Unit #5 MIS5214

Secure Networks

Agenda

- In The News
- Digital Certificates
- Public Key Infrastructure
- Types of Networks
- OSI Model
- Layer 1 Network Devices
- Layer 2 Network Devices
- Layer 3 Network Devices
- Layer 3 7 Network Devices

Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)

Public key cryptography enables entities previously unknown to each other to verify the identity of each other, validate the information being transferred, and securely communicate on an insecure public network

• Public key infrastructure

- Enables online activities requiring more trust and proof of identity than simple passwords
- Provides a hierarchy of trust relationships that:
 - Enable knowing a public key really belongs to the person/system you want to communicate with
 - Are necessary for hybrid cryptography
 - Facilitate secure electronic transfer of information for a range of network activities such as ecommerce, internet banking and confidential email

Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)

Is a system for creating, storing, distributing, validating, revoking and managing **digital certificates** used to verify the identity the owner of a public key contained within the certificate

- Assumes
 - Receiver's and Sender's identities can be positively ensured through digital certificates
 - Asymmetric algorithm will automatically carry out the process of key exchange
- Contains components that
 - Identify users
 - Creates and distributes certificates
 - Maintains and revokes certificates
 - Distributes and maintains encryption keys
 - Enables information technologies to communicate and work together to achieve confidentiality, authentication, integrity, and non-repudiation

Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)


Consists of:

- Public key certificates ("digital certificates") are electronic documents used to prove the ownership of public keys
- Roles
 - Certificate Authorities (CA) store, issue and sign the digital certificates
 - **Registration Authorities** (RA) verify identities of entities requesting their digital certificates be stored at the CA
- Technologies
 - Central directory provides a secure location in which keys are stored and indexed
 - Certificate management system
 - Creates and delivers new certificates to be issued
 - Searches, retrieves and accesses to stored certificates
- Certificate policy states procedures for allowing outsiders to analyze the PKI's trustworthiness

Digital Certificate

One of the most important pieces of a PKI

 Associates a public key with information for uniquely identifying its owner



 X.509 standard defines the format of public key certificates used in many Internet cryptographic protocols for HTTPS for servers & clients, secure email, code signing, digital signatures...

Public Key Certificate

Electronic documents used to prove ownership of a public key

A certificate includes the following common fields:

- Information about the certificate
 - Serial Number: Used to uniquely identify the certificate
 - Issuer: Entity that verified the information and signed the certificate
 - Signature Algorithm: The algorithm used to sign the public key certificate
 - Signature: A signature of the certificate body by the issuer's private key
- Information about the public key
 - Not Before: Earliest time and date on which the certificate is valid.
 - Not After: Time and date past which the certificate is no longer valid
 - **Key Usage**: Valid cryptographic uses of the certificate's public key, e.g. digital signature validation, key encipherment, and certificate signing
 - Extended Key Usage: Applications the certificate may be used for, e.g. TLS server authentication, email protection, code signing, or electronic signature
- Information about the identity of its owner (called the subject)
 - Subject: Entity a certificate belongs to, e.g. individual, machine, or organization




Figure 3-47 Each certificate has a structure with all the necessary identifying information in it.

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VIEW

https://cryptii.com/

Types of Certificates: Different cryptographic protocols ("applications")

X.509 is a standard of the International Telecommunications Union which defines the format of public key certificates used in many Internet cryptographic protocols, including:

- **1. Transport Layer Security** (TLS/SSL) HTTPS protocol for securely browsing the web Certificate's subject is typically a computer or other device, but may also identify organizations or individuals
 - Server certificate
 - A server is required to present a certificate as part of the initial connection setup. A client connecting to that server will validate the certificate by checking that
 - 1. The certificate's subject matches the hostname (i.e. domain name) to which the client is trying to connect
 - 2. The certificate is signed by a trusted certificate authority
 - **Client certificate** (less common than server certificates)
 - Used to authenticate the client connecting to a TLS service (e.g. for access control)
 - Most client certificates contain an email address or personal name rather than a hostname

2. Email encryption certificate

- A certificate's subject is typically a person or organization
- For secure email, senders use an email certificate to discover which public key to use for any given recipient

3. Code signing certificate

 A code signing certificate is used to validate signatures on programs to ensure they were not tampered with during delivery

4. Qualified digital certificate

• A "Qualified digital certificate" identifies an individual for electronic signature purposes

Roles in PKI - Certificate Authority (CA)

Serves as a trusted third party responsible for verifying identities and signing digital certificates of identity ("digital signature") which are exchanged between two parties introducing themselves to each other

Each person wanting to participate in a PKI requires a digital certificate

• Digital certificate is a credential containing the public key for that individual along with other identifying information

<u>A CA is a trusted organization (or server)</u> responsible for:

- Issuing (creating and handing) out digital certificates
- Maintaining digital certificates
- Revoking digital certificates


Use of PKI and exchanging digital certificates is intended to block Man-in-the-Middle attacks where 2 users are not working in PKI environment do not truly know the identity of the owners of public keys

Roles in PKI - Certificate Authority (CA)

- Each person wanting to participate in a PKI requires a digital certificate
 - Digital certificate is a credential containing the public key for that individual, computer or organization along with other identifying information
- When a CA signs the certificate, it binds the individual's, computer's or organization' identity to the public key
 - The CA takes liability for the authenticity of the identity
 - Making a CA the "trusted 3rd party" that allows people who have never met to use their public keys to authenticate each other and communicate in a secure way

Certificate Revocation Information

CA's are also responsible for maintaining up-to-date revocation information about certificates they have issued, indicating when certificates of identity are no longer valid




Roles in PKI – Certificate Authority (CA)

New Certificate Requests

A CA processes requests from people or organizations requesting certificates (called "subscribers")

- 1. Verifies the subscriber's information
- 2. Potentially signs an end-entity certificate based on the subscriber's information



Certificate of Mario Rossi

Registration Authority (RA)

When a user needs a new certificate, the user makes a request to the RA

RA serves as a broker between the user and the CA, and performs certain certification registration tasks

- Performs the certificate life-cycle management functions
- Establishes and confirms the identity of the individual
 - The RA verifies all the necessary identification information before allowing a request to go to the CA
- Initiates the certification process with the CA for the end user


RA cannot issue certificates

PKI Steps

Suppose: John needs to obtain a digital certificate to participate in PKI

- 1. John requests a digital certificate from a RA
- 2. The RA requests John's identification information
 - E.g. driver's license, address, phone number, email, ...
- 3. RA receives John's information, verifies it, and sends his certificate request to CA
- 4. CA creates a certificate with John's public key and embedded identity information
 - Private/Public key pair is generated on John's machine or by the CA (depends on system configuration)
 - Usually user generates this pair and sends his public key in as part of registration process
 - If CA creates key pair, John's private key needs to be sent to him via secure means

Now John is registered and is able to participate in PKI




Token, Credential = Public Key

PKI Steps

John and Diane decide to communicate securely using PKI...

- 1. John requests Diane's public key form a public directory
- 2. The directory (a.k.a. repository) sends Diane's digital certificate
- 3. John verifies the digital certificate...
 - extracts her public key, uses the public key to encrypt a session key that will be used to encrypt their messages
 - John sends the encrypted session key to Diane
 - John also sends his certificate, containing his public key to Diane
- 4. Diane browser receives John's certificate, <u>looks to see if it</u> <u>trusts the CA</u> that digitally signed the certificate
 - Diane's browser trusts this CA
 - After verifying the certificate, both John and Diane can communicate using encryption



Root certificate

- Self-signed certificate used to sign other certificates
- Intermediate certificate
 - A certificate used to sign other certificates.
 - Must be signed by either a root certificate or another intermediate certificate


MIS 5214

• End-entity ("leaf") certificate


- Cannot be used to sign other certificates
- Include:
 - TLS/SSL server and client certificates
 - Email certificates
 - Code signing certificates
 - Qualified certificates


A PKI is often set up with multiple levels of CAs, for practical reasons:

- There is a top-level CA, called the root, which issues certificates on the keys of lower-level CAs, which in turn certify the user keys
- The system of identity validation still behaves in the same way, but now Diane has to check two certificates to verify John's key




Recall... Temple.edu's certificate...





End-entity Certificate




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To perform its role effectively, a CA needs to have one or more broadly trusted <u>root certificates</u> or intermediate certificates and the corresponding private keys

A CA may achieve broad trust by:

Having its root certificates included in popular software Obtaining a cross-signature from another CA delegating trust

Or a CA may be trusted within a relatively small community, like a business In which its root certificates are distributed by other mechanisms like Windows Group Policy





Root programs:

- Some major software products contain a list of certificate authorities that are trusted by default
- This makes it easier for end-users to validate certificates, and easier for people or
 organizations that request certificates to know which certificate authorities can issue a
 certificate that will be broadly trusted
- This is particularly important in HTTPS, where a web site operator generally wants to get a certificate that is trusted by nearly all potential visitors to their web site

The most influential root programs are:

- Microsoft Root Program
- Apple Root Program
- Mozilla Root Program
- Oracle Java root program
- Adobe Approved Trust List and EUTL root programs (used for document signing)






Root programs:

Browsers generally use the operating system's facilities to decide which certificate authorities are trusted:

- Google Chrome on Windows trusts certificate authorities included in Microsoft Root Program
- Google Chrome on macOS or iOS trusts certificate authorities in Apple Root Program
- Edge and Safari use their respective operating system trust stores as well, but each is only available on a single OS.
- Firefox, in contrast, uses the Mozilla Root Program trust store on all platforms

Microsoft Windows Root Program's Trust Stores

- 1. Run **mmc.exe**
- 2. Select File -> Add/Remove Snap-in
- 3. Select Certificates, click Add
- 4. Select Computer Account, click next, click Finish
- 5. Expand the **Certificates** node -> **Trusted Root Certificate Authorities Store**



Microsoft Windows Root Program's Trust Stores

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> 🚞 Preview Build Roots	🔄 QuoVadis Root CA 2	QuoVadis Root CA 2	11/24/2031	Server Authenticatio	QuoVadis Root CA 2			
> 🧮 Test Roots	🔄 QuoVadis Root CA 2 G3	QuoVadis Root CA 2 G3	1/12/2042	Server Authenticatio	QuoVadis Root CA 2			
SIM Certification Authorities	QuoVadis Root Certification Aut	QuoVadis Root Certification Autho	3/17/2021	Server Authenticatio	QuoVadis Root Certi			
> Homegroup Machine Certificates	🔄 SecureTrust CA	SecureTrust CA	12/31/2029	Server Authenticatio	Trustwave			
> Smart Card Trusted Roots	Security Communication RootCA1	Security Communication RootCA1	9/29/2023	Server Authenticatio	SECOM Trust Syste			
> 🚞 Trusted Packaged App Installation Authorities	🔄 Starfield Class 2 Certification Aut	Starfield Class 2 Certification Auth	6/29/2034	Server Authenticatio	Starfield Class 2 Cert			
> 📔 Trusted Devices	🔄 Starfield Root Certificate Authori	Starfield Root Certificate Authority	12/31/2037	Server Authenticatio	Starfield Root Certifi			
> 🧮 Web Hosting	🔄 Symantec Enterprise Mobile Ro	Symantec Enterprise Mobile Root f	3/14/2032	Code Signing	<none></none>			
> I Windows Live ID Token Issuer	🔄 Thawte Premium Server CA	Thawte Premium Server CA	12/31/2020	Server Authenticatio	thawte			
	📮 thawte Primary Root CA	thawte Primary Root CA	7/16/2036	Server Authenticatio	thawte			
	🔄 thawte Primary Root CA - G3	thawte Primary Root CA - G3	12/1/2037	Server Authenticatio	thawte Primary Root			
	Thawte Timestamping CA	Thawte Timestamping CA	12/31/2020	Time Stamping	Thawte Timestampi			
	T-TeleSec GlobalRoot Class 2	T-TeleSec GlobalRoot Class 2	10/1/2033	Server Authenticatio	T-TeleSec GlobalRo			
	USERTrust RSA Certification Auth	USERTrust RSA Certification Author	1/18/2038	Server Authenticatio	Sectigo			
	UTN-USERFirst-Object	UTN-USERFirst-Object	7/9/2019	Encrypting File Syst	Sectigo (UTN Object)			
	VeriSign Class 3 Public Primary C	VeriSign Class 3 Public Primary Cert	7/16/2036	Server Authenticatio	VeriSign			
	VeriSign Universal Root Certifica	VeriSign Universal Root Certificatio	12/1/2037	<all></all>	<none></none>			
	VeriSign Universal Root Certifica	VeriSign Universal Root Certificatio	12/1/2037	Server Authenticatio	VeriSign Universal R			
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Entrust Root Certification Autho	Entrust Root Certification Authority	11/27/2026	Server Authenticatio
Entrust Root Certification Autho	Entrust Root Certification Authorit	12/7/2030	Server Authenticatio
Entrust.net Certification Authorit	Entrust.net Certification Authority (7/24/2029	Server Authenticatio
Equifax Secure Certificate Autho	Equifax Secure Certificate Authority	8/22/2018	Secure Email, Server
🔄 GeoTrust Global CA	GeoTrust Global CA	5/20/2022	Server Authenticatio
GeoTrust Primary Certification A	GeoTrust Primary Certification Aut	1/18/2038	Server Authenticatio
GeoTrust Primary Certification A	GeoTrust Primary Certification Aut	12/1/2037	Server Authenticatio
GlobalSign	GlobalSign	3/18/2029	Server Authenticatio
GlobalSign	GlobalSign	12/15/2021	Server Authenticatio
🔄 GlobalSign Root CA	GlobalSign Root CA	1/28/2028	Server Authenticatio
Go Daddy Class 2 Certification A	Go Daddy Class 2 Certification Aut	6/29/2034	Server Authenticatio
🔄 Go Daddy Root Certificate Auth	Go Daddy Root Certificate Authori	12/31/2037	Server Authenticatio
GTE CyberTrust Global Root	GTE CyberTrust Global Root	8/13/2018	Secure Email, Client
Hotspot 2.0 Trust Root CA - 03	Hotspot 2.0 Trust Root CA - 03	12/8/2043	Server Authenticatio
🔄 Intel(R) Technology Access	Intel(R) Technology Access	12/1/2022	<all></all>
Microsoft Authenticode(tm) Roo	Microsoft Authenticode(tm) Root	12/31/1999	Secure Email, Code
Microsoft ECC Product Root Cert	Microsoft ECC Product Root Certifi	2/27/2043	<all></all>
Microsoft ECC Product Root Cert	Microsoft ECC Product Root Certifi	2/27/2043	<all></all>
Microsoft ECC TS Root Certificat	Microsoft ECC TS Root Certificate	2/27/2043	<all></all>
Microsoft Root Authority	Microsoft Root Authority	12/31/2020	<all></all>
Kicrosoft Root Certificate Autho	Microsoft Root Certificate Authority	5/9/2021	<all></all>
Microsoft Root Certificate Autho	Microsoft Root Certificate Authorit	6/23/2035	<all></all>
Microsoft Root Certificate Autho	Microsoft Root Certificate Authorit	3/22/2036	<all></all>
Microsoft Time Stamp Root Cert	Microsoft Time Stamp Root Certifi	10/22/2039	<all></all>
🔄 NetLock Arany (Class Gold) Főta	NetLock Arany (Class Gold) Főtanú	12/6/2028	Server Authenticatio
NO LIABILITY ACCEPTED, (c)97 Ve	NO LIABILITY ACCEPTED, (c)97 VeriS	1/7/2004	Time Stamping
QuoVadis Root CA 2	QuoVadis Root CA 2	11/24/2031	Server Authenticatio
QuoVadis Root CA 2 G3	QuoVadis Root CA 2 G3	1/12/2042	Server Authenticatio
QuoVadis Root Certification Aut	QuoVadis Root Certification Autho	3/17/2021	Server Authenticatio
SecureTrust CA	SecureTrust CA	12/31/2029	Server Authenticatio
Security Communication RootCA1		9/29/2023	Server Authenticatio
Starfield Class 2 Certification Aut		6/29/2034	Server Authenticatio
Starfield Root Certificate Authori	and the second se	12/31/2037	Server Authenticatio
Symantec Enterprise Mobile Ro	Symantec Enterprise Mobile Root f	3/14/2032	Code Signing
Thawte Premium Server CA	Thawte Premium Server CA	12/31/2020	Server Authenticatio
thawte Primary Root CA	thawte Primary Root CA	7/16/2036	Server Authenticatio
thawte Primary Root CA - G3	thawte Primary Root CA - G3	12/1/2037	Server Authenticatio
Thawte Timestamping CA	Thawte Timestamping CA	12/31/2020	Time Stamping
T-TeleSec GlobalRoot Class 2	T-TeleSec GlobalRoot Class 2	10/1/2033	Server Authenticatio
USERTrust RSA Certification Auth	USERTrust RSA Certification Author	1/18/2038	Server Authenticatio
UTN-USERFirst-Object	UTN-USERFirst-Object	7/9/2019	Encrypting File Syst
VeriSign Class 3 Public Primary C	VeriSign Class 3 Public Primary Cert	7/16/2036	Server Authenticatio
VeriSign Universal Root Certifica	VeriSign Universal Root Certificatio	12/1/2037	<all> 2/</all>
🔄 VeriSign Universal Root Certifica	VeriSign Universal Root Certificatio	12/1/2037	Server Authenticatio

Issued To

AAA Certificate Services

AffirmTrust Commercial

Amazon Root CA 1

Certum CA

AddTrust External CA Root

Baltimore CyberTrust Root

Certum Trusted Network CA

DigiCert Assured ID Root CA

🔄 DigiCert Global Root CA

DigiCert Global Root G2

DigiCert Global Root G3

Class 3 Public Primary Certificati...

COMODO RSA Certification Aut...

Copyright (c) 1997 Microsoft Corp.

DigiCert High Assurance EV Roo...

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Certum CA

AAA Certificate Services

AffirmTrust Commercial

Amazon Root CA 1

AddTrust External CA Root

Baltimore CyberTrust Root

Certum Trusted Network CA

DigiCert Assured ID Root CA

DigiCert Global Root CA

DigiCert Global Root G2

DigiCert Global Root G3

Class 3 Public Primary Certification ..

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Copyright (c) 1997 Microsoft Corp.

DigiCert High Assurance EV Root CA

Expiration Date

12/31/2028

5/30/2020

12/31/2030

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1/18/2038

12/30/1999

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11/9/2031

1/15/2038

1/15/2038

11/9/2031

12/31/2029

Intended Purposes

Server Authenticatio...

Time Stamping

Friendly Name

Sectigo (AAA)

Server Authenticatio... DigiCert Baltimore R...

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DigiCert

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Sectigo (AddTrust)

Amazon Root CA 1

Certum Trusted Net...

VeriSign Class 3 Pub...

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Microsoft Timestam...

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DST Root CA X3 Entrust Entrust.net Entrust (2048) GeoTrust GeoTrust Global CA GeoTrust Primary Ce... GeoTrust Primary Ce... GlobalSign Root CA .. Google Trust Service.. GlobalSign Root CA .. Go Daddy Class 2 C... Go Daddy Root Cert... DigiCert Global Root Hotspot 2.0 Trust Ro... <None> Microsoft Authentic... Microsoft ECC Prod... Microsoft ECC Prod... Microsoft ECC TS Ro.. Microsoft Root Aut... Microsoft Root Certi... Microsoft Root Certi.. Microsoft Root Certi. Microsoft Time Sta... NetLock Arany (Clas... VeriSign Time Stam. QuoVadis Root CA 2 QuoVadis Root CA 2... QuoVadis Root Certi.. Trustwave SECOM Trust Syste... Starfield Class 2 Cert..

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Microsoft Windows Root Program's Trust Stores

Console1 - [Console Root\Certificates (Local Compute	r)\Trusted Root Certification Authorities	\Certificates]					- 0	×
🚰 File Action View Favorites Window Help							-	- 8 ×
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Console Root	Issued To	Issued By	Expiration Date	Intended Purposes	Friendly Name	^	Actions	
	Microsoft ECC Product Root Cert Microsoft ECC Product Root Cert Microsoft ECC TS Root Certificat Microsoft Root Authority Microsoft Root Certificate Autho	Microsoft ECC Product Root Certifi Microsoft ECC Product Root Certifi Microsoft ECC TS Root Certificate Microsoft Root Authority Microsoft Root Certificate Authority Microsoft Root Certificate Authorit Microsoft Time Stamp Root Certifi NetLock Arany (Class Gold) Fótanú NO LIABILITY ACCEPTED, (c)97 VeriS Quo'Vadis Root CA 2 G3 Quo'Vadis Root CA 2 G3 QuoVadis Root CA 2 G3 QuoVadis Root CA 2 G3 SecureTrust CA Security Communication RootCA1 Starfield Class 2 Certification Auth	Expiration Date 2/27/2043 2/27/2043 12/31/2020 5/9/2021 6/23/2035 3/22/2036 10/22/2039 12/6/2028 1/7/2004 11/24/2031 1/12/2042 3/17/2021 12/31/2029 9/29/2023 6/29/2034 12/31/2037 3/14/2032 12/31/2020 7/16/2036	Intended Purposes <all> <all> <all> <all> <all> <all> <all> <all> <all> Server Authenticatio Time Stamping Server Authenticatio Server Authenticatio</all></all></all></all></all></all></all></all></all>	Friendly Name Microsoft ECC Prod Microsoft ECC Prod Microsoft ECC TS Ro Microsoft Root Aut Microsoft Root Certi Microsoft Root Certi Microsoft Root Certi Microsoft Root Certi Microsoft Root Certi Microsoft Root Certi Microsoft Root Certi Tirustwave Staffield Root Cert Starfield Class 2 Cert	^	Actions Certificates More Actions	*
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GeoTrust Primary Certification A	GeoTrust Primary Certification Aut	1/18/2038
GeoTrust Primary Certification A	GeoTrust Primary Certification Aut	12/1/2037
🔄 GlobalSign	GlobalSign	3/18/2029
🔄 GlobalSign	GlobalSign	12/15/2021
GlobalSign Root CA	GlobalSign Root CA	1/28/2028
Go Daddy Class 2 Certification A	Go Daddy Class 2 Certification Aut	6/29/2034
🔄 Go Daddy Root Certificate Auth	Go Daddy Root Certificate Authori	12/31/2037
🔄 GTE CyberTrust Global Root	GTE CyberTrust Global Root	8/13/2018
🔄 Hotspot 2.0 Trust Root CA - 03	Hotspot 2.0 Trust Root CA - 03	12/8/2043
Intel(R) Technology Access	Intel(R) Technology Access	12/1/2022
🔄 Microsoft Authenticode(tm) Roo	Microsoft Authenticode(tm) Root	12/31/1999
Microsoft ECC Product Root Cert	Microsoft ECC Product Root Certifi	2/27/2043
🔄 Microsoft ECC Product Root Cert	Microsoft ECC Product Root Certifi	2/27/2043
Microsoft ECC TS Root Certificat	Microsoft ECC TS Root Certificate	2/27/2043
Microsoft Root Authority	Microsoft Root Authority	12/31/2020
Microsoft Root Certificate Autho	Microsoft Root Certificate Authority	5/9/2021
Microsoft Root Certificate Autho	Microsoft Root Certificate Authorit	6/23/2035
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🔄 Microsoft Time Stamp Root Cert	Microsoft Time Stamp Root Certifi	10/22/2039
🔄 NetLock Arany (Class Gold) Főta	NetLock Arany (Class Gold) Főtanú	12/6/2028
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QuoVadis Root CA 2	QuoVadis Root CA 2	11/24/2031
🔄 QuoVadis Root CA 2 G3	QuoVadis Root CA 2 G3	1/12/2042
QuoVadis Root Certification Aut	QuoVadis Root Certification Autho	3/17/2021
🔄 SecureTrust CA	SecureTrust CA	12/31/2029
Security Communication RootCA1	Security Communication RootCA1	9/29/2023
🔄 Starfield Class 2 Certification Aut	Starfield Class 2 Certification Auth	6/29/2034
Starfield Root Certificate Authori	Starfield Root Certificate Authority	12/31/2037
🔄 Symantec Enterprise Mobile Ro	Symantec Enterprise Mobile Root f	3/14/2032
🔄 Thawte Premium Server CA	Thawte Premium Server CA	12/31/2020
🔄 thawte Primary Root CA	thawte Primary Root CA	7/16/2036
🔄 thawte Primary Root CA - G3	thawte Primary Root CA - G3	12/1/2037
Thawte Timestamping CA	Thawte Timestamping CA	12/31/2020
T-TeleSec GlobalRoot Class 2	T-TeleSec GlobalRoot Class 2	10/1/2033
USERTrust RSA Certification Auth	USERTrust RSA Certification Author	1/18/2038
UTN-USERFirst-Object	UTN-USERFirst-Object	7/9/2019

Issued By

AAA Certificate Services

Expiration Date

12/31/2028

Intended Purposes

Server Authenticatio... Sectigo (AAA)

Friendly Name

Issued To

AAA Certificate Services

1	AAA Certificate Services	AAA Certificate Services	12/31/2028	Server Authenticatio	Sectigo (AAA)
	AddTrust External CA Root	AddTrust External CA Root	5/30/2020	Server Authenticatio	Sectigo (AddTrust)
	AffirmTrust Commercial	AffirmTrust Commercial	12/31/2030	Server Authenticatio	AffirmTrust Commer
	Amazon Root CA 1	Amazon Root CA 1	1/16/2038	Server Authenticatio	Amazon Root CA 1
5	Baltimore CyberTrust Root	Baltimore CyberTrust Root	5/12/2025	Server Authenticatio	DigiCert Baltimore R
5	Certum CA	Certum CA	6/11/2027	Server Authenticatio	Certum
	Certum Trusted Network CA	Certum Trusted Network CA	12/31/2029	Server Authenticatio	Certum Trusted Net
	Class 3 Public Primary Certificati	Class 3 Public Primary Certification	8/1/2028	Server Authenticatio	VeriSign Class 3 Pub
	COMODO RSA Certification Aut	COMODO RSA Certification Autho	1/18/2038	Server Authenticatio	Sectigo (formerly Co
	Copyright (c) 1997 Microsoft Corp.	Copyright (c) 1997 Microsoft Corp.	12/30/1999	Time Stamping	Microsoft Timestam
	DigiCert Assured ID Root CA	DigiCert Assured ID Root CA	11/9/2031	Server Authenticatio	DigiCert
	DigiCert Global Root CA	DigiCert Global Root CA	11/9/2031	Server Authenticatio	DigiCert
	DigiCert Global Root G2	DigiCert Global Root G2	1/15/2038	Server Authenticatio	DigiCert Global Roo
	DigiCert Global Root G3	DigiCert Global Root G3	1/15/2038	Server Authenticatio	DigiCert Global Roo
	DigiCert High Assurance EV Roo	DigiCert High Assurance EV Root CA	11/9/2031	Server Authenticatio	DigiCert
	DST Root CA X3	DST Root CA X3	9/30/2021	Secure Email, Server	DST Root CA X3
	Entrust Root Certification Autho	Entrust Root Certification Authority	11/27/2026	Server Authenticatio	Entrust
	Entrust Root Certification Autho	Entrust Root Certification Authorit	12/7/2030	Server Authenticatio	Entrust.net
E	Entrust.net Certification Authorit	Entrust.net Certification Authority (7/24/2029	Server Authenticatio	Entrust (2048)
	Equifax Secure Certificate Autho	Equifax Secure Certificate Authority	8/22/2018	Secure Email, Server	GeoTrust
	GeoTrust Global CA	GeoTrust Global CA	5/20/2022	Server Authenticatio	GeoTrust Global CA
	GeoTrust Primary Certification A	GeoTrust Primary Certification Aut	1/18/2038	Server Authenticatio	GeoTrust Primary Ce
	GeoTrust Primary Certification A	GeoTrust Primary Certification Aut	12/1/2037	Server Authenticatio	GeoTrust Primary Ce
	GlobalSign	GlobalSign	3/18/2029	Server Authenticatio	GlobalSign Root CA
	GlobalSign	GlobalSign	12/15/2021	Server Authenticatio	Google Trust Service
	GlobalSign Root CA	GlobalSign Root CA	1/28/2028	Server Authenticatio	GlobalSign Root CA
	Go Daddy Class 2 Certification A	Go Daddy Class 2 Certification Aut	6/29/2034	Server Authenticatio	Go Daddy Class 2 C
	Go Daddy Root Certificate Auth	Go Daddy Root Certificate Authori	12/31/2037	Server Authenticatio	Go Daddy Root Cert
	GTE CyberTrust Global Root	GTE CyberTrust Global Root	8/13/2018	Secure Email, Client	DigiCert Global Root
	Hotspot 2.0 Trust Root CA - 03	Hotspot 2.0 Trust Root CA - 03	12/8/2043	Server Authenticatio	Hotspot 2.0 Trust Ro
	Intel(R) Technology Access	Intel(R) Technology Access	12/1/2022	<all></all>	<none></none>
5	Microsoft Authenticode(tm) Roo	Microsoft Authenticode(tm) Root	12/31/1999	Secure Email, Code	Microsoft Authentic
5	Microsoft ECC Product Root Cert	Microsoft ECC Product Root Certifi	2/27/2043	<all></all>	Microsoft ECC Prod
	Microsoft ECC Product Root Cert	Microsoft ECC Product Root Certifi	2/27/2043	<all></all>	Microsoft ECC Prod
5	Microsoft ECC TS Root Certificat	Microsoft ECC TS Root Certificate	2/27/2043	<all></all>	Microsoft ECC TS Ro
	Microsoft Root Authority	Microsoft Root Authority	12/31/2020	<all></all>	Microsoft Root Aut
	Microsoft Root Certificate Autho	Microsoft Root Certificate Authority	5/9/2021	<all></all>	Microsoft Root Certi
	Microsoft Root Certificate Autho	Microsoft Root Certificate Authorit	6/23/2035	<all></all>	Microsoft Root Certi
5	Microsoft Root Certificate Autho	Microsoft Root Certificate Authorit	3/22/2036	<all></all>	Microsoft Root Certi
5	Microsoft Time Stamp Root Cert	Microsoft Time Stamp Root Certifi	10/22/2039	<all></all>	Microsoft Time Sta
	NetLock Arany (Class Gold) Fóta	NetLock Arany (Class Gold) Fótanú	12/6/2028	Server Authenticatio	NetLock Arany (Clas
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5	QuoVadis Root CA 2	QuoVadis Root CA 2	11/24/2031	Server Authenticatio	QuoVadis Root CA 2
	QuoVadis Root CA 2 G3	QuoVadis Root CA 2 G3	1/12/2042	Server Authenticatio	QuoVadis Root CA 2
	QuoVadis Root Certification Aut	QuoVadis Root Certification Autho	3/17/2021	Server Authenticatio	QuoVadis Root Certi
5	SecureTrust CA	SecureTrust CA	12/31/2029	Server Authenticatio	Trustwave
5	Security Communication RootCA1	Security Communication RootCA1	9/29/2023	Server Authenticatio	SECOM Trust Syste
	Starfield Class 2 Certification Aut	Starfield Class 2 Certification Auth	6/29/2034	Server Authenticatio	Starfield Class 2 Cert
	Starfield Root Certificate Authori	Starfield Root Certificate Authority	12/31/2037	Server Authenticatio	Starfield Root Certifi
5	Symantec Enterprise Mobile Ro	Symantec Enterprise Mobile Root f	3/14/2032	Code Signing	<none></none>
5	Thawte Premium Server CA	Thawte Premium Server CA	12/31/2020	Server Authenticatio	thawte
	thawte Primary Root CA	thawte Primary Root CA	7/16/2036	Server Authenticatio	thawte
	thawte Primary Root CA - G3	thawte Primary Root CA - G3	12/1/2037	Server Authenticatio	thawte Primary Root
	Thawte Timestamping CA	Thawte Timestamping CA	12/31/2020	Time Stamping	Thawte Timestampi
5	T-TeleSec GlobalRoot Class 2	T-TeleSec GlobalRoot Class 2	10/1/2033	Server Authenticatio	T-TeleSec GlobalRo
	USERTrust RSA Certification Auth	USERTrust RSA Certification Author	1/18/2038	Server Authenticatio	Sectigo
	UTN-USERFirst-Object	UTN-USERFirst-Object	7/9/2019	Encrypting File Syst	Sectigo (UTN Object)
5	VeriSign Class 3 Public Primary C	VeriSign Class 3 Public Primary Cert	7/16/2036	Server Authenticatio	VeriSign
	VeriSign Universal Root Certifica	VeriSign Universal Root Certificatio	12/1/2037	<ali> 28</ali>	<none></none>
5	VeriSign Universal Root Certifica	VeriSign Universal Root Certificatio	12/1/2037	Server Authenticatio	VeriSign Universal R
<					>

Mac OS X

The root store is in the Keychain.app

- 1. Search Finder (Spotlight) for "keychain"
- 2. Double-click Keychain Access app
- 3. Select "System Roots" in the left-hand pane

Certificate Revocation List (CRL) – in principle

CRL is the mechanism for the CA to let others know that a certificate has become invalid for some reason

A certificate may be revoked because

- The key holder's private key was compromised
- CA discovered the Certificate was issued to the wrong person
- The certificate expired
- The certificate became invalid for other reasons...

The CA handles revocation by putting the revoked certificate's information on a *certificate revocation list* (CRL)

- The CRL is a list of every certificate that has been revoked
- The CRL is maintained and updated

Microsoft Windows Root Program's Trust Stores

Gertificate X	🗔 Certificate	
General Details Certification Path	General Details Certification	Path
Certificate Information	Show: <all></all>	~
This certificate has expired or is not yet valid. Issued to: Microsoft Authenticode(tm) Root Authority Issued by: Microsoft Authenticode(tm) Root Authority Valid from 1/1/1995 to 12/31/1999	Field Version Serial number Signature algorithm Signature hash algorithm Signature hash algorithm Valid from Valid to Subject	Value V3 01 md5RSA Microsoft Authenticode(tm) Roo Sunday, January 01, 1995 3:00 Friday, December 31, 1999 6:5 Microsoft Authenticode(tm) Roo
Issuer Statement		Edit Properties Copy to File
ОК		С

	Issued To	Issued By	Expiration Date	Intended Purposes	Friendly Name
	AAA Certificate Services	AAA Certificate Services	12/31/2028	Server Authenticatio	Sectigo (AAA)
	AddTrust External CA Root	AddTrust External CA Root	5/30/2020	Server Authenticatio	Sectigo (AddTrust)
	AffirmTrust Commercial	AffirmTrust Commercial	12/31/2030	Server Authenticatio	AffirmTrust Commer
	Amazon Root CA 1	Amazon Root CA 1	1/16/2038	Server Authenticatio	Amazon Root CA 1
	Baltimore CyberTrust Root	Baltimore CyberTrust Root	5/12/2025	Server Authenticatio	DigiCert Baltimore R
	Certum CA	Certum CA	6/11/2027	Server Authenticatio	Certum
	Certum Trusted Network CA	Certum Trusted Network CA	12/31/2029	Server Authenticatio	Certum Trusted Net
	Class 3 Public Primary Certificati	Class 3 Public Primary Certification	8/1/2028	Server Authenticatio	VeriSign Class 3 Pub
	COMODO RSA Certification Aut	COMODO RSA Certification Autho	1/18/2038	Server Authenticatio	Sectigo (formerly Co
	Copyright (c) 1997 Microsoft Corp.		12/30/1999	Time Stamping	Microsoft Timestam
	DigiCert Assured ID Root CA	DigiCert Assured ID Root CA	11/9/2031	Server Authenticatio	DigiCert
	DigiCert Global Root CA	DigiCert Global Root CA	11/9/2031	Server Authenticatio	DigiCert
	DigiCert Global Root G2	DigiCert Global Root G2	1/15/2038	Server Authenticatio	DigiCert Global Roo
	DigiCert Global Root G3	DigiCert Global Root G3	1/15/2038	Server Authenticatio	DigiCert Global Roo
	DigiCert High Assurance EV Roo	DigiCert High Assurance EV Root CA	11/9/2031	Server Authenticatio	DigiCert
	DST Root CA X3	DST Root CA X3	9/30/2021	Secure Email, Server	DST Root CA X3
	Entrust Root Certification Autho	Entrust Root Certification Authority	11/27/2026	Server Authenticatio	Entrust
	Entrust Root Certification Autho	Entrust Root Certification Authorit	12/7/2030	Server Authenticatio	Entrust.net
	Entrust.net Certification Authorit	Entrust.net Certification Authority (7/24/2029	Server Authenticatio	Entrust (2048)
	Equifax Secure Certificate Autho	Equifax Secure Certificate Authority	8/22/2018	Secure Email, Server	GeoTrust
	GeoTrust Global CA	GeoTrust Global CA	5/20/2022	Server Authenticatio	GeoTrust Global CA
	GeoTrust Primary Certification A	GeoTrust Primary Certification Aut	1/18/2038	Server Authenticatio	GeoTrust Primary Ce
	GeoTrust Primary Certification A	GeoTrust Primary Certification Aut	12/1/2037	Server Authenticatio	GeoTrust Primary Ce
	GlobalSign	GlobalSign	3/18/2029	Server Authenticatio	GlobalSign Root CA
	GlobalSign	GlobalSign	12/15/2021	Server Authenticatio	Google Trust Service
	GlobalSign Root CA	GlobalSign Root CA	1/28/2028	Server Authenticatio	GlobalSign Root CA
	Go Daddy Class 2 Certification A	Go Daddy Class 2 Certification Aut	6/29/2034	Server Authenticatio	Go Daddy Class 2 C
	Go Daddy Root Certificate Auth	Go Daddy Root Certificate Authori	12/31/2037	Server Authenticatio	Go Daddy Root Cert
	GTE CyberTrust Global Root	GTE CyberTrust Global Root	8/13/2018	Secure Email, Client	DigiCert Global Root
	Hotspot 2.0 Trust Root CA - 03	Hotspot 2.0 Trust Root CA - 03	12/8/2043	Server Authenticatio	Hotspot 2.0 Trust Ro
	Intel(R) Technology Access	Intel(R) Technology Access	12/1/2022	<all></all>	<none></none>
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	Microsoft Root Authority	Microsoft Root Authority	12/31/2020	<all></all>	Microsoft Root Aut
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	NetLock Arany (Class Gold) Fóta	NetLock Arany (Class Gold) Főtanú	12/6/2028	Server Authenticatio	NetLock Arany (Clas
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	SecureTrust CA	SecureTrust CA	12/31/2029	Server Authenticatio	Trustwave
	Security Communication RootCA1		9/29/2023	Server Authenticatio	SECOM Trust Syste
	Starfield Class 2 Certification Aut		6/29/2023	Server Authenticatio	Starfield Class 2 Cert
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	T-TeleSec GlobalRoot Class 2 USERTrust RSA Certification Auth	T-TeleSec GlobalRoot Class 2 USERTrust RSA Certification Author	10/1/2033	Server Authenticatio	T-TeleSec GlobalRo
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Certificate Revocation List (CRL) – in practice

CRLs are problematic in many PKI implementations for many reasons

- Either user's browser must check a central CRL to find out if a certificate has been revoked
- ...or the CA must continually push out CRL values to clients to ensure they have an updated CRL


By default, web browsers do not check a CRL to ensure that a certificate is not revoked

 So when you are setting up a SSL connection to do e-Commerce over the Internet, you may be relying on a revoked certificate and not know it

Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) is increasingly being used...


- If OCSP is implemented, it works automatically
- OCSP does real-time certificate validation
 - Checks the CRL maintained by the CA
 - Notifies user if certificate is valid, invalid, or unknown

PKI Roles and Workflows



Where do you look for Security Controls for PKI Certificates ?

CNTL		RITY	INITIA	L CONTROL BASI	ELINES
NO.	CONTROL NAME	PRIORITY	LOW	MOD	HIGH
	System and Com	nunica	tions Protection		
SC-1	System and Communications Protection Policy and Procedures	P1	SC-1	SC-1	SC-1
SC-2	Application Partitioning	P1	Not Selected	SC-2	SC-2
SC-3	Security Function Isolation	P1	Not Selected	Not Selected	SC-3
SC-4	Information in Shared Resources	P1	Not Selected	SC-4	SC-4
SC-5	Denial of Service Protection	P1	SC-5	SC-5	SC-5
SC-6	Resource Availability	P0	Not Selected	Not Selected	Not Selected
SC-7	Boundary Protection	P1	SC-7	SC-7 (3) (4) (5) (7)	SC-7 (3) (4) (5) (7) (8) (18) (21)
SC-8	Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity	P1	Not Selected	SC-8 (1)	SC-8 (1)
SC-9	Withdrawn				
SC-10	Network Disconnect	P2	Not Selected	SC-10	SC-10
SC-11	Trusted Path	P0	Not Selected	Not Selected	Not Selected
SC-12	Cryptographic Key Establishment and Management	P1	SC-12	SC-12	SC-12 (1)
SC-13	Cryptographic Protection	P1	SC-13	SC-13	SC-13
SC-14	Withdrawn				
SC-15	Collaborative Computing Devices	P1	SC-15	SC-15	SC-15
SC-16	Transmission of Security Attributes	P0	Not Selected	Not Selected	Not Selected
SC-17	Public Key Infrastructure Certificates	P1	Not Selected	SC-17	SC-17
SC-18	Mobile Code	P2	Not Selected	SC-18	SC-18
SC-19	Voice Over Internet Protocol	P1	Not Selected	SC-19	SC-19
SC-20	Secure Name /Address Resolution Service (Authoritative Source)	P1	SC-20	SC-20	SC-20
SC-21	Secure Name /Address Resolution Service (Recursive or Caching Resolver)	P1	SC-21	SC-21	SC-21
SC-22	Architecture and Provisioning for Name/Address Resolution Service	P1	SC-22	SC-22	SC-22
SC-23	Session Authenticity	P1	Not Selected	SC-23	SC-23
SC-24	Fail in Known State	P1	Not Selected	Not Selected	SC-24



MIS 5214

Where else do you look for Security Controls based on the use of PKI Certificates ?

...there are a number of controls that use certificates, including:

CM-14 SIGNED COMPONENTS

<u>Control</u>: Prevent the installation of [*Assignment: organization-defined software and firmware components*] without verification that the component has been digitally signed using a certificate that is recognized and approved by the organization.

<u>Discussion</u>: Software and firmware components prevented from installation unless signed with recognized and approved certificates include software and firmware version updates, patches, service packs, device drivers, and basic input/output system updates. Organizations can identify applicable software and firmware components by type, by specific items, or a combination of both. Digital signatures and organizational verification of such signatures is a method of code authentication.

Related Controls: CM-7, SC-12, SC-13, SI-7.

References: [IR 8062].

2/56 ^ ~	ertificate
NIST Special Publication 800-53 Revision 5	
Security and Privacy Controls for prmation Systems and Organizations	
JOINT TASK FORCE	
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5	
September 2020 INCLUDES UPDATES AS OF 12-10-2020; SEE PAGE XVII	
Sources of the second s	
U.S. Department of Commerce Wilbur L. Ross, Ir., Secretary National Institute of Standards and Technology	

Agenda

- ✓ Digital Certificates
- ✓ Public Key Infrastructure
- Types of Networks
- OSI Model
- Layer 1 Network Devices
- Layer 2 Network Devices
- Layer 3 Network Devices
- Layer 3 7 Network Devices

Types of networks


- Personal Area Network (PAN)
 - Generally, a microcomputer network used for communications among personal computer devices being used by an individual
 - Laptops, tablets, printers, scanners, cameras, telephones
 - May also be connected to a higher-level network and the Internet
 - Extent is typically within 10 meters (33 feet)
 - May be wired with computer buses such as Universal Serial Bus (USB)
 - A Wireless PAN (WPAN) can be set up using network technology such as infrared data association (IrDA) and Bluetooth (piconet)
 - A piconet can include up to 8 active devices in master-slave relationship can range from 10 meters to 100 meters



Types of networks

- Local Area Network (LAN)
 - Cover a limited area, such as home, office or campus
 - Characteristics: High data transfer rates, with smaller geographic range
 - Eithernet and Wi-Fi (WLANs) are the 2 most common technologies used
- Storage Area Network (SAN)
 - Centralize the process for the storage and administration of data
 - Variation of LAN dedicated to connecting storage devices to servers and other computing devices
- Wide Area Network (WAN)
 - Computer network that covers a broad area, such as a city, region, nation or an international link
 - Used to connect LANS and other types of networks together so that users and computers in one location can communicate with users and computers in other locations
 - May be private and built for 1 particular organization
 - May be built by Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to provide connections from an organization's LAN to the Internet
 - May be wireless (WWAN)
 - Internet is the largest example of a WAN
- Metropolitan Area Network (MAN)
 - A WAN that is limited to a city or a region
 - MANs are usually, characterized by higher data transfer rates than WANs

OSI Model



Layer 1: Physical Layer


Network Interface Card (NIC)

- Produces and interprets electromagnetic signals from the network to/from binary bits processed in the computer
- Converts bits into signals or voltages suitable for transmission across the Local Area Network (LAN) and/or Wide Area Network technology it is connected to
- Determines synchronization, data transfer rates, line noise and transmission techniques based on the physical connection to electrical, optical or mechanical equipment

E.g. A '1' bit transmitted via Ethernet would be translated by the NIC to +0.5-volt electric signal, and '0' bit would be transmitted as 0-volts

Standard interfaces at this layer include:

- RS/EIA/TIA-422, RS/EIA/TIA-423, RS/EIA/TIA-429, RS/EIA/TIA-449, RS/EIA/TIA-485
- 10Base-T, 10Base2, 10Base5, 100Base-TX, 100Base-FX, 100Base-T, 1000Base-T, 1000-Base-SX



TIA – Telecommunications Industry Association


EIA – Electronic Industry Alliance

Layer 1 Network Components – Repeaters & Hubs

- A <u>repeater</u> provides the simplest type of connectivity
 - Work at the physical layer (Layer 1) looks at the electrical signal (not within the packets)
 - Add-on devices for extending a network over a greater distance by repeating electrical signals between cable segments
 - Needed to amplify signals because signals are attenuated (reduced) the further they travel
- A <u>hub</u> is a multiport repeater
 - Often referred to as a "concentrator" physically connecting several computers and devices enabling them to communicate with each other
 - When 1 system sends a signal to go to another system, the hub broadcasts the signal to all ports and systems connected to the hub
- Does not understand nor work with IP or MAC addresses
- Can work as a line conditioner to clean up signals
 - Works much better when amplifying digital signals which are discrete units making removal of background noise much easier
 - When amplifying analog signals, accompanying noise can be amplified too further distorting the signal

Layer 1 Collision Domain – Hubs

- The term **collision domain** is used to describe a part of a network where packet collisions can occur
 - Packet collisions occur when two devices on a shared network segment send packets simultaneously
 - The colliding packets must be discarded and sent again, which reduces network efficiency
- Collisions occur often in a hub environment because all devices connected to the hub are in the same collision domain
 - Total network bandwidth is shared among all devices
 - Only one device may transmit at time, and all the other devices connected to the hub must listen to the network in order to avoid collisions
 - This contention and resulting collisions causes traffic delays and uses up previous bandwidth




Layer 2 Network Components – Bridge

- Local Area Network (LAN) device used to connect LAN segments
 - Works at the data link layer (Layer 2) looks at the MAC address within the header
 - Used to segment larger overburdened networks into smaller segments to reduce collision domains and ensure better use of bandwidth and traffic control
 - Amplifies the electrical signal (like a repeater)
 - Has more intelligence than a repeater for filtering frames and controlling where they go
- Filters data frames based on MAC addresses at data link layer (not with IP addresses)
 - When data frame arrives the bridge determines if MAC address is on LAN segment, and if so it sends the data to the port which the network segment is connected
 - If MAC address is not on LAN segment, bridge forwards frame to correct network segment
- "Transparent bridging"
 - Enables bridges to dynamically learn and record MAC addresses and ports from computers sending data frames
- 3 types of bridges:
 - Local bridge connects 2+ LAN segments within a local area (e.g. building) 1.
 - 2. Remote bridge – connects 2+ LAN segments over a Metropolitan Area Network (MAN) using telecommunication links (e.g. telephone or other transmission lines)
 - Translation bridge translates protocols as it connects 2+ different types of networks (e.g. Ethernet 3. and fiberoptic) MIS 5214

Layer 2 Network Components – Switch (basic)


Works at the data link layer (Layer 2), forwarding traffic based on MAC addresses


- Is a multiport bridging device, and each port provides dedicated bandwidth to each device attached to it
 - A port is bridged to another port so the 2 devices have an end-to-end private link
 - Employs full-duplex communication, ensures the 2 are not competing for the same bandwidth
 - 1 wire pair is used for sending, another pair used for receiving
- Reduces and removes the sharing of the network medium and problems that come with it
 - When the data frame comes to the switch, the switch sends the frame directly to the destination computer or network
 - Results in
 - A reduction of traffic
 - More efficient use of network bandwidth
 - Decreased latency
 - Increased security each computer can only see traffic sent to it MAC address (blocks eavesdropping)
- Contention between computers using the network and collisions are not issues when switches are used



Layer 3 Network Components - Routers

- Works at the network layer (Layer 3), looking farther into the frame at the IP address and other routing information
- Used by administrator to divide network along the lines of departments, workgroups, or other business-oriented divisions
- Connecting 2 or more networks together
 - Can connect similar types of networks (e.g. 2 Ethernet LANS) or different types of networks (e.g. Ethernet LAN to a Token Ring LAN)
- Has 2+ interfaces, a routing table, and is able to calculate the shortest route between sending and receiving hosts
 - Changes header information in the packet so the packet can go to the next correct router, or if the destination computer is on the connecting network, the changes made enable the packet to go directly to the destination computer
- Has a 1st generation fire-wall i.e. Access Control List (ACL) built in
 - When packets arrive at one of the interfaces, the router compares the source and destination IP addresses, protocol type, and source and destination ports to the ACL
 - Decides which packets are allowed in and which are denied





tp-link

Status Quick Setup

Network

Wireless

DHCP

Forwarding

Security

Guest Network

- Basic Security

- Advanced Security

- Local Management

Parental Controls

Advanced Routing

Bandwidth Control

IP & MAC Binding

Dynamic DNS

System Tools

IPv6

Logout


Access Control

- Remote Management

Collision Domains - Bridge, Switch, and Router

In contrast to hubs, every port on a bridge, switch, or a router is in a separate collision domain

 This eliminates the possibility of collisions and enables the devices to use the full-duplex mode of communication, which effectively doubles the maximum data capacity



The picture depicts a network of:

- 7 computers, two hubs, a bridge, a switch, and a router
- 7 collision domains are created by these devices, marked in red
 - All devices connected to a hub are in the same collision domain
 - Each port on a bridge, a switch or router is in a separate collision domain

Network Components – Layer 3 Switches


Switches have evolved...

- They now can work at the Network Layer...
- Layer 3 switch is a "router of steroids" Has the intelligence of a router (MAC and IP addressing) but is much more efficient
 - While a router's functionality is implemented in software running on a microprocessor, a layer 3 switch's routing functionality is implemented directly in hardware
 - Layer 3 (& 4) switches use Multiprotocol Label Switching (MPLS) for
 - Faster more direct routing between sender and receiver
 - Addressing additional service and security requirements of different types of packets
 - Time-sensitive traffic has higher priority than less sensitive traffic
 - More granular access control

Layer 3+ VLANS

Modern layer 3+ switches enable administrators to create Virtual LANs (VLANs) to separate and group computers logically based on:

- Business needs, resource requirements, and security policies
- Rather than physical location of the systems (as is done with repeaters, bridges, and routers)




Harris and Maymi (2019) All In One CISSP Exam Guide, p. 604

Layer 3+ VLANS

Exist on a higher logical level than the physical network and are not bound by it

- If Workstation P1 wants to communicate with workstation D1,
 - The message has to be <u>routed</u> even though the workstations are physically next to each other, because they are on different logical networks




Harris and Maymi (2019) All In One CISSP Exam Guide, p. 605

Layer 3+ VLANS


VLANs enable the administrator the flexibility to apply different security policies to respective logical groups


- If tighter security is required for the payroll department, the administrator can develop policy, add all payroll systems to a specific VLAN, and apply the security policy only to the payroll VLAN
- VLANS must be properly configured and managed for security
 - VLAN hopping and switch spoofing attacks allow attackers to access traffic in various VLAN segments



Network Components – Layer 4 through 7 Switches

- Layer 4 switch works at the transport layer, supporting TCP and UDP
 - More resource intensive
 - Able to perform policy-based switching to off-load a sever by balancing traffic across a cluster of servers based on individual session information and status
- Layer 4 7 switches are also known as
 - Content switches
 - Web-switches
 - Application-switches
- Used for load-balancing among groups of servers based on: HTTP, HTTPS, VPN, or for any application TCP/IP traffic using a specific port
- Can also be used for TLS encryption/decryption and to centralize the management of digital certificates






Layer 7 Network Components - Gateways

Gateway is a general term for software running on a device that connects 2 different environments

- Acts as a translator for their protocols
- Or, restricts their interactions

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Because of the translation of protocols, many gateways work at Layer 7 Application Layer

- Network attached storage Gateway
- Electronic mail Gateway for "Sendmail" and Microsoft Exchange
- Voice and Media Gateway
- Voice and Data Gateway

Summary – Some differences of Network Devices

Device	OSI Layer	Functionality
Repeater	1 - Physical	Amplifies the signal and extends networks
Bridge	2 - Data link	Forwards packets and filters based on MAC addresses; Forwards broadcast traffic, but not collision traffic
Router	3 - Network	Separates and connects LANS creating internetworks; routers filter based on IP addresses
Switch	2 through 7 – Data link, Network, Transport, Session, Presentation, Application	Provides private virtual link between communicating devices; allows for VLANS; reduces collisions; impedes network sniffing
Gateway	Application	Connects different types of networks; performs protocol and format translations

Agenda

- ✓ In The News
- ✓ Digital Certificates
- ✓ Public Key Infrastructure
- ✓ Types of Networks
- ✓OSI Model
- ✓ Layer 1 Network Devices
- ✓ Layer 2 Network Devices
- ✓ Layer 3 Network Devices
- ✓ Layer 3 7 Network Devices