

Unit #2

MIS5214

System Security Plan

Agenda

- Threat Modeling Exercise
- Information Systems – some definitions
- Conceptual models of information systems
- NIST Risk Management Framework
- FIPS 199 Security Categorization
- Transforming qualitative risk assessment into quantitative risk assessment
- FedRAMP System Security Plan – overview
 - NIST 800-53 Security controls
 - Role of FIPS 199 in selecting a security control baseline
 - NIST 800-18 classification of security control families



University of Washington Security Cards

A security threat brainstorming activity – find threat modeling cards [here](#):

Break up into teams:

- Pretend you are security professionals
 - A car company tasked you with thinking through the security implications of the modern car computer systems
- Start with the [blue suit of cards \(“Human Impact”\)](#), consider what impacts to people would result if an attacker misused modern car systems like the attack you just witnessed
 - Either think about one car, or think about the entire car product line
 - Rank order the cards from most relevant
 - Explain your 3 top choices

University of Washington Security Cards

- Optionally, outside of class review the [orange “Adversary Motivation” suit](#)
- Consider what motivations adversaries might have for attacking modern car systems

- Optionally, outside of class review the [red “Adversary’s Resources” suit](#)
- Consider what resources adversaries might have for attacking modern car systems

STRIDE

Threat model created by Microsoft, based on 6 types of threats:

1. **Spoofing** – Can an attacker gain access using a false identity?
2. **Tampering** – Can an attacker modify data as it follows through the application?
3. **Repudiation** – If an attacker denies doing something, can we prove he/she did it?
4. **Information disclosure** – Can an attacker gain access to private or potentially injurious data?
5. **Denial of service** – Can an attacker crash or reduce the availability of the system?
6. **Elevation of privilege** – Can an attacker assume the identify of a privileged user?

STRIDE Threat Modeling



A security threat brainstorming activity

- Set aside the cards, and use the STRIDE model
- Consider what methods adversaries might use for attacking modern car systems

Threat	Desired property
Spoofing	Authenticity
Tampering	Integrity
Repudiation	Non-repudiability
Information disclosure	Confidentiality
Denial of Service	Availability
Elevation of Privilege	Authorization

Threat Modeling

- Can be a full-time job for cyber security professionals
- Is now a skill information systems designers, developers and architects need to have




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Information Systems – some definitions

- **Data Structure** is a particular way of organizing data in a computer so that it can be manipulated by an algorithm
- **Algorithm** is a step-by-step procedure in a computer program for solving a problem or accomplishing a goal
- **Programs** = Algorithms + Data Structures
- **Software** are programs used to direct the operation of a computer
- **Hardware** are tangible physical parts of a computer system and IT network
- **Firmware** is software embedded in a piece of hardware
- **Information systems** are software and hardware systems that support data-intensive applications
- **Enterprise information system** is an information system which enable an organization to integrate and improve its business functions




Information System Architecture

- Is an **abstraction** that provides the “big picture” goals for the system
 - Guides the development process, answering questions including:
 - How is it going to be used?
 - What environment will it work within?
 - What type of security and protection is required?
 - What does it need to be able to communicate with?
- Describes the major components of the system and how they interact with each other, with the users, and with other systems


What is meant by the term “abstraction” ?

- A fundamental human capability that enables us to deal with complexity
- Its purpose is to limit the universe so we can do things
- Selective examination of certain aspects of a problem
- Its goal is the purposeful isolation of important aspects and suppression of unimportant aspects (i.e. omitting details)
 - *Purpose determines what is and what is not important*
 - *All abstractions are incomplete and inaccurate – but this is their power and does not limit their usefulness*
- Many different abstractions of the same thing are possible
 - *Depending on the purpose for which they are made – The problem solving context explains the source of their intent*



What is a conceptual model ?

- An abstraction of things for the purpose of understanding them
- Enables dealing with systems that are too complex to understand directly
- Omits nonessential details making them easier to manipulate than the original entities
 - *The human mind can cope with only a limited amount of information at one time*
 - *Models reduce complexity by separating out a small number of important things to deal with at a time*
- Aids understanding complex systems by enabling visualization and communication of different aspects expressed as individual models (“views”) using precise notations
 - Communicate an understanding of content, organization and function of a system
 - Useful for verifying that the system meets requirements
 - *To be relied on, models must be validated by comparison to the implemented system to assure they accurately represent and document the implemented system*
- Serves several purposes
 - Testing a physical entity before building it
 - Communicating a shared understanding of the system with stakeholders, users, developers, information system auditors and testers



Models help us understand Information Systems... and how to defend them...

Models are ways to describe reality

Model quality depends on skill of model designers and qualities of the selected model

Building blocks of models is a small collection of abstraction mechanisms


- Classification
- Aggregation
- Generalization
- *Can you think of any others?*

Abstractions help the designer understand, classify, and model reality

Classification


- An abstraction used to define one concept as a class of real-world objects characterized by common properties

Example: Classes of software types within an enterprise service-oriented architecture



Aggregation

An aggregation abstraction defines a new composite class from a set of other classes that represent its components




Classification and Aggregation

Are 2 basic abstractions used for:

- **Building data structures** within databases and programming languages
- **Building and organizing computational processes** within applications
- **Building and organizing applications** within systems
- **Building and organizing applications and minor systems** within major systems




consolidation methodology “view integration”




model integration achieved by:


1. Identifying,
2. Resolving, and
3. Consolidating



- **Commonalities** (and synonyms)
and
- **Differences** (and homonyms)



Information models from disparate business units







Common Basic Dock Components

Common Geospatial Components


Unique Components

Generalization

- A generalization abstraction defines a subset relationship between elements of two more classes
- In generalization, all the abstract properties defined for the general generic class (super-class) are inherited by all the subset specialized classes (sub-class)


$Datasets = \{Dataset_i : i = source, derived\},$

$Dataset_{derived} = \{Dataset_{derived.k} : k = intermediate, product\}.$




Data lineage metadata model




Generalization enables partitioning objects and structuring common properties and methods





Example of generalizations of different types of datasets



Data Provenance Metadata System




Conceptual models of information system design and development...




Database design²⁶

Models help us understand enterprise information systems and their security




Horatio Huxham's BITS

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Enterprise_information_systems_security_architecture



The Open Data Group Architecture Framework (TOGAF) Version 9.1

<https://www.opengroup.org/architecture/togaf91/downloads.htm>



Sherwood Applied Business Security Architecture (SABSA)


http://www.sabsa.org/white_paper

Enterprise architecture consists of:

- Business Architecture
- Information Architecture
- Technology Architecture
- Security Architecture


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
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Business Architecture



An organization chart may reflect the architecture of the business






The Open Data Group Architecture Framework (TOGAF) Version 9.1

Information Architecture




TOGAF Content Metamodel

Information Architecture




Conceptual models of Information Systems




Content &
Structure

Function &
Use





Conceptual models of Information Systems



Information Systems – Models of Information Flows

“Enterprise applications automate processes that span multiple business functions and organizational levels and may extend outside the organization”



An example of an important security architecture model:


“Defense in Depth”

Also known as:

- *Layered Security*

We will focus our study on elements of layered security moving forward...





In-Class Exercise: Draw a conceptual mode of an N-Tier Architecture for a Web-Based System

- Consider the purpose and contents of a web-based system for managing the accounts of customers of a public utility for a small town
- Using what you learned in the video, draw an N-Tier Architecture for the web-based system



<https://app.diagrams.net/>

- Identify in your diagram:
 1. Where the users are
 2. How their data flows through the system as they access and view their billing records


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

NIST Risk Management Framework




NIST Risk Management Framework



NIST Risk Management Framework



FIPS 199: Qualitative risk assessment based on security objectives



	POTENTIAL IMPACT		
Security Objective	LOW	MODERATE	HIGH
<p>Confidentiality Preserving authorized restrictions on information access and disclosure, including means for protecting personal privacy and proprietary information. [44 U.S.C., SEC. 3542]</p>	<p>The unauthorized disclosure of information could be expected to have a limited adverse effect on organizational operations, organizational assets, or individuals.</p>	<p>The unauthorized disclosure of information could be expected to have a serious adverse effect on organizational operations, organizational assets, or individuals.</p>	<p>The unauthorized disclosure of information could be expected to have a severe or catastrophic adverse effect on organizational operations, organizational assets, or individuals.</p>
<p>Integrity Guarding against improper information modification or destruction, and includes ensuring information non-repudiation and authenticity. [44 U.S.C., SEC. 3542]</p>	<p>The unauthorized modification or destruction of information could be expected to have a limited adverse effect on organizational operations, organizational assets, or individuals.</p>	<p>The unauthorized modification or destruction of information could be expected to have a serious adverse effect on organizational operations, organizational assets, or individuals.</p>	<p>The unauthorized modification or destruction of information could be expected to have a severe or catastrophic adverse effect on organizational operations, organizational assets, or individuals.</p>
<p>Availability Ensuring timely and reliable access to and use of information. [44 U.S.C., SEC. 3542]</p>	<p>The disruption of access to or use of information or an information system could be expected to have a limited adverse effect on organizational operations, organizational assets, or individuals.</p>	<p>The disruption of access to or use of information or an information system could be expected to have a serious adverse effect on organizational operations, organizational assets, or individuals.</p>	<p>The disruption of access to or use of information or an information system could be expected to have a severe or catastrophic adverse effect on organizational operations, organizational assets, or individuals.</p>

FIPS Pub 199 Standards for Security Categorization

Low: Limited adverse effect

Medium: Serious adverse effect

High: Severe or catastrophic adverse effect

The generalized format for expressing the security category, SC, of an information system is:

SC information system = $\{(\text{confidentiality}, \text{impact}), (\text{integrity}, \text{impact}), (\text{availability}, \text{impact})\}$,

where the acceptable values for potential impact are LOW, MODERATE, or HIGH.

Example with multiple information types:

SC contract information = $\{(\text{confidentiality}, \text{MODERATE}), (\text{integrity}, \text{MODERATE}), (\text{availability}, \text{LOW})\}$, = MODERATE rating

and

SC administrative information = $\{(\text{confidentiality}, \text{LOW}), (\text{integrity}, \text{LOW}), (\text{availability}, \text{LOW})\}$. = LOW rating

The resulting security category of the information system is expressed as:

SC acquisition system = $\{(\text{confidentiality}, \text{MODERATE}), (\text{integrity}, \text{MODERATE}), (\text{availability}, \text{LOW})\}$, = MODERATE rating

What are the security categorizations of these datasets?

Dataset	Confidentiality	Integrity	Availability	Impact Rating
Communication	High	Moderate	Moderate	High
Electric	Moderate	Moderate	Moderate	Moderate
Traffic control	Low	Low	Low	Low
Comm_Electric Geodatabase				
Water Distribution System	Moderate	Moderate	Low	Moderate
Sanitary Collection System	Low	Low	Low	Low
Storm Collection System	Low	Low	Low	Low
Water_Sewer Geodatabase				
Parcel Boundary Shapefile	Low	Low	Low	Low

What is the overall impact ratings of the datasets?

Dataset	Confidentiality	Integrity	Availability	Impact Rating
Communication	High	Moderate	Moderate	High
Electric	Moderate	Moderate	Moderate	Moderate
Traffic control	Low	Low	Low	Low
Comm_Electric Geodatabase				
Water Distribution System	Moderate	Moderate	Low	Moderate
Sanitary Collection System	Low	Low	Low	Low
Storm Collection System	Low	Low	Low	Low
Water_Sewer Geodatabase				
Parcel Boundary Shapefile	Low	Low	Low	Low

What are the security categorizations of the geodatabases?

Dataset	Confidentiality	Integrity	Availability	Impact Rating
Communication	High	Moderate	Moderate	High
Electric	Moderate	Moderate	Moderate	Moderate
Traffic control	Low	Low	Low	Low
Comm_Electric Geodatabase	High	Moderate	Moderate	High
Water Distribution System	Moderate	Moderate	Low	Moderate
Sanitary Collection System	Low	Low	Low	Low
Storm Collection System	Low	Low	Low	Low
Water_Sewer Geodatabase	Moderate	Moderate	Low	Moderate
Parcel Boundary Shapefile	Low	Low	Low	Low

What is the overall Information System impact rating?

System - Critical Infrastructure Information				
Dataset	Confidentiality	Integrity	Availability	Impact Rating
Communication	High	Moderate	Moderate	High
Electric	Moderate	Moderate	Moderate	Moderate
Traffic control	Low	Low	Low	Low
<i>Comm_Electric Geodatabase</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>Moderate</i>	<i>Moderate</i>	<i>High</i>
Water Distribution System	Moderate	Moderate	Low	Moderate
Sanitary Collection System	Low	Low	Low	Low
Storm Collection System	Low	Low	Low	Low
<i>Water_Sewer Geodatabase</i>	<i>Moderate</i>	<i>Moderate</i>	<i>Low</i>	<i>Moderate</i>
Parcel Boundary Shapefile	Low	Low	Low	Low


High

How would you transform these ordinal impact ratings into quantitative risk measures?

System - Critical Infrastructure Information				
Dataset	Confidentiality	Integrity	Availability	Impact Rating
Communication	High	Moderate	Moderate	High
Electric	Moderate	Moderate	Moderate	Moderate
Traffic control	Low	Low	Low	Low
<i>Comm_Electric Geodatabase</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>Moderate</i>	<i>Moderate</i>	<i>High</i>
Water Distribution System	Moderate	Moderate	Low	Moderate
Sanitary Collection System	Low	Low	Low	Low
Storm Collection System	Low	Low	Low	Low
<i>Water_Sewer Geodatabase</i>	<i>Moderate</i>	<i>Moderate</i>	<i>Low</i>	<i>Moderate</i>
Parcel Boundary Shapefile	Low	Low	Low	Low
				High

How would you quantify risk to prioritize asset types for cost-effective information security protection?

Overall Risk of CIA Breach



Dataset	Impact Rating	Likelihood
Communication	High	High
Electric	Moderate	Low
Traffic control	Low	Low
Water Distribution System	Moderate	Low
Sanitary Collection System	Low	Low
Storm Collection System	Low	Low
Parcel Boundary Shapefile	Low	Moderate

Hint:

NIST Special Publication 800-100

Information Security Handbook: A Guide for Managers

NIST
National Institute of Standards and Technology
Technology Administration
U.S. Department of Commerce


Recommendations of the National Institute of Standards and Technology

Pauline Bowen
Joan Hash
Mark Wilson

INFORMATION SECURITY

Computer Security Division
Information Technology Laboratory
National Institute of Standards and Technology
Gaithersburg, MD 20899-8930

October 2006




U.S. Department of Commerce
Carlos M. Gutierrez, Secretary

Technology Administration
Robert Cresanti, Under Secretary of Commerce for Technology

National Institute of Standards and Technology
William Jeffrey, Director

CHAPTER 10 **Risk Management**

Table 10-1. Risk Level Matrix



Threat Likelihood	Impact		
	Low (10)	Moderate (50)	High (100)
High (1.0)	10 x 1.0 = 10	50 x 1.0 = 50	100 x 1.0 = 100
Moderate (0.5)	10 x 0.5 = 5	50 x 0.5 = 25	100 x 0.5 = 50
Low (0.1)	10 x 0.1 = 1	50 x 0.1 = 5	100 x 0.1 = 10

Risk Scale: High (>50 to 100) Moderate (>10 to 50) Low (1 to 10) 01527a

Because the determination of risk ratings for impact and threat likelihood is largely subjective, it is best to assign each rating a numeric value for ease of calculation. The rationale for this justification can be explained in terms of the probability assigned for each threat likelihood level and a value assigned for each impact level. For example:

- The probability assigned for each threat likelihood level is 1.0 for high, 0.5 for moderate, and 0.1 for low.
- The value assigned for each impact level is 100 for high, 50 for moderate, and 10 for low.

Table 10-2, below, describes the risk levels shown in the above matrix. This risk scale, with its ratings of high, moderate, and low, represents the degree of risk to which an information system, facility, or procedure might be exposed if a given vulnerability were exploited. It also describes the type of action senior managers must take for each risk level.

Table 10-2. Risk Scale and Necessary Management Action

Risk Level	Risk Description and Necessary Management Action
High	If an observation or finding is evaluated as high risk, there is a strong need for corrective measures. An existing system may continue to operate, but a corrective action plan must be put in place as soon as possible.
Moderate	If an observation is rated as moderate risk, corrective actions are needed and a plan must be developed to incorporate these actions within a reasonable period of time.
Low	If an observation is described as low risk, the system's authorizing official must determine whether corrective actions are still required or decide to accept the risk.


10.1.5 Step 5 – Control Recommendations

The goal of the control recommendations is to reduce the level of risk to the information system and its data to a level the organization deems acceptable. These recommendations are essential input for the risk mitigation process, during which the recommended procedural and technical security controls are evaluated, prioritized, and implemented. This step is designed to help agencies identify and select controls appropriate to the organization's operations and mission that could mitigate or eliminate the risks identified in the preceding steps. The following factors should be considered in recommending controls and alternative solutions to minimize or eliminate identified risks:

- Effectiveness of recommended options (e.g., system compatibility);
- Legislation and regulation;

90

Transformation of ordinal qualitative risk categories to interval quantitative risk measures



The diagram shows four ovals: Likelihood (green), Threat (pink), Risk (yellow), and Impact (blue). Arrows point from Likelihood to Risk, from Threat to Risk, and from Risk to Impact. The word 'vulnerability' is written below the Risk oval.

	Impact		
Threat Likelihood	Low (10)	Moderate (50)	High (100)
High (1.0)	$10 \times 1.0 = 10$	$50 \times 1.0 = 50$	$100 \times 1.0 = 100$
Moderate (0.5)	$10 \times 0.5 = 5$	$50 \times 0.5 = 25$	$100 \times 0.5 = 50$
Low (0.1)	$10 \times 0.1 = 1$	$50 \times 0.1 = 5$	$100 \times 0.1 = 10$

Risk Scale: High (>50 to 100)

Moderate (>10 to 50)

Low (1 to 10)

01527a


Requires the risk analyst to contribute additional knowledge to transform ordinal scale into an interval scale...

NIST SP 800-100 "Information Security Handbook: A Guide for Managers", page 90

Solution

Dataset	Impact Rating	Likelihood
Communication	High	High
Electric	Moderate	Low
Traffic control	Low	Low
Water Distribution System	Moderate	Low
Sanitary Collection System	Low	Low
Storm Collection System	Low	Low
Parcel Boundary Shapefile	Low	Moderate

+



	Impact		
Threat Likelihood	Low (10)	Moderate (50)	High (100)
High (1.0)	10 x 1.0 = 10	50 x 1.0 = 50	100 x 1.0 = 100
Moderate (0.5)	10 x 0.5 = 5	50 x 0.5 = 25	100 x 0.5 = 50
Low (0.1)	10 x 0.1 = 1	50 x 0.1 = 5	100 x 0.1 = 10

Risk Scale: High (>50 to 100) Moderate (>10 to 50) Low (1 to 10)

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= ?




Dataset	Impact Rating	Likelihood	Risk
Communication	100	1	100
Electric	50	0.1	5
Traffic control	10	0.1	1
Comm_Electric Geodatabase	High		
			0
Water Distribution System	50	0.1	5
Sanitary Collection System	10	0.1	1
Storm Collection System	10	0.1	1
Water_Sewer Geodatabase	Moderate	0.1	
			0
Parcel Boundary Shapefile	10	0.5	5

Dataset	Impact Rating	Likelihood	Risk
Communication	100	1	100
Electric	50	0.1	5
Water Distribution System	50	0.1	5
Parcel Boundary Shapefile	10	0.5	5
Traffic control	10	0.1	1
Sanitary Collection System	10	0.1	1
Storm Collection System	10	0.1	1



Agenda

- ✓ Threat Modeling Exercise
- ✓ Information Systems – some definitions
- ✓ Conceptual models of information systems
- ✓ NIST Risk Management Framework
- ✓ FIPS 199 Security Categorization
- ✓ Transforming qualitative risk assessment into quantitative risk assessment
- **FedRAMP System Security Plan – overview**
 - NIST 800-53 Security controls
 - Role of FIPS 199 in selecting a security control baseline
 - NIST 800-18 classification system for security control families

Conceptual Views of NIST Risk Management Framework




Documenting Information System Security Categorization in a System Security Plan



System Security Plan (SSP)

FedRAMP = Federal Risk and Authorization Management Program


<https://www.fedramp.gov/documents-templates/>




FedRAMP® (High, Moderate, Low, LI-SaaS) Baseline System Security Plan (SSP)

for <Insert CSP Name>
<Insert CSO Name>

<Insert Version X.X>
<Insert MM/DD/YYYY>


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FedRAMP® System Security Plan (SSP)
Appendix A: High FedRAMP Security Controls

for <Insert CSP Name>
<Insert CSO Name>

<Insert Version X.X>
<Insert MM/DD/YYYY>


 Controlled Unclassified Information




FedRAMP® System Security Plan (SSP)
Appendix A: Moderate FedRAMP Security Controls

for <Insert CSP Name>
<Insert CSO Name>

<Insert Version X.X>
<Insert MM/DD/YYYY>


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FedRAMP® System Security Plan (SSP)
Appendix A: Low FedRAMP Security Controls

for <Insert CSP Name>
<Insert CSO Name>

<Insert Version X.X>
<Insert MM/DD/YYYY>


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
FedRAMP® System Security Plan (SSP)
Appendix A: LI-SaaS FedRAMP Security Controls

for <Insert CSP Name>
<Insert CSO Name>

<Insert Version X.X>
<Insert MM/DD/YYYY>

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Information System Security Plan (SSP)



Understanding Baselines and Impact Levels

Low Impact is appropriate where the loss of confidentiality, integrity, and availability would result in limited adverse effects on an agency's operations, assets, or individuals

FedRAMP has 2 baselines for systems with Low Impact data:

- **LI-SaaS** Baseline and **Low** Baseline

LI-SaaS Baseline

- Accounts for Low-Impact SaaS applications that do not store personal identifiable information (PII) beyond that generally required for login capability (i.e. username, password, and email address)
- Required security documentation is consolidated and the requisite number of security controls needing testing and verification are lowered relative to a standard Low Baseline authorization

Understanding Baselines and Impact Levels

Moderate Impact is appropriate for CSOs where the loss of confidentiality, integrity, and availability would result in serious adverse effects on an agency's operations, assets, or individuals

- Accounts for nearly 80% of CSP applications that receive FedRAMP authorization

Serious adverse effects could include significant operational damage to agency assets, financial loss, or individual harm that is not loss of life or physical.

Understanding Baselines and Impact Levels

High Impact data is usually in

- Law Enforcement and Emergency Services systems
 - Financial systems
 - Health systems
 - ...any other system where loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability could be expected to have a severe or catastrophic adverse effect on organizational operations, organizational assets, or individuals.
- The High Baseline accounts for the most sensitive, unclassified data in cloud computing environments, including data that involves the protection of life and financial ruin

Graphic I. High Baseline Across the U.S. Government





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Where to document information system categorization within a System Security Plan


FedRAMP™

**FedRAMP® (High,
Moderate, Low, LI-SaaS)
Baseline System Security
Plan (SSP)**


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<Insert CSO Name>**

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

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Information System Security Plan (SSP)




Security Controls



FIPS 200 *Minimum Security Control Requirements*

1. Access Control (AC)
2. Awareness and Training (AT)
3. Audit and Accountability (AU)
4. Certification, Accreditation, and Security Assessment (CA)
5. Configuration Management (CM)
6. Contingency Planning
7. Identification and Authentication
8. Incident Response (IR)
9. Maintenance (MA)
10. Media Protection (MP)
11. Physical and Environmental Protection *PE)
12. Planning (PL)
13. Personal Security (PS)
14. Risk Assessment (RA)
15. System and Services Acquisition(SA)
16. System and Communications Protection (SC)
17. System and Information Integrity (SI)

NIST RMF




NIST Special Publication 800-53
Revision 5

Security and Privacy Controls for Information Systems and Organizations

JOINT TASK FORCE

This publication is available free of charge from:
<https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5>

September 2020
INCLUDES UPDATES AS OF 12-10-2020; SEE PAGE XVII



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Wilbur L. Ross, Jr., Secretary

National Institute of Standards and Technology
Walter Copan, NIST Director and Under Secretary of Commerce for Standards and Technology

Minimum Security Controls have evolved




TABLE 1: SECURITY AND PRIVACY CONTROL FAMILIES

ID	FAMILY	ID	FAMILY
AC	Access Control	PE	Physical and Environmental Protection
AT	Awareness and Training	PL	Planning
AU	Audit and Accountability	PM	Program Management
CA	Assessment, Authorization, and Monitoring	PS	Personnel Security
CM	Configuration Management	PT	PII Processing and Transparency
CP	Contingency Planning	RA	Risk Assessment
IA	Identification and Authentication	SA	System and Services Acquisition
IR	Incident Response	SC	System and Communications Protection
MA	Maintenance	SI	System and Information Integrity
MP	Media Protection	SR	Supply Chain Risk Management

Since FIPS 200 was written in 2006, 3 more control families have been added

Control Baselines for Information Systems and Organizations

NIST Special Publication 800-53B

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October 2020
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National Institute of Standards and Technology
 Walter Copan, NIST Director and Under Secretary of Commerce for Standards and Technology

CNTL NO.	CONTROL NAME	PRIORITY	INITIAL CONTROL BASELINES		
			LOW	MOD	HIGH
Awareness and Training					
AT-1	Security Awareness and Training Policy and Procedures	P1	AT-1	AT-1	AT-1
AT-2	Security Awareness Training	P1	AT-2	AT-2 (2)	AT-2 (2)
AT-3	Role-Based Security Training	P1	AT-3	AT-3	AT-3
AT-4	Security Training Records	P3	AT-4	AT-4	AT-4
AT-5	Withdrawn	---	---	---	---
Audit and Accountability					
AU-1	Audit and Accountability Policy and Procedures	P1	AU-1	AU-1	AU-1
AU-2	Audit Events	P1	AU-2	AU-2 (3)	AU-2 (3)
AU-3	Content of Audit Records	P1	AU-3	AU-3 (1)	AU-3 (1) (2)
AU-4	Audit Storage Capacity	P1	AU-4	AU-4	AU-4
AU-5	Response to Audit Processing Failures	P1	AU-5	AU-5	AU-5 (1) (2)
AU-6	Audit Review, Analysis, and Reporting	P1	AU-6	AU-6 (1) (3)	AU-6 (1) (3) (5) (6)
AU-7	Audit Reduction and Report Generation	P2	Not Selected	AU-7 (1)	AU-7 (1)
AU-8	Time Stamps	P1	AU-8	AU-8 (1)	AU-8 (1)
AU-9	Protection of Audit Information	P1	AU-9	AU-9 (4)	AU-9 (2) (3) (4)
AU-10	Non-repudiation	P2	Not Selected	Not Selected	AU-10
AU-11	Audit Record Retention	P3	AU-11	AU-11	AU-11
AU-12	Audit Generation	P1	AU-12	AU-12	AU-12 (1) (3)
AU-13	Monitoring for Information Disclosure	P0	Not Selected	Not Selected	Not Selected
AU-14	Session Audit	P0	Not Selected	Not Selected	Not Selected
AU-15	Alternate Audit Capability	P0	Not Selected	Not Selected	Not Selected
AU-16	Cross-Organizational Auditing	P0	Not Selected	Not Selected	Not Selected
Security Assessment and Authorization					
CA-1	Security Assessment and Authorization Policies and Procedures	P1	CA-1	CA-1	CA-1
CA-2	Security Assessments	P2	CA-2	CA-2 (1)	CA-2 (1) (2)
CA-3	System Interconnections	P1	CA-3	CA-3 (5)	CA-3 (5)
CA-4	Withdrawn	---	---	---	---
CA-5	Plan of Action and Milestones	P3	CA-5	CA-5	CA-5
CA-6	Security Authorization	P2	CA-6	CA-6	CA-6
CA-7	Continuous Monitoring	P2	CA-7	CA-7 (1)	CA-7 (1)
CA-8	Penetration Testing	P2	Not Selected	Not Selected	CA-8
CA-9	Internal System Connections	P2	CA-9	CA-9	CA-9
Configuration Management					
CM-1	Configuration Management Policy and Procedures	P1	CM-1	CM-1	CM-1
CM-2	Baseline Configuration	P1	CM-2	CM-2 (1) (3) (7)	CM-2 (1) (2) (3) (7)
CM-3	Configuration Change Control	P1	Not Selected	CM-3 (2)	CM-3 (1) (2)
CM-4	Security Impact Analysis	P2	CM-4	CM-4	CM-4 (1)
CM-5	Access Restrictions for Change	P1	Not Selected	CM-5	CM-5 (1) (2) (3)

How we use FIPS 199 security categorization to select security controls...

CNTL NO.	CONTROL NAME	PRIORITY	INITIAL CONTROL BASELINES		
			LOW	MOD	HIGH
SC-25	Thin Nodes	P0	Not Selected	Not Selected	Not Selected
SC-26	Homogeneity	P0	Not Selected	Not Selected	Not Selected
SC-27	Platform-Independent Applications	P0	Not Selected	Not Selected	Not Selected
SC-28	Protection of Information at Rest	P1	Not Selected	SC-28	SC-28
SA-10	Developer Configuration Management	P1	Not Selected	SA-10	SA-10
SA-11	Developer Security Testing and Evaluation	P1	Not Selected	SA-11	SA-11
SA-12	Supply Chain Protection	P1	Not Selected	SA-12	SA-12
SA-13	Trustworthiness	P0	Not Selected	SA-13	SA-13
PE-17	Alternate Work Site	P2	Not Selected	PE-17	PE-17
PE-18	Location of Information System Components	P3	Not Selected	PE-18	PE-18
PE-19	Information Leakage	P0	Not Selected	PE-19	PE-19
PE-20	Asset Monitoring and Tracking	P2	Not Selected	PE-20	PE-20
IR-3	Incident Response Testing	P2	Not Selected	IR-3 (2)	IR-3 (2)
IR-4	Incident Handling	P1	IR-4	IR-4 (1) (4)	IR-4 (1) (4)
IR-5	Incident Monitoring	P1	IR-5	IR-5 (1)	IR-5 (1)
IR-6	Incident Reporting	P1	IR-6	IR-6 (1)	IR-6 (1)
MA-1	Alternate System Component Inventory	P1	MA-1	MA-1 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)	MA-1 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
MA-2	Configuration Management Plan	P1	Not Selected	MA-2	MA-2
MA-3	Software Usage Restrictions	P2	MA-3	MA-3 (1) (2) (3)	MA-3 (1) (2) (3)
MA-4	User-Installed Software	P1	MA-4	MA-4 (1)	MA-4 (1)
CP-1	Contingency Planning Policy and Procedures	P1	CP-1	CP-1	CP-1
CP-2	Contingency Plan	P1	CP-2	CP-2 (1) (3) (4) (5) (6)	CP-2 (1) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CP-3	Contingency Training	P2	CP-3	CP-3 (1)	CP-3 (1)
CP-4	Contingency Plan Testing	P2	CP-4	CP-4 (1)	CP-4 (1)
CP-5	Withdrawn	---	---	---	---
CP-6	Alternate Storage Site	P1	Not Selected	CP-6 (1) (3)	CP-6 (1) (3)
CP-7	Alternate Processing Site	P1	Not Selected	CP-7 (1) (2) (3) (4)	CP-7 (1) (2) (3) (4)
CP-8	Telecommunications Services	P1	Not Selected	CP-8 (1) (2)	CP-8 (1) (2) (3) (4)
CP-9	Information System Backup	P1	CP-9	CP-9 (1) (2) (3) (4)	CP-9 (1) (2) (3) (4)
CP-10	Information System Recovery and Reconstruction	P1	CP-10	CP-10 (2) (4)	CP-10 (2) (4)
CP-11	Alternate Communications Protocols	P0	Not Selected	Not Selected	Not Selected
CP-12	Safe Mode	P0	Not Selected	Not Selected	Not Selected
CP-13	Alternative Security Mechanisms	P0	Not Selected	Not Selected	Not Selected
IA-1	Identification and Authentication Policy and Procedures	P1	IA-1	IA-1	IA-1
IA-2	Identification and Authentication (Organizational Users)	P1	IA-2 (1) (12)	IA-2 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)	IA-2 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
IA-3	Device Identification and Authentication	P1	Not Selected	IA-3	IA-3
IA-4	Identifier Management	P1	IA-4	IA-4	IA-4
IA-5	Authenticator Management	P1	IA-5 (1) (11)	IA-5 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)	IA-5 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
IA-6	Authenticator Feedback	P2	IA-6	IA-6	IA-6
IA-7	Cryptographic Module Authentication	P1	IA-7	IA-7	IA-7
IA-8	Identification and Authentication (Non-Organizational Users)	P1	IA-8 (1) (2) (3) (4)	IA-8 (1) (2) (3) (4)	IA-8 (1) (2) (3) (4)
IA-9	Service Identification and Authentication	P0	Not Selected	Not Selected	Not Selected
IA-10	Adaptive Identification and Authentication	P0	Not Selected	Not Selected	Not Selected
IA-11	Re-authentication	P0	Not Selected	Not Selected	Not Selected
IR-1	Incident Response Policy and Procedures	P1	IR-1	IR-1	IR-1
IR-2	Incident Response Training	P2	IR-2	IR-2	IR-2 (1) (2)

NIST 800-53 risk controls are typically presented alphabetically

TABLE 1: SECURITY AND PRIVACY CONTROL FAMILIES

ID	FAMILY	ID	FAMILY
<u>AC</u>	Access Control	<u>PE</u>	Physical and Environmental Protection
<u>AT</u>	Awareness and Training	<u>PL</u>	Planning
<u>AU</u>	Audit and Accountability	<u>PM</u>	Program Management
<u>CA</u>	Assessment, Authorization, and Monitoring	<u>PS</u>	Personnel Security
<u>CM</u>	Configuration Management	<u>PT</u>	PII Processing and Transparency
<u>CP</u>	Contingency Planning	<u>RA</u>	Risk Assessment
<u>IA</u>	Identification and Authentication	<u>SA</u>	System and Services Acquisition
<u>IR</u>	Incident Response	<u>SC</u>	System and Communications Protection
<u>MA</u>	Maintenance	<u>SI</u>	System and Information Integrity
<u>MP</u>	Media Protection	<u>SR</u>	Supply Chain Risk Management

NIST 800-53 Controls can be grouped by “Class”

NIST Special Publication 800-18
Revision 1

Guide for Developing Security
Plans for Federal Information
Systems

NIST
National Institute of
Standards and Technology
Technology Administration
U.S. Department of Commerce

Marianne Swanson
Joan Hash
Pauline Bowen

I N F O R M A T I O N S E C U R I T Y

Computer Security Division
Information Technology Laboratory
National Institute of Standards and Technology
Gaithersburg, MD 20899-8930

February 2006



U.S. Department of Commerce
Carlos M. Gutierrez, Secretary

National Institute of Standards and Technology
William Jeffrey, Director

CLASS	FAMILY	IDENTIFIER
Management	Risk Assessment	RA
Management	Planning	PL
Management	System and Services Acquisition	SA
Management	Certification, Accreditation, and Security Assessments	CA
Operational	Personnel Security	PS
Operational	Physical and Environmental Protection	PE
Operational	Contingency Planning	CP
Operational	Configuration Management	CM
Operational	Maintenance	MA
Operational	System and Information Integrity	SI
Operational	Media Protection	MP
Operational	Incident Response	IR
Operational	Awareness and Training	AT
Technical	Identification and Authentication	IA
Technical	Access Control	AC
Technical	Audit and Accountability	AU
Technical	System and Communications Protection	SC

Table 2: Security Control Class, Family, and Identifier

3.16 RISK ASSESSMENT FAMILY

Table 3-16 provides a summary of the controls and control enhancements assigned to the Risk Assessment Family. The controls are allocated to the low-impact, moderate-impact, and high-impact security control baselines and the privacy control baseline, as appropriate. A control or control enhancement that has been withdrawn from the control catalog is indicated by a "W" and an explanation of the control or control enhancement disposition in light gray text.

TABLE 3-16: RISK ASSESSMENT FAMILY

CONTROL NUMBER	CONTROL NAME CONTROL ENHANCEMENT NAME	PRIVACY CONTROL BASELINE	SECURITY CONTROL BASELINES		
			LOW	MOD	HIGH
RA-1	Policy and Procedures	x	x	x	x
RA-2	Security Categorization		x	x	x
RA-2(1)	IMPACT-LEVEL PRIORITIZATION				
RA-3	Risk Assessment	x	x	x	x
RA-3(1)	SUPPLY CHAIN RISK ASSESSMENT		x	x	x
RA-3(2)	USE OF ALL-SOURCE INTELLIGENCE				
RA-3(3)	DYNAMIC THREAT AWARENESS				
RA-3(4)	PREDICTIVE CYBER ANALYTICS				
RA-4	Risk Assessment Update	W: Incorporated into RA-3.			
RA-5	Vulnerability Monitoring and Scanning		x	x	x
RA-5(1)	UPDATE TOOL CAPABILITY	W: Incorporated into RA-5.			
RA-5(2)	UPDATE VULNERABILITIES TO BE SCANNED		x	x	x
RA-5(3)	BREADTH AND DEPTH OF COVERAGE				
RA-5(4)	DISCOVERABLE INFORMATION				x
RA-5(5)	PRIVILEGED ACCESS			x	x
RA-5(6)	AUTOMATED TREND ANALYSES				
RA-5(7)	AUTOMATED DETECTION AND NOTIFICATION OF UNAUTHORIZED COMPONENTS	W: Incorporated into CM-8.			
RA-5(8)	REVIEW HISTORIC AUDIT LOGS				
RA-5(9)	PENETRATION TESTING AND ANALYSES	W: Incorporated into CA-8.			
RA-5(10)	CORRELATE SCANNING INFORMATION				
RA-5(11)	PUBLIC DISCLOSURE PROGRAM		x	x	x
RA-6	Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Survey				
RA-7	Risk Response	x	x	x	x
RA-8	Privacy Impact Assessments	x			
RA-9	Criticality Analysis			x	x
RA-10	Threat Hunting				

How do you determine which RA controls are relevant to the web-based system you began designing for managing the utility's customers' billing records for the small town ?

TABLE 3-16: RISK ASSESSMENT FAMILY

CONTROL NUMBER	CONTROL NAME CONTROL ENHANCEMENT NAME	PRIVACY CONTROL BASELINE	SECURITY CONTROL BASELINES		
			LOW	MOD	HIGH
RA-1	Policy and Procedures	x	x	x	x
RA-2	Security Categorization		x	x	x
RA-2(1)	IMPACT-LEVEL PRIORITIZATION				
RA-3	Risk Assessment	x	x	x	x
RA-3(1)	SUPPLY CHAIN RISK ASSESSMENT		x	x	x
RA-3(2)	USE OF ALL-SOURCE INTELLIGENCE				
RA-3(3)	DYNAMIC THREAT AWARENESS				
RA-3(4)	PREDICTIVE CYBER ANALYTICS				
RA-4	Risk Assessment Update	W: Incorporated into RA-3.			
RA-5	Vulnerability Monitoring and Scanning		x	x	x
RA-5(1)	UPDATE TOOL CAPABILITY	W: Incorporated into RA-5.			
RA-5(2)	UPDATE VULNERABILITIES TO BE SCANNED		x	x	x
RA-5(3)	BREADTH AND DEPTH OF COVERAGE				
RA-5(4)	DISCOVERABLE INFORMATION				x
RA-5(5)	PRIVILEGED ACCESS			x	x
RA-5(6)	AUTOMATED TREND ANALYSES				
RA-5(7)	AUTOMATED DETECTION AND NOTIFICATION OF UNAUTHORIZED COMPONENTS	W: Incorporated into CM-8.			
RA-5(8)	REVIEW HISTORIC AUDIT LOGS				
RA-5(9)	PENETRATION TESTING AND ANALYSES	W: Incorporated into CA-8.			
RA-5(10)	CORRELATE SCANNING INFORMATION				
RA-5(11)	PUBLIC DISCLOSURE PROGRAM		x	x	x
RA-6	Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Survey				
RA-7	Risk Response	x	x	x	x
RA-8	Privacy Impact Assessments	x			
RA-9	Criticality Analysis			x	x
RA-10	Threat Hunting				

RA-1

FAMILY: RISK ASSESSMENT

RA-1 RISK ASSESSMENT POLICY AND PROCEDURES

Control: The organization:

- a. Develops, documents, and disseminates to [*Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles*]:

RA-1 RISK ASSESSMENT POLICY AND PROCEDURES

Control: The organization:

- a. Develops, documents, and disseminates to [*Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles*]:
 1. A risk assessment policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and
 2. Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the risk assessment policy and associated risk assessment controls; and
- b. Reviews and updates the current:
 1. Risk assessment policy [*Assignment: organization-defined frequency*]; and
 2. Risk assessment procedures [*Assignment: organization-defined frequency*].

purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance;

of the risk assessment policy and associated

organization-defined frequency]; and

organization-defined frequency].

establishment of policy and procedures for the controls and control enhancements in the RA family. Policies, Executive Orders, directives, regulations, standards, and procedures at the organization level are not necessary. The policy can be organization-wide or organization-specific. The complexity of certain organizations. The policy can be in general and for particular information systems. Information management strategy is a key factor in establishing

policy and procedures. Related control: PM-9.

Control Enhancements: None.

References: NIST Special Publications 800-12, 800-30, 800-100.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1	LOW RA-1	MOD RA-1	HIGH RA-1	73
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SSP – Control Inventory Example

RA-1 Policy and Procedures (L)(M)(H)

- a. Develop, document, and disseminate to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]:
 1. [Selection (one-or-more): organization-level; mission/business process-level; system-level] risk assessment policy that:
 - (a) Addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and
 - (b) Is consistent with applicable laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidelines; and
 2. Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the risk assessment policy and the associated risk assessment controls;
- b. Designate an [Assignment: organization-defined official] to manage the development, documentation, and dissemination of the risk assessment policy and procedures; and
- c. Review and update the current risk assessment:
 1. Policy [FedRAMP Assignment: at least every three (3) years] and following [Assignment: organization-defined events]; and
 2. Procedures [FedRAMP Assignment: at least annually] and following [FedRAMP Assignment: significant changes].

RA-1 Control Summary Information
Responsible Role:
Parameter RA-1(a):
Parameter RA-1(a)(1):
Parameter RA-1(b):
Parameter RA-1(c)(1)-1:
Parameter RA-1(c)(1)-2:
Parameter RA-1(c)(2)-1:
Parameter RA-1(c)(2)-2:
Implementation Status (check all that apply):
<input type="checkbox"/> Implemented
<input type="checkbox"/> Partially Implemented
<input type="checkbox"/> Planned
<input type="checkbox"/> Alternative implementation
<input type="checkbox"/> Not Applicable
Control Origination (check all that apply):
<input type="checkbox"/> Service Provider Corporate
<input type="checkbox"/> Service Provider System Specific
<input type="checkbox"/> Service Provider Hybrid (Corporate and System Specific)


RA-1 What is the solution and how is it implemented?
Part a:
Part b:
Part c:




FedRAMP® System Security Plan (SSP)
Appendix A: Moderate FedRAMP Security Controls

for <Insert CSP Name>
 <Insert CSO Name>

<Insert Version X.X>
 <Insert MM/DD/YYYY>


Controlled Unclassified Information
info@fedramp.gov
fedramp.gov

How to assess an InfoSec Control ?



NIST Special Publication 800-53A
Revision 4

Assessing Security and Privacy Controls in Federal Information Systems and Organizations

Building Effective Assessment Plans

JOINT TASK FORCE
TRANSFORMATION INITIATIVE

This publication is available free of charge from:
<http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53Ar4>

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Penny Pritzker, Secretary

National Institute of Standards and Technology
Willie May, Acting Under Secretary of Commerce for Standards and Technology and Acting Director

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Revision 5

Assessing Security and Privacy Controls in Information Systems and Organizations

JOINT TASK FORCE

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August 2021

U.S. Department of Commerce
Gina M. Raimondo, Secretary

National Institute of Standards and Technology
James K. Olthoff, Performing the Non-Exclusive Functions and Duties of the Under Secretary of Commerce for Standards and Technology & Director, National Institute of Standards and Technology

Assessing InfoSec control

FAMILY: RISK ASSESSMENT

RA-1		RISK ASSESSMENT POLICY AND PROCEDURES	
ASSESSMENT OBJECTIVE:			
<i>Determine if the organization:</i>			
RA-1(a)(1)	RA-1(a)(1)[1]	<i>develops and documents a risk assessment policy that addresses:</i>	
		RA-1(a)(1)[1][a]	<i>purpose;</i>
		RA-1(a)(1)[1][b]	<i>scope;</i>
		RA-1(a)(1)[1][c]	<i>roles;</i>
		RA-1(a)(1)[1][d]	<i>responsibilities;</i>
		RA-1(a)(1)[1][e]	<i>management commitment;</i>
		RA-1(a)(1)[1][f]	<i>coordination among organizational entities;</i>
		RA-1(a)(1)[1][g]	<i>compliance;</i>
	RA-1(a)(1)[2]	<i>defines personnel or roles to whom the risk assessment policy is to be disseminated;</i>	
RA-1(a)(1)[3]	<i>disseminates the risk assessment policy to organization-defined personnel or roles;</i>		
RA-1(a)(2)	RA-1(a)(2)[1]	<i>develops and documents procedures to facilitate the implementation of the risk assessment policy and associated risk assessment controls;</i>	
	RA-1(a)(2)[2]	<i>defines personnel or roles to whom the procedures are to be disseminated;</i>	
	RA-1(a)(2)[3]	<i>disseminates the procedures to organization-defined personnel or roles;</i>	
RA-1(b)(1)	RA-1(b)(1)[1]	<i>defines the frequency to review and update the current risk assessment policy;</i>	
	RA-1(b)(1)[2]	<i>reviews and updates the current risk assessment policy with the organization-defined frequency;</i>	
RA-1(b)(2)	RA-1(b)(2)[1]	<i>defines the frequency to review and update the current risk assessment procedures; and</i>	
	RA-1(b)(2)[2]	<i>reviews and updates the current risk assessment procedures with the organization-defined frequency.</i>	
POTENTIAL ASSESSMENT METHODS AND OBJECTS:			
Examine: [SELECT FROM: risk assessment policy and procedures; other relevant documents or records].			
Interview: [SELECT FROM: Organizational personnel with risk assessment responsibilities; organizational personnel with information security responsibilities].			

RA-2 Security Categorization (L)(M)(H)

- a. Categorize the system and information it processes, stores, and transmits;
- b. Document the security categorization results, including supporting rationale, in the security plan for the system; and
- c. Verify that the authorizing official or authorizing official designated representative reviews and approves the security categorization decision.

RA-2 Control Summary Information

Responsible Role:

Implementation Status (check all that apply):

- Implemented
- Partially Implemented
- Planned
- Alternative implementation
- Not Applicable

Control Origination (check all that apply):

- Service Provider Corporate
- Service Provider System Specific
- Service Provider Hybrid (Corporate and System Specific)
- Configured by Customer (Customer System Specific)
- Provided by Customer (Customer System Specific)
- Shared (Service Provider and Customer Responsibility)
- Inherited from pre-existing FedRAMP Authorization for [Click here to enter text], Date of Authorization

RA-2 What is the solution and how is it implemented?

Part a:

Part b:

Part c:

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Assessing InfoSec control

RA-2	SECURITY CATEGORIZATION
	ASSESSMENT OBJECTIVE: <i>Determine if the organization:</i>
RA-2(a)	<i>categorizes information and the information system in accordance with applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, standards, and guidance;</i>
RA-2(b)	<i>documents the security categorization results (including supporting rationale) in the security plan for the information system; and</i>
RA-2(c)	<i>ensures the authorizing official or authorizing official designated representative reviews and approves the security categorization decision.</i>
	POTENTIAL ASSESSMENT METHODS AND OBJECTS: Examine: [SELECT FROM: Risk assessment policy; security planning policy and procedures; procedures addressing security categorization of organizational information and information systems; security plan; security categorization documentation; other relevant documents or records]. Interview: [SELECT FROM: Organizational personnel with security categorization and risk assessment responsibilities; organizational personnel with information security responsibilities]. Test: [SELECT FROM: Organizational processes for security categorization].

Appendix K <Insert CSO Name> Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 199 Categorization

Information Type	NIST SP 800-60 V2 R1 Recommended Confidentiality Impact Level	NIST SP 800-60 V2 R1 Recommended Integrity Impact Level	NIST SP 800-60 V2 R1 Recommended Availability Impact Level	CSP Selected Confidentiality Impact Level	CSP Selected Integrity Impact Level	CSP Selected Availability Impact Level	Statement for Impact Adjustment Justification

SSP Contains & Documents the status of the System's Control Inventory

Control Summary Information
Responsible Role:
Implementation Status (check all that apply):
<input type="checkbox"/> Implemented
<input type="checkbox"/> Partially implemented
<input type="checkbox"/> Planned
<input type="checkbox"/> Alternative implementation
<input type="checkbox"/> Not applicable

Control Class	Control Family	FedRamp	Implemented	Partial	Planned	Alternate	NA	System
Management	Risk Assessment	10	2	5	1	2	1	11
Management	Planning	6	1	2	1			4
Management	System & Service Acquisition	22						0
Management	Security Assessments & Authorization	15				1		1
Technical	Identification & Authentication	27	9	3	8		9	29
Technical	Access Control	43	4	3	28	1	13	49
Technical	Audit & Accountability	19	1	3	13		4	21
Technical	System & Communication Protection	32	17	8	9	1	5	40
Operational	Personnel Security	9	6	1			2	9
Operational	Physical & Environmental Protection	20					19	19
Operational	Contingency Planning	24	1	2	24			27
Operational	Configuration Management	26	8	6	11		5	30
Operational	Maintenance	11						0
Operational	System & Information Integrity	28		5	16		8	33
Operational	Media Protection	10	2				3	5
Operational	Incident Response	18						0
Operational	Awareness & Training	5			5			5
	Total:	325	55	38	116	5	69	283

Agenda

- ✓ Threat Modeling Exercise
- ✓ Information Systems – some definitions
- ✓ Conceptual models of information systems
- ✓ NIST Risk Management Framework
- ✓ FIPS 199 Security Categorization
- ✓ Transforming qualitative risk assessment into quantitative risk assessment
- ✓ FedRAMP System Security Plan – overview
 - ✓ NIST 800-53 Security controls
 - ✓ Role of FIPS 199 in selecting a security control baseline
 - ✓ NIST 800-18 classification of security control families