

# Web Application Security ☐ First (and nearly only) Rule Never Trust User Input

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### Where Do We Start ☐ For web application security and web application penetration testing Owasp.org Misszilou 5

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### **OWASP**

- OWASP stands for the Open Web Application Security Project
- Founded in 2001 as a charitable organization dedicated to improving Web Application Security
- Creators and publishers of the OWASP top 10
- Hosts numerous Web App tools and projects

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## OWASP tools Documentation Software ZAP: Zed Attack Proxy Web Testing Environment Juice Shop Cheat sheets


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### OWASP Juice Shop Deliberately insecure web app Demonstrates the flaws of the Top 10 and more Can be reconfigured for custom purpose

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### Tools for reconnaissance and attack Google Chrome Tamper Chrome Postman and Postman Interceptor Developer Tools Mozilla Firefox Tamper Data for FF Quantum Web Developer Tools

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# A01:2021 - Broken Access Control Access control enforces policy such that users cannot act outside of their intended permissions. Failures typically lead to unauthorized information disclosure, modification, or destruction of all data or performing a business function outside the user's limits.

### A01:2021 - Broken Access **Control Mitigation**

- Deny access to resources by default
  Access controls specific to user and group rather than
  simply allowing logged-in users equal access
  Model access controls should enforce record ownership
  rather than accepting that the user can create, read,
  update, or delete any record.
  Log access control failures, alert admins when appropriate
  (e.g., repeated failures).
  Rate limit API and controller access to minimize the harm
  from automated attack tooling.

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### A02-2021: Cryptographic Failures

The first thing is to determine the protection needs of data in transit and at rest. For example, passwords, credit card numbers, health records, personal information, and business secrets require extra protection.

Is any data transmitted in clear text?

- Are any old or weak cryptographic algorithms or protocols used either by default or in older code?
- Are default crypto keys in use, weak crypto keys generated or re-used, or is proper key management or rotation missing? Are crypto keys checked into source code repositories?

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### A02:2021 - Cryptographic Failures Mitigation

- Classify data processed, stored, or transmitted by an application. Identify which data is sensitive according to privacy laws, regulatory requirements, or business needs.
- Don't store sensitive data unnecessarily. Discard it as soon as possible or use PCI DSS compliant tokenization or even truncation. Data that is not retained cannot be stolen.
- Make sure to encrypt all sensitive data at rest.
- Ensure up-to-date and strong standard algorithms, protocols, and keys are in place; use proper key management.

### A03:2021 - Injection Unvalidated input, which contains malicious content, is accepted by the application Many different types of injection attacks, including lany different types of the Code Scripts Commands which can be executed in the victim's browser SQL Database commands that can access or alter data OS commands Submits operating system commands that run on the web application server

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### A03:2021 - Injection mitigation

- Use appropriate APIs
- For any residual dynamic queries, escape special characters using the specific escape syntax for that interpreter.

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### A04:2021 - Insecure Design

Insecure design is a broad category representing different weaknesses, expressed as "missing or ineffective control design."

Secure design is a culture and methodology that constantly evaluates threats and ensures that code is robustly designed and tested to prevent known attack methods.

Secure software requires a secure development lifecycle, some form of secure design pattern, paved road methodology, secured component library, tooling, and threat modeling.

### A04:2021 - Insecure Design Mitigation

- Establish and use a secure development lifecycle
- Establish and use a library of secure design patterns or paved road ready to use components
- Use threat modeling for critical authentication, access control, business logic, and key flows
- Integrate security language and controls into user stories

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### A05:2021 - Security Misconfiguration

- Pages, ports, services not secured against unauthenticated access.
  - e.g. directory listings allowed in app, which lets attackers scan for files
- Unnecessary features enabled
- Error messages provide details about app infrastructure

  e.g. versions of libraries used might be displayed in an error message, which would allow attacker to search for known vulnerabilities in those libraries

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### A05:2021 - Security Misconfiguration Mitigation

- automated processed to ensure no step is left out
- Remove unneeded features

### A06:2021 - Vulnerable and **Outdated Components**

- If you do not know the versions of all components you use (both client-side and server-side). This includes components you directly use as well as nested dependencies.

  If the software is vulnerable, unsupported, or out of date. This includes the OS, web/application server, database management system (DBMS), applications, APIs and all components, runtime environments, and libraries.

  If you do not scan for vulnerabilities regularly and subscribe to security bulletins related to the components you use.

  If you do not fix or upgrade the underlying platform, frameworks, and dependencies in a risk-based, timely fashion. f software developers do not test the compatibility of updated, upgraded, or patched libraries.

  If you do not secure the components' configurations (see A05:2021-Security Misconfiguration).

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### A06:2021 - Vulnerable and **Outdated Components Mitigation**

- Remove unused dependencies, unnecessary features, components, files, and documentation.
- Continuously inventory the versions of both client-side and server-side components
- Only obtain components from official sources over
- Monitor for libraries and components that are unmaintained or do not create security patches for older versions.

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### A07:2021 - Identification and **Authentication Failures**

Confirmation of the user's identity, authentication, and session management is critical to protect against authentication-related attacks.

- attacks.

  There may be authentication weaknesses if the application:

  Permits automated attacks such as credential stuffing, where the attacker has a list of valid usernames and passwords.

  Permits brute force or other automated attacks.

  Permits default, weak, or well-known passwords, such as "Password!" or "admin/admin".

  Uses weak or ineffective credential recovery and forgotpassword processes, such as "knowledge-based answers," which cannot be made safe.

  Uses plain text, encrypted, or weakly hashed passwords data stores

### A07:2021 - Identification and **Authentication Failures Mitigation**

- Where possible, implement multi-factor authentication to prevent automated credential stuffing, brute force, and stolen credential

- admin users.

  Implement weak password checks, such as testing new or changed passwords against the top 10,000 worst passwords list.

  Align password length, complexity, and rotation policies
  Ensure registration, credential recovery, and API pathways are hardened against account enumeration attacks by using the same messages for all outcomes.

  Limit or increasingly delay failed login attempts but be careful not to create a denial-of-service scenario. Log all failures and alert administrators when credential stuffing, brute force, or other attacks are detected.

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### A08:2021 - Software and Data Integrity Failures

Software and data integrity failures relate to code and infrastructure that does not protect against integrity violations. An example of this is where an application relies upon plugins, libraries, or modules from untrusted sources, repositories, and content delivery

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### A08:2021 - Software and Data Integrity Failures Mitigation

- Use digital signatures or similar mechanisms to verify the software or data is from the expected source and has not been altered.
- Ensure libraries and dependencies, such as npm or Maven, are consuming trusted repositories.
- Ensure that there is a review process for code and configuration changes

### A09:2021 - Security Logging and Monitoring Failures

This category is to help detect, escalate, and respond to active breaches.

Insufficient logging, detection, monitoring, and active response occurs any time:

Auditable events, such as logins, failed logins, and high-value transactions, are not logged.

Warnings and errors generate no, inadequate, or unclear log messages.

- nessages. .ogs of applications and APIs are not monitored for suspicious .ctivity.
- Logs are only stored locally.

  Appropriate alerting thresholds and response escalation processes are not in place or effective.

  Penetration testing and scans by dynamic application security testing (DAST) tools do not trigger alerts.

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### A09:2021 - Security Logging and **Monitoring Failures Mitigations**

- Ensure all login, access control, and server-side input validation failures can be logged with sufficient user context to identify suspicious or malicious accounts and held for enough time to allow delayed forensic analysis.

  Ensure that logs are generated in a format that log management solutions can easily consume.

  Ensure log data is encoded correctly to prevent injections or attacks on the logging or monitoring systems.

  Ensure high-value transactions have an audit trail with integrity controls to prevent tampering or deletion, such as append-only database tables or similar.

  DevSecOps teams should establish effective monitoring and alerting such that suspicious activities are detected and responded to quickly.

  Establish or adopt an incident response and recovery plan

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### A10:2021 - Server-Side Request Forgery

SSRF flaws occur whenever a web application is fetching a remote resource without validating the user-supplied URL. It allows an attacker to coerce the application to send a crafted request to an unexpected destination, even when protected by a firewall, VPN, or another type of network access control list (ACL).

### A10:2021 - Server-Side Request Forgery Mitigations

- Network Layer

  Segment remote resource access functionality in separate networks to reduce the impact of SSRF

  Enforce "deny by default" firewall policies or network access control rules to block all but essential intranet traffic.

- traffic.
  Application Layer

  Sanitize and validate all client-supplied input data

  Enforce the URL schema, port, and destination with a positive allow list

  Do not send raw responses to clients

  Disable HTTP redirections

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### OWASP chapters

- Local groups that sponsor events and speakers
- Foster collaboration among developers and security
- https://owasp.org/www-chapter-philadelphia/
- https://www.meetup.com/OWASP-Philadelphia/

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### Resources

- - https://www.owasp.org
  - https://owasp.org/www-project-top-ten/

### **OWASP Cheat sheets** Cover a broad number of security issues https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/

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### A Little About Browsers

- - JavaScript Engine
- May also include
  - Add-Ins

  - Browser Helper ObjectsAPIs to/for other applications

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### A Little More About Browsers

- Why are we talking about this?

  - Browser are fairly complicated
    Browsers have many sub-components and features
    Browsers need to understand many different forms of character encoding
- All of this gives us something to work with when attacking Web Applications
- Good reference for details
- http://taligarsiel.com/Projects/howbrowsers work1.htm

### Now What

- So, all of this is interesting, but does that have to do with penetration testing
- Or, to put it another way. How de we exploit these issues?
- First step

**Intercepting Proxies** 

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### What's an Intercepting Proxy

- In this instance, an intercepting proxy is software that acts as a server and sits between the web browser and your internet connection
- Examples
  - Burp Suite
  - Wobscaral
  - Paros



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### Some Rules for Our Use of Intercepting Proxies


- For this course
- Monitor and record ONLY UNLESS YOU ARE ON A TEST SITE YOU OWN
- Do not inject or alter any traffic unless you personally own the web site.
- We'll save changing traffic in the next course

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### **Burp Suite**


- Start Burp Suite by logging in to Kali and selecting Burp Suite from:
   Kali Linux>Web Applications>Web Application Proxies>burpsuite
- For those interested in a video, here is a link to a YouTube video I found useful:
- https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G3hpAe oZ4ek
- There are many others


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


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























### Now, Lets Go Somewhere More Interesting

- Restart burpsuite and turn intercept off
- Now navigate to temple.edu and look around the sitetemple.edu
- Look over the results

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### Some Basics

- What can we tell from this?
- First we can see what we are telling temple about us
  - Web Browser is Iceweasel, a derivative of Firefox
  - What versions we are running
  - Cookies
  - What exactly is If-None-Match: "1414416188-1"?

• As I	Darth Vader	says "Co	re's More me to the Dark S	iide,
Request Respon Raw Params H GET request to / Type Lookie Lookie Cookie Cookie Cookie	_	es"	Value   1   1685511881137091780.1414549907.14145499   168551188.1101414549907.1   168561188.1414549807.1.1.dmcs=-(drect)/pm	
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■ Note:	There's bot	th a reques	t and a respor	ıse
tab.				
Request Response				
Date: Ned, 29 Oct 2014 02 Server: nginx Connection: Keep-Alive Keep-Alive: fimeout=15 Etag: '141446188-1' Expires: Sun, 19 Nov 1978 Cache-Control: public, ma Vary: Cookie.Accept-Encod X-Pad: avoid browser bug	: 05:00:00 GMT x-age=21600			









### A Few More Things

- We covered just one proxy
- Different proxies have different strengths and
- For instance, Webscarab will flag potential XSS
- Also, OWASPs ZAP Tool (Zed Attack Proxy) has many of the features only available in the Pro version of BurpSuite

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### Poor Man's Substitute

- - Allows user to at least see the code loaded in browser
    Often worth looking at as developers sometimes leave comments

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### Assignment 3

- Using an Intercepting Proxy, look at a Website
  - Choose a site that interests you
- Review what you find and create an executive summary and three page PowerPoint as if you were reporting out for an initial Pen Test
- Remember Do not alter any data Monitor and Record Only

# Next Week Download SecurityShepherd https://github.com/OWASP/SecurityShepherd/releases Download Security Dojo https://sourceforge.net/projects/websecuritydojo/ Plan for next week will be to walk through some of the exploits live, so get both Shepherd and Dojo working on your system

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