expectancy of the risk of a trade secret being stolen once in a hundred-year period is now \$400.

What is the associated single loss expectancy value in this scenario?

Agenda

- ✓ In The News
- ✓ Categorizing Information for IT Risk Management
- ✓ Revisit Risk & Controls of Publicly Shared Geographic Information
- ✓ More on Confidentiality: Linked & Linkable PII
- ✓ Risk Evaluation
- ✓ Risk Management Techniques, a brief review
- ✓ Test taking tip
- ✓ Quiz