Unit #7a

Incident and Disaster Response

MIS 5214

Agenda

- Computer virus
- Malicious software
 - Proliferation of malware
 - Malware components
 - Anti-malware components
 - Best practices for protection
- Business Continuity and Disaster Contingency Planning
- Incident Response Planning
- Team Project Q&A

Virus

Virus: attached to a file

1986 Brain virus




Malicious Software (Malware)

Malware enables unauthorized access to networks for purposes of theft, sabotage, or espionage

- There are many types of malware, many cyberattacks use a combination of several types to achieve their goals
 - Obtain sensitive information (login credentials, credit card data, Social Security numbers, ...)
 - Gain unauthorized access to systems
 - Carry out a profit-oriented scheme
- Usually introduced into a network through phishing, attachments, downloads, or may gain access through social engineering or flash drives
- Manual attacks on information systems are less common than the used to be

>95% of all compromises use email as the main attack vector






Types of malware


Туре	What It Does	Real-World Example
Ransomware	disables victim's access to data until ransom is paid	RYUK
Fileless Malware	makes changes to files that are native to the OS	Astaroth
Spyware	collects user activity data without their knowledge	DarkHotel
Adware	serves unwanted advertisements	Fireball
Trojans	disguises itself as desirable code	Emotet
Worms	spreads through a network by replicating itself	Stuxnet
Rootkits	gives hackers remote control of a victim's device	Zacinlo
Keyloggers	monitors users' keystrokes	Olympic Vision
Bots	launches a broad flood of attacks	Echobot
Mobile Malware	infects mobile devices	Triada

https://www.crowdstrike.com/epp-101/types-of-malware/

Distribution of malware under Windows



Q1 2018



Ransomware

- Software that uses encryption to disable a target's access to its data until a ransom is paid
 - The victim organization is rendered partially or totally unable to operate until it pays
 - There is no guarantee that payment will result in the necessary decryption key or that the decryption key provided will function properly

```
Ooops, your important files are encrypted.

If you see this text, then your files are no longer accessible, because they have been encrypted. Perhaps you are busy looking for a way to recover your files, but don't waste your time. Nobody can recover your files without our decryption service.

We guarantee that you can recover all your files safely and easily. All you need to do is submit the payment and purchase the decryption key.

Please follow the instructions:

1. Send $300 worth of Bitcoin to following address:

1Mz7153HMuxXTuR2R1t78mGSdzaAtNbBWX

2. Send your Bitcoin wallet ID and personal installation key to e-mail wowsmith123456@posteo.net. Your personal installation key:

zRNagE-CDBMfc-pD5Ai4-vFd5d2-14mhs5-d7UCzb-RYjq3E-ANg8rK-49XFX2-Ed2R5A

If you already purchased your key, please enter it below.

Key: _
```

In 2019 the city of Baltimore was hit by a type of ransomware named RobbinHood which was distributed using the National Security Agency's Eternal Blue hacking tool

- The attack halted all city activities, including tax collection, property transfers, and government email for weeks, and cost the city more than \$18 million
- The same type of malware was used against the city of Atlanta in 2018, resulting in costs of \$17 million

Fileless Malware

- Does not install anything initially, instead, it makes changes to files that are native to the operating system, such as PowerShell
 - Because the operating system recognizes the edited files as legitimate, a fileless attack is not caught by antivirus software
 - Because these attacks are stealthy, they are up to 10 times more successful than traditional malware attacks

Astaroth is a fileless malware

- When users downloaded the file, a Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) tool was launched, along with other legitimate Windows tools
- These tools downloaded additional code that was executed only in memory, leaving no evidence that could be detected by vulnerability scanners
- Then the attacker downloaded and ran a Trojan that stole credentials and uploaded them to a remote server

Malware proliferation is directly related to profit hackers can make without being caught

Money making schemes include:

- Compromising systems with botnets for later use in:
 - Distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks
 - Spam distribution
- Ransomware encrypting users' files with keys that are only given after users pay a ransom
- Spyware collects personal data for resale
- Redirecting web traffic pointing people to a specific product for purchase
- Installing key loggers, which collect financial information for reuse
- Carrying out phishing attacks, fraudulent activities, identity theft, and information warfare


Malware is increasing

AVTest reports over 450,000 new malware and potentially unwanted applications identified each day


Main reasons types malware is increasing in quantity and potency:

- Homogenous computer environments (Windows, MacOS, Android, iOS) – 1 piece of malware will work on many/most devices
- Everything is becoming a computer capable of being compromised (phones, TVs, game consoles, power grids, medical devices,...)
- More people and companies store all their data in digital format
- Many accounts are configured with too much privilege (i.e. root/administrator access)
- More people who do not understand technology are using it for sensitive purposes (i.e. e-commerce, online banking, ...)









Malware Components

Malware typically has 6 common elements

- 1. Insertion Installs itself on the victim's computer
- 2. Replication Copies itself and spreads to other victims
- Avoidance Uses methods to avoid being detected
- 4. Trigger An event initiates its payload execution
- Payload Caries out its function (i.e. exploits a vulnerability to provide access, deletes files, encrypts files, installs a backdoor, ...)
- 6. Eradication Removes itself after its payload is executed

Anti-malware software components

Detection techniques

- Signature-based
- Integrity-based
- Heuristic-based
- Behavior-based

Protection techniques

- Quarantine the file
- Clean the file
- Roll-back to prior version of the file
- Warn the user
- Log the event

Signature-based malware detection

Anti-malware software scans files, e-mail, other data and **compares** them **to a database of signatures** created by the anti-malware vendor

- A malware signature is a sequence of code extracted from the virus that is used to identify the virus
- Can only identify previously identified malware
- Updates to the signatures must be downloaded and applied frequently
- Cannot detect 0-day attacks

Signature-based malware detection avoidance

Polymorphic virus has the capability to change its own code to produce thousands of varied operational versions of itself

- Can use different encryption techniques
- Can vary the sequence of their instructions
 - Combining noise or bogus instructions with the useful instructions
 - Using a mutation engine and a random-number generator to change the sequence of their instructions


Multi-part virus distributes its components to different parts of the system

Integrity-based malware detection

- Calculates and stores a hash for each component of the system: operating system files, application files, configuration files, ...
- Each new scan of the system calculates a hash for each component and compares it with the stored hash to detect differences

Detected differences send alters and are flagged as suspect for

further analysis



Heuristic-based malware detection

Analyzes the overall structure of the malicious code, evaluating

- Coded logic, instructions, functions and modules
- Data types and structures

Assesses likelihood that the code is malicious by accumulating a scored rating of "suspiciousness"

- Increases as it finds more potentially malicious attributes
- Compared to a threshold, which when crossed the detector identifies the software as malware and the protections are activated

2 types of heuristic malware detection methods

- 1. Static analysis Reviewing code without running it
- 2. Dynamic analysis Reviewing code as it is running

Behavior-based malware detection

Allows suspicious code to execute within the unprotected operating system, and watches its interaction with the operating system components looking for suspicious activities:

- Writing to Run keys in the Windows Registry or startup files
- Opening, deleting, or modifying files
- Modifying executable logic
- Creating or modifying macros and scripts
- Scripting e-mail messages to send executable code
- Connecting to network shares or resources
- Formatting a hard drive or writing to the boot sector

Anti-malware software components

Detection techniques

- Signature-based
- Integrity-based
- Heuristic-basedBehavior-based

Proactive techniques able to detect new malware (i.e. 0-day attacks)

Protection techniques

- Quarantine the file
- Clean the file
- Roll-back to prior version of the file
- Warn the user
- Log the event

Best practices against malware attacks

User Education

Training users on best practices can go a long way in protecting an organization

- How to avoid malware
 - Don't download and run unknown software
 - Don't blindly insert "found media" into your computer
- How to identify potential malware
 - Phishing emails
 - Unexpected applications/processes running on a system

Best practices against malware attacks

Use Reputable Anti-Virus (A/V) Software

• When installed, a suitable A/V solution will detect (and remove) any existing malware on a system, as well as monitor for and mitigate potential malware installation or activity while the system is running. It'll be important to keep it up-to-date with the vendor's latest definitions/signatures.

Ensure Your Network is Secure

- Control access to systems on the organization's network
- Use of proven technology and methodologies—such as using a firewall, IPS, IDS
- Remote access only through VPN—will help minimize the attack "surface" your organization exposes

Regular Website Security Audits

- Scan the organization's websites regularly for vulnerabilities
 - Software with known bugs and server/service/application misconfiguration
 - Detect if known malware has been installed

Create Regular, Verified Backups


- Have regular (i.e. current and automated) offline backup
- Make sure they are verified to be happening on the expected regular basis and are usable for restore operations
 - Old, outdated backups are less valuable than recent ones
 - Backups that don't restore properly are of no value

Mitigation – Backup Best Practice

Three-Two-One rule

 Make 3 copies of all mission critical software and corresponding data in 2 different formats (to run on Linux and Windows machines), with 1 copy stored off-site not connected to any network

Maersk had 50 copies of their mission critical software and corresponding data – all in the same format, all on the network



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Business Continuity

Capability to continue service delivery at acceptable levels following" natural or human-induced disaster

Source: International Standards Organization 22300:2018

Security and resilience - Vocabulary

Resiliency

"Capacity to recover quickly from difficulties

• • •

Antonyms:

Vulnerability, weakness..."

Source: https://www.lexico.com/en/synonym/resilience

Critical Infrastructure

"Critical infrastructures are those physical and cyber-based systems essential to the minimum operations of the economy and government. ... As a result of advances in information technology and the necessity of improved efficiency, however, these infrastructures have become increasingly automated and interlinked. These same advances have created new vulnerabilities to equipment failure, human error, weather and other natural causes, and physical and cyber attacks." Presidential Decision Directive/NSC 63, 1998



Emergency Services





Commercial **Facilities**



Nuclear Reactors. Materials, and Waste



Communications



Energy



Chemical



Government **Facilities**



Critical Manufacturing



Healthcare and Public Health



Food and Agriculture



Financial Services



Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience

"Critical infrastructure owners and operators are uniquely positioned to manage risks to their individual operations and assets, and to determine effective strategies to make them more secure and resilient"

> Presidential Policy Directive/ PPD-21, 2013

America's Water Infrastructure Act of 2018



Defines 'resilience' as

"The ability of a community water system or an asset of a community water system to adapt to or withstand the effects of a malevolent act or natural hazard without interruption to the asset's or system's function, or if the function is interrupted, to rapidly return to a normal operating condition"



To assure resilient response

Business Continuity Plan (BCP)

Documented procedures for recovering and resuming critical operational functions following significant disruption

Source: ISO 22301:2012

Societal security – Business continuity management systems - Requirements

...includes a Disaster Recovery Plan (DRP)


Procedures for relocating critical information systems operations to an alternative site following significant disruption



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Catalog of cyber-security controls

for Business Continuity and Resiliency planning focus on Contingency Planning controls

NIST Special Publication 800-53

Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations

CLASS	FAMILY	IDENTIFIER	
Management	Risk Assessment	RA	
Management	Planning	PL	
Management	System and Services Acquisition	SA	
Management	Certification, Accreditation, and Security Assessments	CA	
Operational	Personnel Security	PS	
Operational	Physical and Environmental Protection	PE	
Operational	Contingency Planning	СР	
Operational	Configuration Management	CM	
Operational	Maintenance	MA	
Operational	System and Information Integrity	SI	
Operational	Media Protection	MP	
Operational	Incident Response	IR	lation
Operational	Awareness and Training	AT	
Technical	Access Control	AC	
Technical	Audit and Accountability	AU]-
Technical	System and Communications Protection	SC	

JOINT TASK FORCE TRANSFORMATION INITIATIVE

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> April 2013 INCLUDES UPDATES AS OF 01-22-2015



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Contingency Planning Controls


CONTROL NAME		BASELINES				
	LOW	MOD	HIGH			
Contingency Planning Policy and Procedures	Χ	X	Χ			
Contingency Plan	Χ	X	Χ			
Contingency Training	Χ	X	Х			
Contingency Plan Testing	Χ	X	Χ			
Alternative Storage Site		X	Χ			
Alternative Processing Site		X	Χ			
Telecommunications Services		X	Χ			
Information System Backup	Χ	X	Χ			
Information System Recovery and Reconstitution	Χ	Χ	Χ			

NIST SP 800-53r4 "Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations"

		MM	NCE	CONTROL BASELINES		
NO.	CONTROL NAME Control Enhancement Name	WITHDRAWN	ASSURANCE	LOW	MOD	HIGH
CP-1	Contingency Planning Policy and Procedures		х	×	×	х
CP-2	Contingency Plan			x	×	х
CP-2(1)	CONTINGENCY PLAN COORDINATE WITH RELATED PLANS				X	X
CP-2(2)	CONTINGENCY PLAN CAPACITY PLANNING					х
CP-2(3)	CONTINGENCY PLAN RESUME ESSENTIAL MISSIONS / BUSINESS FUNCTIONS				×	x
CP-2(4)	CONTINGENCY PLAN RESUME ALL MISSIONS / BUSINESS FUNCTIONS					X
CP-2(5)	CONTINGENCY PLAN CONTINUE ESSENTIAL MISSIONS / BUSINESS FUNCTIONS					x
CP-2(8)	CONTINGENCY PLAN IDENTIFY CRITICAL ASSETS				X	X
CP-3	Contingency Training		X	x	X	Х
CP-3(1)	CONTINGENCY TRAINING SIMULATED EVENTS		X	x		X
CP-4	Contingency Plan Testing		х	x	x	X
CP-4(1)	CONTINGENCY PLAN TESTING COORDINATE WITH RELATED PLANS		x		x	X
CP-4(2)	CONTINGENCY PLAN TESTING ALTERNATE PROCESSING SITE		X			х
CP-5	Contingency Plan Update	X	Inco	rporated int	o CP-2.	
CP-6	Alternate Storage Site				×	X
CP-6(1)	ALTERNATE STORAGE SITE SEPARATION FROM PRIMARY SITE				×	х
CP-6(2)	ALTERNATE STORAGE SITE RECOVERY TIME / POINT OBJECTIVES			1		x
CP-6(3)	ALTERNATE STORAGE SITE ACCESSIBILITY				X	X
CP-7	Alternate Processing Site			0	x	x
CP-7(1)	ALTERNATE PROCESSING SITE SEPARATION FROM PRIMARY SITE				×	x
CP-7(2)	ALTERNATE PROCESSING SITE ACCESSIBILITY				×	X
CP-7(3)	ALTERNATE PROCESSING SITE PRIORITY OF SERVICE		- 1	-	x	×
CP-7(4)	ALTERNATE PROCESSING SITE PREPARATION FOR USE					х
CP-7(5)	ALTERNATE PROCESSING SITE EQUIVALENT INFORMATION SECURITY SAFEGUARDS	x	Incorporated into CP-7.			
CP-8	Telecommunications Services				x	X
CP-8(1)	TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES PRIORITY OF SERVICE PROVISIONS				x	х
CP-8(2)	TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES SINGLE POINTS OF FAILURE				X	х
CP-8(3)	TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES SEPARATION OF PRIMARY / ALTERNATE PROVIDERS					х
CP-8(4)	TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES PROVIDER CONTINGENCY PLAN					X
CP-9	Information System Backup			X	X	X
CP-9(1)	INFORMATION SYSTEM BACKUP TESTING FOR RELIABILITY / INTEGRITY				×	x
CP-9(2)	INFORMATION SYSTEM BACKUP TEST RESTORATION USING SAMPLING					x
CP-9(3)	INFORMATION SYSTEM BACKUP SEPARATE STORAGE FOR CRITICAL INFORMATION					x
CP-9(4)	INFORMATION SYSTEM BACKUP PROTECTION FROM UNAUTHORIZED MODIFICATION	×	Inco	rporated int	o CP-9.	
CP-9(5)	INFORMATION SYSTEM BACKUP TRANSFER TO ALTERNATE STORAGE SITE					x
CP-10	Information System Recovery and Reconstitution			x	X	X
CP-10(1)	INFORMATION SYSTEM RECOVERY AND RECONSTITUTION CONTINGENCY PLAN TESTING	×	Inco	rporated int		
CP-10(2)	INFORMATION SYSTEM RECOVERY AND RECONSTITUTION TRANSACTION RECOVERY				×	×
CP-10(3)	INFORMATION SYSTEM RECOVERY AND RECONSTITUTION COMPENSATING SECURITY CONTROLS	X	Addi	ressed by ta	ailoring proc	
CP-10(4)	INFORMATION SYSTEM RECOVERY AND RECONSTITUTION RESTORE WITHIN TIME PERIOD			31		x
CP-10(5)	INFORMATION SYSTEM RECOVERY AND RECONSTITUTION FAILOVER CAPABILITY	x	Inco	rporated int	o SI-13.	

3-Phases in a Contingency Plan

All dependent on a BIA "Business Impact Analysis"




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
Categorizing information systems enables us to understand the priority for recovery...



Impact on which security objective determines priorities for recovery?

			POTENTIAL IMPACT			FIPS PUB 199	
Security Objective LOW		MODERATE	нібн		FEDERAL INFORMATION PROCESSING STANDARDS PUBLICATION		
Preserving authorized restrictions on information access and disclosure, including means for disclosure of information could be expected to have a limited adverse effect on organizational operations,		The unauthorized disclosure of information could be expected to have a serious adverse effect on organizational operations, organizational assets, or		ave nic	Standards for Security Categorization of Federal Information and Information Systems		
privacy a informati [44 U.S.C					PC	TENTIAL IMPACT	
Security Objective Security Objective Availability Ensuring timely and reliable access to and use of information. [44 U.S.4 Availab Ensuring timely and reliable access to and use of information. [44 U.S.6 [44 U.S.6 [44 U.S.6 [44 U.S.6 [44 U.S.6 [44 U.S.7 [44 U.S.6 [45 U.S.6 [45 U.S.6 [46 U.S.6 [46 U.S.6 [47 U.S.6 [47 U.S.6 [48 U.S.6		ity Objective	LO	w		MODERATE	HIGH
		The disruption of access to or use of information or an information system could be expected to have a limited adverse effect on organizational operations, organizational assets, or individuals.		The disruption of access to or use of information or an information system could be expected to have a serious adverse effect on organizational operations, organizational assets, or individuals.		The disruption of access to or use of information or an information system could be expected to have a severe or catastrophic adverse effect on organizational operations, organizational assets, or individuals.	

Plan is based on "recovery priorities"



Business Impact Analysis (BIA) Answers

- 1. What are the work processes?
- 2. How critical is each?
- 3. What data, applications, and people are needed to run each critical process?
- 4. What are the priorities for recovering information systems after disruption?
- 5. For each critical IT resource, what are:
 - Recover time objective (RTO):


Maximum acceptable downtime


• Recovery point objective (RPO):


Maximum acceptable data loss (measured in time, but implies # of data records)

Prerequisite for BIA and contingency planning...


Good work process documentation identifies all people, data, applications, communications and information technologies needed to restore operations








Priorities for recovery example



Business Impact Analysis (BIA) example...


- Determine Business Processes and Recovery Criticality
- Identify Information and IT Resource Requirements
- Identify Information System Resource Recovery Priorities



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for Business Continuity and Resiliency planning focus on Contingency Planning controls

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Management	System and Services Acquisition	SA
Management	Certification, Accreditation, and Security Assessments	CA
Operational	Personnel Security	PS
Operational	Physical and Environmental Protection	PE
Operational	Contingency Planning	СР
Operational	Configuration Management	CM
Operational	Maintenance	MA
Operational	System and Information Integrity	SI
Operational	Media Protection	MP
Operational	Incident Response	IR
Operational	Awareness and Training	AT
Technical	Access Control	AC
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Technical	System and Communications Protection	SC

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Contingency Planning Controls

CONTROL NAME	BASELINES					
	LOW	MOD	HIGH			
Contingency Planning Policy and Procedures	Χ	X	X			
Contingency Plan	Χ	X	X			
Contingency Training	Х	X	X			
Contingency Plan Testing	Χ	X	X			
Alternative Storage Site		X	X			
Alternative Processing Site		X	X			
Telecommunications Services		X	X			
Information System Backup	Х	X	X			
Information System Recovery and Reconstitution	Χ	Χ	Χ			

NIST SP 800-53r4 "Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations"

CNT	CONTROL WATE	RAWN	NCE	CONTROL BASELINES		
NO.	CONTROL NAME Control Enhancement Name	WITHDRAWN	ASSURANCE	LOW	MOD	HIGH
CP-1	Contingency Planning Policy and Procedures		x	×	×	x
CP-2	Contingency Plan			×	x	x
CP-2(1)	CONTINGENCY PLAN COORDINATE WITH RELATED PLANS				X	X
CP-2(2)	CONTINGENCY PLAN CAPACITY PLANNING					х
CP-2(3)	CONTINGENCY PLAN RESUME ESSENTIAL MISSIONS / BUSINESS FUNCTIONS				x	x
CP-2(4)	CONTINGENCY PLAN RESUME ALL MISSIONS / BUSINESS FUNCTIONS					Х
CP-2(5)	CONTINGENCY PLAN CONTINUE ESSENTIAL MISSIONS / BUSINESS FUNCTIONS					x
CP-2(8)	CONTINGENCY PLAN IDENTIFY CRITICAL ASSETS				X	×
CP-3	Contingency Training		X	x	X	x
CP-3(1)	CONTINGENCY TRAINING SIMULATED EVENTS		x			X
CP-4	Contingency Plan Testing		х	x	x	x
CP-4(1)	CONTINGENCY PLAN TESTING COORDINATE WITH RELATED PLANS		x		X	X
CP-4(2)	CONTINGENCY PLAN TESTING ALTERNATE PROCESSING SITE		X			х
CP-5	Contingency Plan Update	x	Inco	rporated int	o CP-2.	
CP-6	Alternate Storage Site				x	x
CP-6(1)	ALTERNATE STORAGE SITE SEPARATION FROM PRIMARY SITE				х	х
CP-6(2)	ALTERNATE STORAGE SITE RECOVERY TIME / POINT OBJECTIVES					x
CP-6(3)	ALTERNATE STORAGE SITE ACCESSIBILITY				x	×
CP-7	Alternate Processing Site				x	x
CP-7(1)	ALTERNATE PROCESSING SITE SEPARATION FROM PRIMARY SITE				x	×
CP-7(2)	ALTERNATE PROCESSING SITE ACCESSIBILITY				x	×
CP-7(3)	ALTERNATE PROCESSING SITE PRIORITY OF SERVICE				×	×
CP-7(4)	ALTERNATE PROCESSING SITE PREPARATION FOR USE			-		×
CP-7(5)	ALTERNATE PROCESSING SITE EQUIVALENT INFORMATION SECURITY SAFEGUARDS	х	Inco	porated int	o CP-7.	
CP-8	Telecommunications Services				x	x
CP-8(1)	TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES PRIORITY OF SERVICE PROVISIONS				x	х
CP-8(2)	TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES SINGLE POINTS OF FAILURE				x	×
CP-8(3)	TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES SEPARATION OF PRIMARY / ALTERNATE PROVIDERS					х
CP-8(4)	TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES PROVIDER CONTINGENCY PLAN					×
CP-9	Information System Backup			x	x	x
CP-9(1)	INFORMATION SYSTEM BACKUP TESTING FOR RELIABILITY / INTEGRITY				x	х
CP-9(2)	INFORMATION SYSTEM BACKUP TEST RESTORATION USING SAMPLING					x
CP-9(3)	INFORMATION SYSTEM BACKUP SEPARATE STORAGE FOR CRITICAL INFORMATION					x
CP-9(4)	INFORMATION SYSTEM BACKUP PROTECTION FROM UNAUTHORIZED MODIFICATION	x	Inco	porated int	o CP-9.	
CP-9(5)	INFORMATION SYSTEM BACKUP TRANSFER TO ALTERNATE STORAGE SITE					x
CP-10	Information System Recovery and Reconstitution			x	x	x
CP-10(1)	INFORMATION SYSTEM RECOVERY AND RECONSTITUTION CONTINGENCY PLAN TESTING	×	Inco	rporated int	o CP-4.	
CP-10(2)	INFORMATION SYSTEM RECOVERY AND RECONSTITUTION TRANSACTION RECOVERY				×	x
CP-10(3)	INFORMATION SYSTEM RECOVERY AND RECONSTITUTION COMPENSATING SECURITY CONTROLS	X	Addr	essed by ta	alloring proc	edures.
CP-10(4)	INFORMATION SYSTEM RECOVERY AND RECONSTITUTION RESTORE WITHIN TIME PERIOD			42		x
CP-10(5)	INFORMATION SYSTEM RECOVERY AND RECONSTITUTION FAILOVER CAPABILITY	x	Inco	rporated int	o SI-13.	

Options for alternate Data Processing Site

Hot site: A geographically remote facility, fully equipped and ready to power up at a moments notice

Warm site: Includes communications components but computers are not installed – will need to be delivered and setup


Cold site: Provides only the basic environment that can be outfitted with communication, utilities and computers

Site	Cost	Hardware Equipment	Telecommunications	Setup Time
Hot Site	High	Full	Full	Short
Warm Site	Medium	Partial	Full / Partial	Medium
Cold Site	Low	None	None	Long


Location of Alternate site

Disaster recovery site should be in a different geophysical area not susceptible to same disaster as the primary operations facility

Note: even the cloud is located somewhere...



With multiple providers of:



- Telecommunications
- Stable power supply
- Redundant utilities

Multi-hazard mapping

Primer on Natural Hazard Management in Integrated Regional Development Planning

Department of Regional Development and Environment Executive Secretariat for Economic and Social Affairs Organization of American States

With support from the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance United States Agency for International Development

Washington, D.C. 1991

Figure 6-1 EXAMPLES OF NATURAL PHENOMENA WHICH MAY BE HAZARDOUS

Atmospheric	Volcanic	Hydrologic	Other Geologic	Seismic	Wildfire
Hailstorms Hurricanes Lightning Thunderstorms Tornadoes Tropical storms	Ashfalls Gases Lava flows Projectiles and lateral blasts Pyroclastic flows Tephra (ashes, cinders, lapilli)	Coastal flooding Desertification Drought Erosion River floods Storm surges	Debris avalanches Expansive soils Rockfalls Submarine slides Subsidence	Fault ruptures Ground shaking Lateral spreading Liquefaction Seiches Tsunamis	Brush Forest Savannah Urban conflagration

CHAPTER 6 - MULTIPLE HAZARD MAPPING

A. BENEFITS OF MULTIPLE HAZARD MAPPING B. PREPARING MULTIPLE HAZARD MAPS

- 1. Translated Information
- 2. Sources and Compiling Information
- 3. Timing

C. MAP FORMAT

- 1. Base Map
- 2. Scale and Coverage
- 3. Hazards to be Shown
- 4. Types of Symbols

D. OTHER FORMS OF MULTIPLE HAZARDS INFORMATION


- 1. Cross section of Effects
- 2. Photographs of Damage
- 3. Atlas of Hazards
- 4. Plan for Reducing Hazards
- 5. Analyses of Land Capability
- Single Event with Multiple Hazards
- 7. Series of Strip Maps
- 8. Photo Maps
- 9. Geographic Information Systems
- 10. Information Processed by Computer


E. LIMITATIONS

- 1. Credibility
- 2. Likelihood, Location, and Severity
- 3. Accuracy versus Precision
- 4. Scale
- 5. Abuse
- Synthesis versus Detail
- 7. Use of Caveats

CONCLUSION REFERENCES

Map of Comprehensive Urban Natural Disaster Intensity in China





Example is an outdated internet infrastructure map intended to illustrate what is needed to plan data center disaster recovery site

Contingency Planning Controls


CONTROL NAME	BASELINES					
	LOW	MOD	HIGH			
Contingency Planning Policy and Procedures	Х	X	Х			
Contingency Plan	Χ	X	Х			
Contingency Training	Х	X	Χ			
Contingency Plan Testing	Χ	X	Χ			
Alternative Storage Site		X	Χ			
Alternative Processing Site		X	Χ			
Telecommunications Services		X	Χ			
Information System Backup	Χ	X	Χ			
Information System Recovery and Reconstitution	Χ	Χ	Χ			


NIST SP 800-53r4 "Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations"


OUT	CONTROL WAVE	AWN	NCE	CONT	ROL BASI	ELINES
CP-2(1) CCP-2(2) C	CONTROL NAME Control Enhancement Name	WITHDRAWN	ASSURANCE	LOW	MOD	HIGH
CP-1	Contingency Planning Policy and Procedures		х	×	×	х
CP-2	Contingency Plan			x	×	X
CP-2(1)	CONTINGENCY PLAN COORDINATE WITH RELATED PLANS				X	X
CP-2(2)	CONTINGENCY PLAN CAPACITY PLANNING					Х
CP-2(3)	CONTINGENCY PLAN RESUME ESSENTIAL MISSIONS / BUSINESS FUNCTIONS				×	x
CP-2(4)	CONTINGENCY PLAN RESUME ALL MISSIONS / BUSINESS FUNCTIONS					Х
CP-2(5)	CONTINGENCY PLAN CONTINUE ESSENTIAL MISSIONS / BUSINESS FUNCTIONS					х
CP-2(8)	CONTINGENCY PLAN IDENTIFY CRITICAL ASSETS				X	х
CP-3	Contingency Training		X	x	X	х
CP-3(1)	CONTINGENCY TRAINING SIMULATED EVENTS		x			х
CP-4	Contingency Plan Testing		х	x	x	x
CP-4(1)	CONTINGENCY PLAN TESTING COORDINATE WITH RELATED PLANS		x		x	X
CP-4(2)	CONTINGENCY PLAN TESTING ALTERNATE PROCESSING SITE		х			х
CP-5	Contingency Plan Update	x	Inco	rporated int	o CP-2.	
CP-6	Alternate Storage Site				×	x
CP-6(1)	ALTERNATE STORAGE SITE SEPARATION FROM PRIMARY SITE				×	х
CP-6(2)	ALTERNATE STORAGE SITE RECOVERY TIME / POINT OBJECTIVES		- 10	4		×
CP-6(3)	ALTERNATE STORAGE SITE ACCESSIBILITY				x	x
CP-7	Alternate Processing Site			Ĭ	x	×
CP-7(1)	ALTERNATE PROCESSING SITE SEPARATION FROM PRIMARY SITE				×	x
CP-7(2)	ALTERNATE PROCESSING SITE ACCESSIBILITY				×	x
CP-7(3)	ALTERNATE PROCESSING SITE PRIORITY OF SERVICE				×	×
CP-7(4)	ALTERNATE PROCESSING SITE PREPARATION FOR USE			-		x
CP-7(5)	ALTERNATE PROCESSING SITE EQUIVALENT INFORMATION SECURITY SAFEGUARDS	x	Inco	rporated int	o CP-7.	-
CP-8	Telecommunications Services				x	X
CP-8(1)	TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES PRIORITY OF SERVICE PROVISIONS				×	х
CP-8(2)	TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES SINGLE POINTS OF FAILURE				×	x
CP-8(3)	TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES SEPARATION OF PRIMARY / ALTERNATE PROVIDERS					х
CP-8(4)	TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES PROVIDER CONTINGENCY PLAN					X
CP-9	Information System Backup			x	x	х
CP-9(1)	INFORMATION SYSTEM BACKUP TESTING FOR RELIABILITY / INTEGRITY				×	x
CP-9(2)	INFORMATION SYSTEM BACKUP TEST RESTORATION USING SAMPLING					x
CP-9(3)	INFORMATION SYSTEM BACKUP SEPARATE STORAGE FOR CRITICAL INFORMATION					x
CP-9(4)	INFORMATION SYSTEM BACKUP PROTECTION FROM UNAUTHORIZED MODIFICATION	x	Inco	rporated int	o CP-9.	
CP-9(5)	INFORMATION SYSTEM BACKUP TRANSFER TO ALTERNATE STORAGE SITE					x
CP-10	Information System Recovery and Reconstitution			x	X	х
CP-10(1)	INFORMATION SYSTEM RECOVERY AND RECONSTITUTION CONTINGENCY PLAN TESTING	×	Inco	rporated int	o CP-4.	
CP-10(2)	INFORMATION SYSTEM RECOVERY AND RECONSTITUTION TRANSACTION RECOVERY				×	×
CP-10(3)	INFORMATION SYSTEM RECOVERY AND RECONSTITUTION COMPENSATING SECURITY CONTROLS	X	Addi	ressed by ta	ailoring proc	
CP-10(4)	INFORMATION SYSTEM RECOVERY AND RECONSTITUTION RESTORE WITHIN TIME PERIOD			48		x
CP-10(5)	INFORMATION SYSTEM RECOVERY AND RECONSTITUTION FAILOVER CAPABILITY	x	Inco	rporated int	o SI-13.	

Data backup systems and redundancies

- Database shadowing
- Electronic vaulting
- Remote journaling
- Storage area network and hierarchical storage management
- Shared storage
- RAID
- Failover clustering







Recovery Options: Location & Backup


Information System Recovery Priority	Backup / Recovery Strategy					
	Backup: Mirrored systems and disc	ems and disc replication				
High priority	Strategy: Hot site	\$\$\$				
	Backup: Optical backup and WAN/VLAN replication					
Moderate priority	Strategy: Warm or Cold site	\$\$				
	Backup: Tape backup	4				
Low priority	Strategy: Cold site	Ş				

NIST SP 800-34 R1
Planning Guide for Federal Information Systems

Recovery Time Objective



Recovery Point Objective




Considerations - Budget

Contingency Resources	Strategies	Vendor Costs	Hardware Costs	Software Costs	Travel / Shipping Costs	Labor / Contractor Costs	Testing Costs	Supply Costs
Alternate	Cold Site							
Site	Warm Site							
	Hot Site							
Offsite	Commercial							
Storage	Internal							
Equipment	SLA							
Replace- ment	Storage							
1110110	Existing Use							

MIS5214 Security Architecture 51

Response Roles and Responsibilities example



NIST SP 800-34 R1 – Contingency Planning Guide for Federal Information Systems

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
	NIST Special Publication 800-34 Rev. 1	2. Cor	ncept of Operations	A.3-5
	Contingency Planning Guide for Federal Information Systems		System Description Overview of Three Phases Roles and Responsibilities	A.3-5
	Marianne Swanson Pauline Bowen Amy Wohl Phillips	3. Act	ivation and Notification	A.3-6
	Dean Gallup David Lynes		3.1 Activation Criteria and Procedure	A.3-6
	May 2010		3.3 Outage Assessment	A.3-7
		4. Rec	covery	A.3-7
			4.1 Sequence of Recovery Activities	A.3-8
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	National Institute of Standards and Technology Patrick D. Gallagher, Director		5.1 Concurrent Processing 5.2 Validation Data Testing. 5.3 Validation Functionality Testing. 5.4 Recovery Declaration.	A.3-8 A.3-9 A.3-9
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A.1 A.2 A.3	Sample Template for Low-Impact Systems Sample Template for Moderate-Impact Systems	A.1-1	5.6 Cleanup	A.3-9 A.3-9 A.3-9 A.3-10

Contingency plans must be practiced and tested

...to be sure the plan is good, everyone is prepared and knows what to do

Can range from:


- Checklist review
- Tabletop exercise
- Structured walk-through
- Dry-Run tests



Agenda

- ✓ Computer virus
- ✓ Malicious software
 - ✓ Proliferation of malware
 - ✓ Malware components
 - ✓ Anti-malware components
 - ✓ Best practices for protection
- ✓ Business Continuity and Disaster Contingency Planning
- Incident Response Planning
- Team Project Q&A

NIST Cybersecurity Framework



Version 1.1

National Institute of Standards and Technology

April 16, 2018

What assets need protection?

What safeguards are available?

What techniques can identify incidents?

What techniques can contain impacts of incidents?

What techniques can restore capabilities?



Functions	Categories
IDENTIFY	
PROTECT	
DETECT	
RESPOND	
RECOVER	56

NIST Cybersecurity Framework

What assets need protection?

What safeguards are available?

What techniques can identify

What techniques can contain

What techniques can restore

impacts of incidents?

incidents?

capabilities?

ID

Function

Unique

Identifier

PR

DE

RS

RC

Identify Asset Management **Business Environment**

- - Governance
 - Risk Assessment Risk Management Strategy

Category

- Supply Chain Risk Management Identity Management and Access Control
- Protect

Detect

Respond

Function

- - Awareness and Training **Data Security** Information Protection Processes and Procedures
 - Maintenance
 - Protective Technology
 - Anomalies and Events
 - Security Continuous Monitoring
 - **Detection Processes**

 - Response Planning

Communications

- Communications
- Improvements Recover Recovery Planning Improvements
- Analysis Mitigation

Computer security incident response - vocabulary

Event – any observable occurrence in a system or a network, e.g.

- User sending an email
- User connecting to a file share (i.e. file folder on another computer)
- Server receiving a request for a web page
- Firewall blocking a connection attempt

Adverse event – is an event with a negative consequence, e.g.

- System crash
- Execution of malware that destroys data
- Unauthorized use of system privileges

Computer security incident response - vocabulary


Computer security incident – is a violation (or imminent threat) of computer security policies, acceptable use policies, or standard practices, e.g.

- Users are tricked into opening a "quarterly report" sent via email that is actually malware; running the tool has infected their computers and established connections with an external host
- An attacker obtains sensitive data and threatens that the details will be released publicly if the organization does not pay a designated sum of money
- An attacker commands a botnet to send high volumes of connection requests to a web server, causing it to crash
- A user provides or exposes sensitive information to others by mistake or on purpose


Computer security incident response

Is necessary because...

- Computer security controls, systems, and processes are not perfect
- Protections designed to protect information and information systems eventually fail
- Security breaches are inevitable



Example of Network Intrusion



Industry Targeting

"The top five most targeted industries in 2020 were:

- business and professional services,
- retail and hospitality,
- financial,
- healthcare, and
- high technology.


Over the past decade, business and professional services and financial have consistently placed in the top five most targeted industries."

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Who is detecting intrusions by attackers?





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How long are attackers remaining in compromised systems?

Compromise Notifications	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
All	416	243	229	205	146	99	101	78	56	24
External Notification	_	_	_	-	320	107	186	184	141	73
Internal Detection	_	_	_	_	56	80	57.5	50.5	30	12

Median Dwell Time



"Dwell time is calculated as the number of days an attacker is present in a victim environment before they are detected."



Handling an Incident

Incident response process has several phases:

- 1. **Preparation** the business attempts to limit the number of incidents that will occur by selecting and implementing a set of controls based on the results of risk assessments
 - o **Residual risk** will inevitably persist after controls are implemented
- **2. Detection and analysis** of security breaches is necessary to alert the organization when incidents occur

National Institute of Standards and Technology U.S. Department of Commerce

Special Publication 800-61 Revision 2

Computer Security

Computer Security Incident Handling Guide

Recommendations of the National Institute of Standards and Technology

Paul Cichonski Tom Millar Tim Grance Karen Scarfone

http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-61r2

- **3. Containment, Eradication & Recovery** the organization works to mitigate the impact of the incident by containing it and ultimately recovering from it
 - Activity often cycles back to detection and analysis
 E.g., to see if additional hosts are infected by malware while eradicating malware
- **4. Post-Incident Activity** After the incident is adequately handled, the organization issues a report that details the cause and cost of the incident and the steps the organization should take to prevent future incidents


Handling an Incident - Preparation

Preventing Incidents – Keeping the number of incidents reasonably low is very important to protect the business processes of the organization

- If security controls are insufficient, higher volumes of incidents may occur, overwhelming the incident response team
- This can lead to slow and incomplete responses, which translate to a larger negative business impact (e.g., more extensive damage, longer periods of service and data unavailability)

Incident response preparation includes preventing incidents by ensuring that systems, networks, and applications are sufficiently secure

- Risk Assessments
- Host Security
- Network Security
- Malware Prevention
- User Awareness and Training



Handling an Incident – Detection and Analysis

Signs of an incident

For many organizations, the most challenging part of the incident response process is accurately detecting and assessing possible incidents—determining whether an incident has occurred and, if so, the type, extent, and magnitude of the problem

Signs of an incident fall into one of two categories:

1. Precursors – a sign that an incident may occur in the future

2. Indicators - a sign that an incident may have occurred or may be

occurring now



Handling an Incident – Detection and Analysis

Precursors – While rare, if precursors are detected, the organization may have an opportunity to prevent the incident by altering its security posture to save a target from attack. At a minimum, the organization could monitor activity involving the target more closely.

Examples of precursors are:

- Web server log entries that show the usage of a vulnerability scanner
- NIST National Vulnerability Database (NVD) Announcement of a new exploit targeting a vulnerability of the organization's mail server
- A threat from a group stating the group will attack the organization





Detection and Analysis



Indicators - While precursors are relatively rare, indicators are all too common. Too many types of indicators exist to exhaustively list them, but some examples are listed below:

- An application logs multiple failed login attempts from an unfamiliar remote system
- A network intrusion detection sensor alerts when a buffer overflow attempt occurs against a database server
- A system administrator sees a filename with unusual characters
- Antivirus software alerts when it detects that a host is infected with malware
- A host records a configuration change in its log
- An email administrator sees a large number of bounced emails with suspicious content
- A network administrator notices an unusual deviation from typical network traffic flows





Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs)


While firewalls and antivirus are preventive controls, IDS are access control monitoring devices designed to

1. Detect a security breach

2. Aid in mitigating damage caused by hackers breaking into sensitive computer and network systems

• IDS' components

- 1. Sensors
 - Collect and send traffic and user activity data to analyzers
- 2. Analyzers
 - Look for suspicious activity and if found sends alert to administrator's interface
- 3. Administrative interfaces




Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs)

Two main types of IDS

- 1. Host-based for analyzing activity within a particular computer system
- 2. Network-based for monitoring network communications


IDS can be configured to:

- Watch for attacks
- Alert administrator as attacks happen
- Expose a hacker & her/his techniques
- Work with firewalls to terminate a connection



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
Continuous monitoring with a Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) system



SIEM's help with Data Analysis and Correlation

Firewall Log IDS Event Server Log
Switch Log Firewall Cfg. AV Alert
Switch Cfg. NAT Cfg. App Log
Router Cfg. Netflow VA Scanner

- Bring raw data events into one database
- Database software is programmed to look for "Notable events" or correlations
- Correlations will take seemingly isolated events and bring them forward for review/action:
 - Windows Log: Employee denied windows login (unknown user account)
 - Identity Management System: notes the user account was deleted because employee was terminated last month.
- Security Domains: Access, Endpoints, Networks, Identity



SIEM

- <u>Security Information and Event Management</u> (<u>SIEM</u>) market is defined by the customer's need to analyze event data in <u>real time</u>.
- Allows for the early detection of targeted attacks and data breaches
- Collect, store, investigate and report on log data for incident response, forensics and regulatory compliance.
- Aggregates event data produced by security devices, network infrastructure, systems and applications. The primary data source is log data.

2021 Magic Quadrant =




COMPLETENESS OF VISION


As of Apr 2021

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splunk>



:: LogRhythm[™]



Containment, Eradication, and Recovery

Containment - is important before an incident overwhelms resources or increases damage

 Most incidents require containment, which provides time for developing a tailored remediation strategy



- An essential part of containment is decision-making (e.g., shut down a system, disconnect it from a network, disable certain functions)
- Criteria for selecting among containment strategies are based on type of incident:
 - Potential damage & theft of resources
 - Need for evidence preservation
 - Service availability requirements (e.g., network connectivity, services provided to external parties)
 - Time & resources needed to implement
 - Effectiveness (e.g., partial containment, full containment)

Containment, Eradication, and Recovery

Eradication - After an incident has been contained, eradication may be necessary to eliminate components of the incident, such as:

- Deleting malware
- Disabling breached user accounts
- Identifying and mitigating all vulnerabilities that were exploited
 - During eradication, it is important to identify all affected hosts within the organization so that they can be remediated



Containment, Eradication, and Recovery

Recovery - In recovery, administrators restore systems to normal operation, confirm that the systems are functioning normally, and (if applicable) remediate vulnerabilities to prevent similar incidents



May involve such actions as:

- Restoring systems from clean backups
- Rebuilding systems from scratch
- Replacing compromised files with clean versions
- Installing patches
- Changing passwords
- Tightening network perimeter security (e.g. firewall rules, boundary router access control lists, ...)

Once a resource is successfully attacked, it is often attacked again, or other resources within the organization are attacked in a similar manner

 As a result, higher levels of system logging or network monitoring are often part of the recovery process

Incident Response Workflow

Detection and Analysis	
1.	Determine whether an incident has occurred
1.1	Analyze the precursors and indicators
1.2	Look for correlating information
1.3	Perform research (e.g., search engines, knowledge base)
1.4	As soon as the handler believes an incident has occurred, begin documenting the investigation and gathering evidence
2.	Prioritize handling the incident based on the relevant factors (functional impact, information impact, recoverability effort, etc.)
3.	Report the incident to the appropriate internal personnel and external organizations
Containment, Eradication, and Recovery	
4.	Acquire, preserve, secure, and document evidence
5.	Contain the incident
6.	Eradicate the incident
6.1	Identify and mitigate all vulnerabilities that were exploited
6.2	Remove malware, inappropriate materials, and other components
6.3	If more affected hosts are discovered (e.g., new malware infections), repeat the Detection and Analysis steps (1.1, 1.2) to identify all other affected hosts, then contain (5) and eradicate (6) the incident for them
7.	Recover from the incident
7.1	Return affected systems to an operationally ready state
7.2	Confirm that the affected systems are functioning normally
7.3	If necessary, implement additional monitoring to look for future related activity
Post-Incident Activity	
8.	Create a follow-up report
9.	Hold a lessons learned meeting (mandatory for major incidents, optional otherwise)



Agenda

- ✓ Computer virus
- ✓ Malicious software
 - ✓ Proliferation of malware
 - ✓ Malware components
 - ✓ Anti-malware components
 - ✓ Best practices for protection
- ✓ Business Continuity and Disaster Contingency Planning
- ✓ Incident Response Planning
- Team Project Q&A

Team Project Q&A

MIS5214 Security Architecture