Unit #5a

MIS 5214

Access Control


Agenda

- Access Control
- Identification and Authentication
 - Digital Identity Guidelines
 - Biometrics (quick overview/review)
- Centralized Remote Access Control Technologies

Access

The flow of information between a subject and an object


- Subject
 - Is an active entity that requests access to an object or the data within the object
 - Can be a user, program, or process
- Object
 - Can be a computer, computer directory, file, program, database or field within a table within a database



Access Controls

- Broad term covering several types of mechanisms that control access to features of networks, computers and information stored and flowing within them
- First line of defense in battling unauthorized access to network resources and systems
 - Give organizations ability to control, restrict, monitor and protect resource confidentiality, integrity and availability


To access a network's resource, a user must:



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
MIS5214 Security Architecture

• Prove their identity (i.e. has the necessary credentials)




To access a network's resource, a user must:

- Prove their identity (i.e. has the necessary credentials),
- Have been given privileges to access a resource and perform action they are requesting




To access a network's resource, a user must:

- Prove their identity (i.e. has the necessary credentials),
- Have been given privileges to access a resource and perform action they are requesting
- Be tracked to enforce accountability of their actions



To access a network's resource, a user must:

- Prove their identity (i.e. has the necessary credentials),
- Have been given privileges to perform action they are requesting
- Be tracked to enforce accountability of their actions



Logical Access Controls

- Are technical tools used for identification, authentication, authorization and accountability
 - "Logical" and "Technical" are synonyms that can be used interchangeably in this context
- Can be embedded in operating systems, applications, add-on security packages, databases and telecommunication management systems

Identification and Authentication

Usually involves a two-step process:

- 1. Identification: Entering public information
 - Method by which a subject (user, program or process) claims to have a specific identity
 - Username, employee number, account number, or email address
- 2. Authentication: Entering private information
 - Individual's identify must be verified during authentication process
 - Method by which subject proves it is who it says it is
 - Static password, smart authenticator ("token"), one-time password, or PIN

Identification



USER ID

User Identification

Identification: Entering public information

- Method by which a subject (user, program or process) supplies identifying information to claim they have a specific identity
 - Username, employee number, account number, or email address
- Creating secure identities involves 3 key aspects:
 - 1. Uniqueness every user, program or process must be identified with an identifier (i.e. unique ID) that is specific to the individual for accountability
 - 2. Non-descriptive Identifier should not indicate the purpose of the account nor the user's position nor tasks done with the account
 - **3.** Issuance provided by an authority as a formal/official means of proving identity

Question:

How should information systems be set up to mitigate risks to the CIA of their data content?

FIPS 199: Risk assessment based on security objectives and impact ratings

FIPS PUB 199	
FEDERAL INFORMA	ATION PROCESSING STANDARDS PUBLICATION
	or Security Categorization of rmation and Information System
Computer Security Divisi Information Technology I National Institute of Stan Gaithersburg, MD 20899	Laboratory dards and Technology
February 2004	
SATURDAT OF COMMINISTRATION OF RANGE OF	
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COM Donald L. Evans, Secretary	
TECHNOLOGY ADMINISTRA Phillip J. Bond, Under Secre	etary for 1 ecnnology

	POTENTIAL IMPACT			
Security Objective	LOW	MODERATE	HIGH	
Confidentiality Preserving authorized restrictions on information access and disclosure, including means for protecting personal privacy and proprietary information. [44 U.S.C., SEC. 3542]	The unauthorized disclosure of information could be expected to have a limited adverse effect on organizational operations, organizational assets, or individuals.	The unauthorized disclosure of information could be expected to have a serious adverse effect on organizational operations, organizational assets, or individuals.	The unauthorized disclosure of information could be expected to have a severe or catastrophic adverse effect on organizational operations, organizational assets, or individuals.	
Integrity Guarding against improper information modification or destruction, and includes ensuring information non-repudiation and authenticity. [44 U.S.C., SEC. 3542]	The unauthorized modification or destruction of information could be expected to have a limited adverse effect on organizational operations, organizational assets, or individuals.	The unauthorized modification or destruction of information could be expected to have a serious adverse effect on organizational operations, organizational assets, or individuals.	The unauthorized modification or destruction of information could be expected to have a severe or catastrophic adverse effect on organizational operations, organizational assets, or individuals.	
Availability Ensuring timely and reliable access to and use of information. [44 U.S.C., SEC. 3542]	The disruption of access to or use of information or an information system could be expected to have a limited adverse effect on organizational operations, organizational assets, or individuals.	The disruption of access to or use of information or an information system could be expected to have a serious adverse effect on organizational operations, organizational assets, or individuals.	The disruption of access to or use of information or an information system could be expected to have a severe or catastrophic adverse effect on organizational operations, organizational assets, or individuals.	

NIST Special Publication 800-53

Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations

JOINT TASK FORCE TRANSFORMATION INITIATIVE

This publication is available free of charge from: http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r4

> April 2013 DES UPDATES AS OF 01-22-2015




U.S. Department of Commerce Rebecca M. Blank, Acting Secretary

National Institute of Standards and Technology
Patrick D. Gallagher, Under Secretary of Commerce for Standards and Technology and Director

Identification and Authentication					
IA-1	Identification and Authentication Policy and Procedures	P1	IA-1	IA-1	IA-1
IA-2	Identification and Authentication (Organizational Users)	P1	IA-2 (1) (12)	IA-2 (1) (2) (3) (8) (11) (12)	IA-2 (1) (2) (3) (4) (8) (9) (11) (12)
IA-3	Device Identification and Authentication	P1	Not Selected	IA-3	IA-3
IA-4	Identifier Management	P1	IA-4	IA-4	IA-4
IA-5	Authenticator Management	P1	IA-5 (1) (11)	IA-5 (1) (2) (3) (11)	IA-5 (1) (2) (3) (11)
IA-6	Authenticator Feedback	P2	IA-6	IA-6	IA-6
IA-7	Cryptographic Module Authentication	P1	IA-7	IA-7	IA-7
IA-8	Identification and Authentication (Non- Organizational Users)	P1	IA-8 (1) (2) (3) (4)	IA-8 (1) (2) (3) (4)	IA-8 (1) (2) (3) (4)
IDENTIFIER					

		Organizational Oser
CLASS	FAMILY	IDENTIFIER
Management	Risk Assessment	RA
Management	Planning	PL
Management	System and Services Acquisition	SA
Management	Certification, Accreditation, and Security Assessments	CA
Operational	Personnel Security	PS
Operational	Physical and Environmental Protection	PE
Operational	Contingency Planning	CP
Operational	Configuration Management	CM
Operational	Maintenance	MA
Operational	System and Information Integrity	SI
Operational	Media Protection	MP
Operational	Incident Response	IR
Operational	Awareness and Training	AT
Technical	Identification and Authentication	IA
Technical	Access Control	AC
Technical	Audit and Accountability	AU
Technical	System and Communications Protection	SC



FEDRAMP SYSTEM SECURITY PLAN (SSP) HIGH BASELINE TEMPLATE

Cloud Service Provider Name Information System Name Version # Version Date



CONTROLLED UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION

FEDRAMP SYSTEM SECURITY PLAN (SSP) HIGH BASELINE TEMPLATE

CSP Name | Information System Name

Version #.#, Date

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13. MINIMUM SECURITY CONTROLS

Security controls must meet minimum security control baseline requirements. Upon categorizing a system as Low, Moderate, or High sensitivity in accordance with FIPS 199, the corresponding security control baseline standards apply. Some of the control baselines have enhanced controls which are indicated in parentheses.

Security controls that are representative of the sensitivity of Enter Information System Abbreviation are described in the sections that follow. Security controls that are designated as "Not Selected" or "Withdrawn by NIST" are not described unless they have additional FedRAMP controls. Guidance on how to describe the implemented standard can be found in NIST 800-53, Rev 4. Control enhancements are marked in parentheses in the sensitivity columns.

Systems that are categorized as FIPS 199 Low use the controls designated as Low, systems categorized as FIPS 199 Moderate use the controls designated as Moderate and systems categorized as FIPS 199 High use the controls designated as High. A summary of which security standards pertain to which sensitivity level is found in Table 13-1 Summary of Required Security Controls that follows.

Table 13-1. Summary of Required Security Controls

ID	Control Description	Sensitivity Level			
		Low	Moderate	High	
AC	Access Control				
AC-1	Access Control Policy and Procedures	AC-1	AC-1	AC-1	
AC-2	Account Management	AC-2	AC-2 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (7) (9) (10) (12)	AC-2 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (7) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)	
AC-3	Access Enforcement	AC-3	AC-3	AC-3	
AC-4	Information Flow Enforcement	Not Selected	AC-4 (21)	AC-4 (8) (21)	
AC-5	Separation of Duties	Not Selected	AC-5	AC-5	
AC-6	Least Privilege	Not Selected	AC-6 (1) (2) (5) (9) (10)	AC-6 (1) (2) (3) (5) (7) (8) (9) (10)	
AC-7	Unsuccessful Logon Attempts	AC-7	AC-7	AC-7 (2)	
AC-8	System Use Notification	AC-8	AC-8	AC-8	
AC-10	Concurrent Session Control	Not Selected	AC-10	AC-10	
AC-11	Session Lock	Not Selected	AC-11 (1)	AC-11 (1)	
AC-12	Session Termination	Not Selected	AC-12	AC-12 (1)	
AC-14	Permitted Actions Without Identification or Authentication	AC-14	AC-14	AC-14	
AC-17	Remote Access	AC-17	AC-17 (1) (2) (3) (4) (9)	AC-17 (1) (2) (3) (4) (9)	
AC-18	Wireless Access	AC-18	AC-18 (1)	AC-18 (1) (3) (4) (5)	
AC-19	Access Control For Mobile Devices	AC-19	AC-19 (5)	AC-19 (5)	
AC-20	Use of External Information Systems	AC-20	AC-20 (1) (2)	AC-20 (1) (2)	
AC-21	Information Sharing	Not Selected	AC-21	AC-21	
AC-22	Publicly Accessible Content	AC-22	AC-22	AC-22	
AT	Awareness and Training				
AT-1	Security Awareness and Training Policy and Procedures	AT-1	AT-1	AT-1	

ID	Control Description	Sensitivity Level		
II.	Control Description	Low	Moderate	High
	AP does not include CM-7 (4) in the Mo if (5) is implemented.	oderate Baseline. NIS	T supplemental guidance s	tates that CM-7 (4) is not
CP	Contingency Planning			
CP-1	Contingency Planning Policy and Procedures	CP-1	CP-1	CP-1
CP-2	Contingency Plan	CP-2	CP-2 (1) (2) (3) (8)	CP-2 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (8)
CP-3	Contingency Training	CP-3	CP-3	CP-3 (1)
CP-4	Contingency Plan Testing	CP-4	CP-4 (1)	CP-4 (1) (2)
CP-6	Alternate Storage Site	Not Selected	CP-6 (1) (3)	CP-6 (1) (2) (3)
CP-7	Alternate Processing Site	Not Selected	CP-7 (1) (2) (3)	CP-7 (1) (2) (3) (4)
CP-8	Telecommunications Services	Not Selected	CP-8 (1) (2)	CP-8 (1) (2) (3) (4)
CP-9	Information System Backup	CP-9	CP-9 (1) (3)	CP-9 (1) (2) (3) (5)
CP-10	Information System Recovery and	CP-10	CP-10 (2)	CP-10 (2) (4)
	Reconstitution			
IA	Identification and Authentication			
IA-1	Identification and Authentication Policy and Procedures	IA-1	IA-1	IA-1
IA-2	Identification and Authentication (Organizational Users)	IA-2 (1) (12)	IA-2 (1) (2) (3) (5) (8) (11) (12)	IA-2 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (8) (9) (11) (12)
IA-3	Device Identification and Authentication	Not Selected	IA-3	IA-3
IA-4	Identifier Management	IA-4	IA-4 (4)	IA-4 (4)
IA-5	Authenticator Management	IA-5 (1) (11)	IA-5 (1) (2) (3) (4) (6) (7) (11)	IA-5 (1) (2) (3) (4) (6) (7) (8) (11) (13)
IA-6	Authenticator Feedback	IA-6	IA-6	IA-6
IA-7	Cryptographic Module Authentication	IA-7	IA-7	IA-7
IA-8	Identification and Authentication (Non-Organizational Users)	IA-8 (1) (2) (3) (4)	IA-8 (1) (2) (3) (4)	IA-8 (1) (2) (3) (4)
IK	incident Kesponse		·	<u> </u>
IR-1	Incident Response Policy and Procedures	IR-1	IR-1	IR-1
IR-2	Incident Response Training	IR-2	IR-2	IR-2 (1) (2)
IR-3	Incident Response Testing	Not Selected	IR-3 (2)	IR-3 (2)
IR-4	Incident Handling	IR-4	IR-4 (1)	IR-4 (1) (2) (3) (4) (6) (8)
IR-5	Incident Monitoring	IR-5	IR-5	IR-5 (1)
IR-6	Incident Reporting	IR-6	IR-6 (1)	IR-6 (1)
IR-7	Incident Response Assistance	IR-7	IR-7 (1) (2)	IR-7 (1) (2)
IR-8	Incident Response Plan	IR-8	IR-8	IR-8
IR-9	Information Spillage Response	Not Selected	IR-9 (1) (2) (3) (4)	IR-9 (1) (2) (3) (4)
MA	Maintenance			
MA-1	System Maintenance Policy and Procedures	MA-1	MA-1	MA-1
MA-2	Controlled Maintenance	MA-2	MA-2	MA-2 (2)
MA-3	Maintenance Tools	Not Selected	MA-3 (1) (2) (3)	MA-3 (1) (2) (3)
IVIA-5	Iviaintenance 100is	Not selected	INIU-2 (T) (T) (2)	NUC 2 (1) (2) (3)

NIST Special Publication 800-53A

Assessing Security and Privacy Controls in Federal Information Systems and Organizations

Building Effective Assessment Plans

JOINT TASK FORCE TRANSFORMATION INITIATIVE

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U.S. Department of Commerce
Penny Pritzker, Secretary

National Institute of Standards and Technology
Willie May, Acting Under Secretary of Commerce for Standards and Technology and Acting Director

pecial Publication 800-53A	
Revision 4	

IA-2	IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (ORGANIZATIONAL USERS)
	ASSESSMENT OBJECTIVE: Determine if the information system uniquely identifies and authenticates organizational users (or processes acting on behalf of organizational users).
	POTENTIAL ASSESSMENT METHODS AND OBJECTS: Examine: [SELECT FROM: Identification and authentication policy; procedures addressing user identification and authentication; information system design documentation; information
	system configuration settings and associated documentation; information system audit records; list of information system accounts; other relevant documents or records]. Interview: [SELECT FROM: Organizational personnel with information system operations responsibilities; organizational personnel with information security responsibilities; system/network
	administrators; organizational personnel with account management responsibilities; system developers].
	Test : [SELECT FROM: Organizational processes for uniquely identifying and authenticating users; automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing identification and authentication capability].

Assessing Security and Privacy Controls in Federal Information Systems

and Organizations — Building Effective Assessment Plans

IA-2(1)	IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION NETWORK ACCESS TO PRIVILEGED ACCOUNTS
	ASSESSMENT OBJECTIVE:
Determine if the information system implements multifactor authentication for access to privileged accounts.	
	POTENTIAL ASSESSMENT METHODS AND OBJECTS:
Examine: [select from: Identification and authentication policy; procedures addressing us identification and authentication; information system design documentation; information system configuration settings and associated documentation; information system records; list of information system accounts; other relevant documents or record	
	Interview: [select from: Organizational personnel with information system operations responsibilities; organizational personnel with account management responsibilities; organizational personnel with information security responsibilities; system/network administrators; system developers].
	Test : [SELECT FROM: Automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing multifactor authentication capability].

IA-2(2)	IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION NETWORK ACCESS TO NON-PRIVILEGED ACCOUNTS		
ASSESSMENT OBJECTIVE: Determine if the information system implements multifactor authentication for network access to non-privileged accounts.			
	POTENTIAL ASSESSMENT METHODS AND OBJECTS:		
	Examine: [SELECT FROM: Identification and authentication policy; procedures addressing user identification and authentication; information system design documentation; information system configuration settings and associated documentation; information system audit records; list of information system accounts; other relevant documents or records].		
	Interview: [select from: Organizational personnel with information system operations responsibilities; organizational personnel with account management responsibilities; organizational personnel with information security responsibilities; system/network administrators; system developers].		
	Test: [SELECT FROM: Automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing multifactor authentication capability]		

How should information systems be set up to identify and authenticate users, programs, and processes to mitigate risks to the CIA of their data content?

NIST 800 63-3: Digital Identity Guidelines

Controls focus on 2 errors we seek to avoid:

1. The impact of providing a service to the wrong subject

• E.g. An attacker successfully identifies as someone else

2. The impact of excessive identity proofing

 I.e. collecting and storing more information about a person than is required to successfully provide the digital service NIST Special Publication 800-63-3

Digital Identity Guidelines

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This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-63-3



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Digital Identity Guidelines

6 Categories of impact resulting from providing a service to the wrong subject

- 1. Inconvenience, distress, or damage to standing or reputation
- 2. Financial loss or agency liability
- 3. Harm to agency programs or public interests
- 4. Unauthorized release of sensitive information
- 5. Personal safety
- 6. Civil or criminal violations

Identity and Authentication Controls are selected based on information security breach impact levels:

- 1. Low impact
- 2. Moderate impact
- 3. High impact

Impact-based determination of Identity and Authentication Assurance Levels

Table 6-1 Maximum Potential Impacts for Each Assurance Level			
	Assurance Level		
Impact Categories	1	2	3
Inconvenience, distress or damage to standing or reputation	Low	Mod	High
Financial loss or agency liability	Low	Mod	High
Harm to agency programs or public interests	N/A	Low/Mod	High
Unauthorized release of sensitive information	N/A	Low/Mod	High
Personal Safety	N/A	Low	Mod/High
Civil or criminal violations	N/A	Low/Mod	High

Agenda

- ✓ New schedule for today's classes and mid-term exam
- ✓ Access Control
- Identification and Authentication
 - Digital Identity Guidelines
 - Biometrics (quick overview/review)
- Centralized Remote Access Control Technologies

Identity & Authentication Assurance Levels are defined as:

- 1. The degree of confidence in the vetting process used to establish the identity of the individual to whom the credential was issued
 - IAL Identity Assurance Level
- 2. The degree of confidence that the individual who uses the credential is the individual to whom the credential was issued
 - AAL Authentication Assurance Level



Digital Identity & Authentication Guidelines

Specifies **3 kinds of identity authentication assurance controls to select in** mitigating risks associated with impacts resulting from identity and authentication errors in electronic transactions:

- 1. Enrollment and Identity Proofing
 - Protecting against: A false claim to an identity
- 2. Authentication and Lifecycle Management
 - Protecting against: A false use of a credential
- 3. Federation and Assertions
 - A false or compromised identity passed among a collection of systems
 - NIST SP 800-63C

NIST Special Publication 800-63-3

Digital Identity Guidelines

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This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-63-3

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U.S. Department of Commerce
Wilbur L. Ross, Jr., Secretary

Kent Rochford, Acting NIST Director and Under Secretary of Commerce for Standards and Technology

E-Authentication Credentials

Verifiers use credentials to authenticate the Claimant's identity based on possession and control of the corresponding authenticator

- Paper credentials presented by subject in-person can be checked to verify that the physical holder of the credential is the subject, these include:
 - Passports, birth certificates, driver's licenses, employee identity cards...
- Verification of electronic credentials
 - The password database entries possessed by the Verifier are considered to be the credentials
 - Public key certificates (X.509) are a classic example of credentials the Claimant can possess
 - To authenticate a Claimant using an electronic credential, the Verifier validates the credential and assures it was issued by an authorized Credential Service Provider and has not expired or been revoked by
 - 1. Determining if the credential has been signed by the Credential Service Provider
 - 2. Interactively querying the Credential Service Provider through a secure protocol

Identity Assurance

NIST Special Publication 800-63A

Digital Identity Guidelines

Enrollment and Identity Proofing

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
Mary F. Theofanos Office of Data and Informatics Material Measurement Laboratory This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-63a

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National Institute of Standards and Technology Kent Rochford, Acting NIST Director and Under Secretary of Commerce for Standards and Technology



Identity Assurance

Identity Assurance Level

IAL1: At IAL1, attributes, if any, are self-asserted or should be treated as self-asserted.

IAL2: At IAL2, either remote or in-person identity proofing is required. IAL2 requires identifying attributes to have been verified in person or remotely using, at a minimum, the procedures given in <u>SP 800-63A</u>.

IAL3: At IAL3, in-person identity proofing is required. Identifying attributes must be verified by an authorized CSP representative through examination of physical documentation as described in <u>SP 800-63A</u>.

Requirement	IAL1	IAL2	IAL3
Dassansa	No	In-person and unsupervised	In-person and supervised
Presence	Requirements	remote.	remote.
Resolution	No Requirements	 The minimum attributes necessary to accomplish identity resolution. KBV may be used for added confidence. 	Same as IAL2

Authentication Assurance

NIST Special Publication 800-63B

Digital Identity Guidelines

Authentication and Lifecycle Management

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
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U.S. Department of Commerce Wilbur L. Ross, Jr., Secretary

National Institute of Standards and Technology Kent Rochford, Acting NIST Director and Under Secretary of Commerce for Standards and Technology



Authenticator Assurance

Authenticator Assurance Level

AAL1: AAL1 provides some assurance that the claimant controls an authenticator registered to the subscriber. AAL1 requires single-factor authentication using a wide range of available authentication technologies. Successful authentication requires that the claimant prove possession and control of the authenticator(s) through a secure authentication protocol.

AAL2: AAL2 provides high confidence that the claimant controls authenticator(s) registered to the subscriber. Proof of possession and control of two different authentication factors is required through a secure authentication protocol. Approved cryptographic techniques are required at AAL2 and above.

AAL3: AAL3 provides very high confidence that the claimant controls authenticator(s) registered to the subscriber. Authentication at AAL3 is based on proof of possession of a key through a cryptographic protocol. AAL3 is like AAL2 but also requires a "hard" cryptographic authenticator that provides verifier impersonation resistance.


Each assurance level describes the degree of certainty that the user has presented an identifier that refers to his or her identity

Assurance is defined as:


- 1. The degree of confidence in the vetting process used to establish the identity of the individual to whom the credential was issued
- 2. The degree of confidence that the individual who uses the credential is the individual to whom the credential was issued

Identity Assurance levels:

- 1. Level 1: Little or no confidence in the asserted identity's validity
- 2. Level 2: High confidence in the asserted identity's validity
- 3. Level 3: Very high confidence in the asserted identity's validity



Identity Assurance



	Assurance Level		
Impact Categories	1	2	3
Inconvenience, distress or damage to standing or reputation	Low	Mod	High
Financial loss or agency liability	Low	Mod	High
Harm to agency programs or public interests	N/A	Low/Mod	High
Unauthorized release of sensitive information	N/A	Low/Mod	High
Personal Safety	N/A	Low	Mod/High
Civil or criminal violations	N/A	Low/Mod	High

Requirement	IAL1	IAL2	IAL3	
Evidence	No identity evidence is collected.	One piece of SUPERIOR or STRONG evidence depending on strength of original proof and validation occurs with issuing source, OR Two pieces of STRONG evidence, OR One piece of STRONG evidence plus two (2) pieces of FAIR evidence.	Two pieces of SUPERIOR evidence, OR One piece of SUPERIOR evidence and one piece of STRONG evidence depending on strength of original proof and validation occurs with issuing source, OR Two pieces of STRONG evidence plus one piece of FAIR evidence.	
Validation	No validation	Each piece of evidence must be validated with a process that is able to achieve the same strength as the evidence presented.	Same as IAL2	
Verification	No verification	Verified by a process that is able to achieve a strength of STRONG.	Verified by a process that is able to achieve a strength of SUPERIOR.	
Address Confirmation	No requirements for address confirmation	Required. Enrollment code sent to any address of record. Notification sent by means different from enrollment code.	Required. Notification of proofing to postal address.	
Biometric Collection	No	Optional	Mandatory	
Security Controls	N/A	SP 800-53 Moderate Baseline (or equivalent federal or industry standard).	SP 800-53 High Baseline (or equivalent federal or industry standard). 21	

Authentication – Classic 3 factor paradigm

...for authentication systems

Subject provides information to prove it is who it says it is and authentication system verifies the identification information

1. Something the subject knows ("authentication by knowledge")

- Examples: password, PIN, combination to a lock...
- Usually least expensive method to implement
- Vulnerability: Someone else may acquire this knowledge and gain unauthorized access to a resource

2. Something the subject has ("authentication by ownership")

- Examples: Key, swipe card, access card, badge...
- Common for accessing facilities, sensitive areas, and authenticate holder
- Vulnerability: Can be lost or stolen and result in unauthorized access

3. Something the subject is ("authentication by characteristic")

- Examples: Fingerprint, palm scan, retina scan...
- Based on biometrics a way to identify the subject by a unique physical attribute
- Vulnerability: Can be expensive, cumbersome/troubling to users and associated with false acceptance or rejection


Authentication

Multi-factor authentication refers to use of >1 factor

- * Something the subject knows ("authentication by knowledge")
- * Something the subject has ("authentication by ownership")
- * Something the subject is ("authentication by characteristic")

Authentication system strength determined by the number of factors incorporated into the systems

- 2 factor implementations considered stronger than those using 1 factor
- Systems that incorporate 3 factors are stronger than 2 factor systems



E-Authentication is slightly different from "classic" authentication

E-authenticators always contain a secret

• Used by the claimant to prove possession and control of the authenticator

Some of the classic authentication factors do not apply directly to e-authentication, for example:

- ID badge is "something you have" useful for authenticating to a human (e.g. a guard), but is not usually an authenticator for e-authentication
- Authentication factors classified as "something you know" are not necessary secrets
 - Knowledge based authentication where a claimant is prompted to answer questions that can be confirmed from public databases does not constitute an acceptable secret for e-authentication

E-Authentication, is slightly different from "classic" authentication

- Claimant authenticates to a system or application over a network by proving that he/she has possession and control of an authenticator registered with the Credential Service Provider for proving the bearer's identity
- The authenticator contains a <u>secret</u> the Claimant uses to prove that he/she is the Subscriber named in a particular credential
 - The authenticator uses the secret to generate an output ("token")

...used in the authentication process to demonstrate and prove the Claimant is the person to whom the authenticator was issued

E-Authentication Authenticators —

The secret contained in a is based on either public/private key pairs (asymmetric keys) or a shared authenticator secret (symmetric key)

Public Key authenticators - have the private key stored in the authenticator

A Verifier knowing the Claimant's public key through some credential (typically a public key certificate) can use an authentication protocol to verify the Claimant's identity, by proving that the Claimant has possession and control of the associated private key authenticator

- **Shared Secret authenticators** may be either symmetric keys or passwords
 - While often used in similar protocols, an important difference is how they related to the Subscriber
 - **Symmetric keys** are stored in hardware or software that the Subscriber controls
 - "Something the Subscriber has"
 - <u>Passwords</u> are memorized by the Subscriber
 - "Something the Subscriber knows"
 - More vulnerable to password guessing network attacks, keyboard logging, and being learned by someone watching the password being entered than practical for cryptographic keys
 - Also susceptible to keyboard logging

Either way - Subscriber has a duty to maintain exclusive control of his/her authenticator, since possession and control of the authenticator is used to authenticate the Claimant's identity

Assertions

- On completion of the authentication process, the Verifier generates an assertion containing the result of the authentication and provides it to the RP
- Examples of Assertions:
 - Cookies Character strings, placed in memory, which are available to websites within the same Internet domain as the server that placed them in the Web browsers. Cookies may be assertions or pointers to assertions
 - SAML (Security Assertion Markup Language) Assertions Specified using a mark-up language intended for describing security assertions. They can be used by a Verifier to make a statement to a RP about the identity of a Claimant, and may be digitally signed
 - Kerberos Tickets Allow a ticket granting authority to issue session keys to tow authenticated parties using symmetric key based encapsulation schemes


1. Memorized Secrets – something you know

- A secret shared between Subscriber and CSP
- Typically character strings (e.g. passwords, passphrases,) or numerical strings (PINs)
- Authenticator presented to the Verifier in an authentication process is the secret itself (e.g. password, passphrase, or PIN itself)



2. Look-up Secret – something you have

- The secret(s) identified by a prompt
- A physical or electronic authenticator that stores a set of secrets shared between the Claimant and the CSP
- Claimant uses the authenticator to look up the appropriate secret(s) needed to respond to a prompt from the Verifier (the authenticator input)
- E.g. Claimant asked by the Verifier to provide a specific subset of the numeric or character strings printed on a card in table format



3. Out of Band authenticator

- Physical device uniquely addressable
- Receives a Verifier-selected secret sent to the Claimant's device for one-time use
- Is possessed and controlled by Claimant
 - Supports private communication over a channel that is separate from the primary channel for e-authentication
- Value provided by the Out of Band authenticator is presented to the Verifier using the primary channel for e-authentication

E.g. Claimant attempts to log into a website and receives a text message on his/her cellphone with a random authenticator to be presented as part of the electronic protocol



4. Single-factor (SF) One-Time Password (OTP) – something you have

- Authentication achieved via the one-time password
- A hardware device that supports the spontaneous generation of one-time passwords
- This device has an embedded secret that is used as the seed for generation of one-time passwords and does not require activation through a second factor
- Authentication is accomplished by providing an acceptable one-time password and thereby proving possession and control of the device
- E.g. the one-time password device may display 6 numbers at a time



5. Single-factor (SF) Cryptographic Device— something you have

- Authenticator is a signed message
- Hardware device performs cryptographic operations on input provided to the device
- Device uses embedded symmetric or asymmetric cryptographic keys
- Authentication is accomplished by proving possession of the device
- Device does not require activation through a second factor of authentication
 - E.g. Transport Layer Security (TLS) uses a "certificate verify" message
 - The server verifies the client's identity by verifying the client's digital certificate with the public key







- **6. Multi-factor (MF) Cryptographic Software** something you have (and either something you know or something you are)
 - Authenticator is a signed message
 - A cryptographic key is stored on disk or some other "soft" media and requires activation through a second factor of authentication
 - Authentication is accomplished by proving possession and control of the key
 - Device requires activation through a second factor of authentication either something you know or something you are (e.g. fingerprint)
 - E.g. Transport Layer Security (TLS) uses a "certificate verify" message
 - The server verifies the client's identity by verifying the client's digital certificate with the public key



- 8. Multi-factor (MF) One-Time Password (OTP) Device something you have (and either something you know or something you are)
 - Authenticator is the one-time password
 - A hardware device that generates one-time passwords for use in authentication and which requires activation through a second factor of authentication
 - Second factor of authentication may be achieved through an integrated
 - Keypad
 - Biometric reader (e.g. fingerprint)
 - Direct computer interface (e.g. USB port)
 - One-time password is typically displayed on the device and manually input to the Verifier as a password, although direct electronic input from the device to a computer is also allowed

- **9.** Multi-factor (MF) Cryptographic Device something you have (and either something you know or something you are)
 - Authenticator is some type of signed message
 - A hardware device that contains a protected cryptographic key that requires activation through a second authentication factor
 - Authentication accomplished by proving possession of the device and control of the key
 - May be activated by something you know or something you have

Authenticator Usage

An authentication process may involve a single authenticator, or a combination of two or more authenticators:

- Single authenticator Claimant presents a single authenticator to prove their identity to the Verifier
 - E.g. Claimant attempts to log into a password protected website, the Claimant enters a username and password
 - In this instance, only the password is considered to be an authenticator
- Multi-authenticator authentication Claimant presents values generated by two or more authenticator to prove his/her identity to the Verifier
 - The combination of authenticators is characterized by the combination of factors used by the authenticators (both inherent in the manifestation of the authenticators, and those used to activate the authenticators)
 - E.g. Verifier requires a Claimant to enter a password and use a single-factor cryptographic device is an example of a multi-authenticator authentication
 - The combination is considered multi-factor, since the password is something you know and the cryptographic device is something you have


AAL = Authenticator Assurance Level

AAL1 : = 1 Factor

AAL2 : = 2 Factors

AAL3 : = 2 Factors: Hardware-based authenticator and an

authenticator that provides verifier impersonation resistance



Requirement	AAL1	AAL2	AAL3
Permitted Authenticator Types	Memorized Secret; Look-Up Secret; Out-of-Band; SF OTP Device; MF OTP Device; SF Crypto Software; SF Crypto Device; MF Crypto Software; MF Crypto Device	MF OTP Device; MF Crypto Software; MF Crypto Device; or Memorized Secret plus: • Look-Up Secret • Out-of-Band • SF OTP Device • SF Crypto Software • SF Crypto Device	MF Crypto Device; SF Crypto Device plus Memorized Secret; SF OTP Device plus MF Crypto Device or Software; SF OTP Device plus SF Crypto Software plus Memorized Secret
FIPS 140 Verification	Level 1 (Government agency verifiers)	Level 1 (Government agency authenticators and verifiers)	Level 2 overall (MF authenticators) Level 1 overall (verifiers and SF Crypto Devices) Level 3 physical security (all authenticators)
Reauthentication	30 days	12 hours or 30 minutes inactivity; MAY use one authentication factor	12 hours or 15 minutes inactivity; SHALL use both authentication factors
Security Controls	SP 800-53 Low Baseline (or equivalent)	SP 800-53 Moderate Baseline (or equivalent)	SP 800-53 High Baseline (or equivalent)
MitM Resistance	Required	Required	Required
Verifier- Impersonation Resistance	Not required	Not required	Required
Verifier- Compromise Resistance	Not required	Not required	Required
Replay Resistance	Not required	Not required	Required
Authentication Intent	Not required	Recommended	Required
Records Retention Policy	Required	Required	Required
Privacy Controls	Required	Required	Required 47

A "draft" attempt at summarizing use of Authenticators for Authentication Assurance Levels

	Something you.	MOCY	hove	on or	oney	ono ₄	have x Anow or ore)	ono ₄	Povex Know or ore)	Powe x Riow or one
Something you		Memorized Secret	Look-up Secret	Out of Band Device	Single-Factor OTP Device	Single-Factor Cryptographic Software	Multi-Factor Cryptographic Software	Single-Factor Cryptographic Device	Multi-Factor OTP Device	Multi-Factor Cryptographic Device
know	Memorized Secret	AAL1	AAL2	AAL2	AAL2	AAL2	AAL2	AAL3	AAL3	AAL3
have	Look-up Secret		AAL1	AAL1	AAL1	AAL1	AAL2	AAL1	AAL3	AAL3
have	Out of Band Device			AAL1	AAL1	AAL1	AAL2	AAL1	AAL3	AAL3
have	Single-Factor OTP Device				AAL1	AAL1	AAL2	AAL1	AAL3	AAL3
have	Single-Factor Cryptographic Software					AAL1	AAL2	AAL1	AAL3	AAL3
have + (know or are)	Multi-Factor Cryptographic Software							AAL2	AAL3	AAL3
have	Single-Factor Cryptographic Device								AAL3	AAL3
have + (know or are)	Multi-Factor OTP Device									AAL3
have + (know or are) MIS5214 Securit	Multi-Factor Cryptographic									AAL3

Authenticator Threats

Something you have...

- May be lost, damaged, stolen from the owner or cloned by the Attacker
 - E.g. Attacker who gains access to the owner's computer might copy a software authenticator
 - E.g. A hardware authenticator might be stolen, tampered with, or duplicated

Authenticator Threats

Something you know...

- May be disclosed to an Attacker
- Attacker might guess a password or PIN
- Where the authenticator is a shared secret, the Attacker could gain access to the CSP or Verifier and obtain the secret value
- An attacker may observe the entry of a PIN or passcode, find a written record or journal entry of a PIN or passcode, or may install malicious software (e.g. a keyboard logger) to capture the secret
- An attacker may determine the secret through off-line attacks on network traffic from an authentication attempt
- An attacker may be able to gain information about a Subscriber's Preregistered Knowledge researching the subscriber or through other social engineering techniques (e.g. the subscriber might refer to his/her pet in a conversation or blog)

Authenticator Threats

- Something you are (biometrics)...
 - May be replicated

An Attacker may obtain a copy of the authenticator owner's fingerprint and construct a replica – assuming that the biometric system(s) employed to not block such attacks by employing robust liveness detection techniques

Biometrics – when employed as a single factor of authentication by themselves may not be an acceptable technique for e-authentication

Digital Identity Determination for your SSP

FEDRAMP SYSTEM SECURITY PLAN (SSP) LOW BASELINE TEMPLATE

CSP Name | Information System Name Version #.#. Date

Using this categorization, in conjunction with the risk assessment and any unique security requirements. we have established the security controls for this system, as detailed in this SSP.

2.3. Digital Identity Determination

The digital identity information may be found in Attachment 3. Digital Identity Worksheet.

Note: NIST SP 800-63-3. Digital Identity Guidelines, does not recognize the four Levels of Assurance model previously used by federal agencies and described in OMB M-04-04, instead requiring agencies to individually select levels content entire at least on being performed.

The digital identity level is Choose an item. Additional digital identity [2] bn 15 Attachments Di choose an item. Selection. Level 1: AAL1, IAL1, FAL1 3. INFORMATI Level 2: AAL2, IAL2, FAL2 Čhoose an item.

Level 3: AAL3, IAL3, FAL3, functional proponent/advocate for this

Table 3-1. Information System Owner

Information System Owner Information				
Name	<enter name=""></enter>			
Title	<enter title=""></enter>			
Company / Organization	<enter company="" organization="">.</enter>			
Address	<enter address,="" and="" city,="" state="" zip=""></enter>			
Phone Number	<555-555-555>			
Email Address	<enter address="" email=""></enter>			

4. AUTHORIZING OFFICIAL

Instruction: The Authorizing Official is determined by the path that the CSP is using to obtain an authorization.

JAB P-ATO: FedRAMP, JAB, as comprised of member representatives from the General Services Administration (GSA), Department of Defense (DoD) and Department of Homeland Security (DHS)

Agency Authority to Operate (ATO): Agency Authorizing Official name, title and contact information Delete this and all other instructions from your final version of this document

FEDRAMP SYSTEM SECURITY PLAN (SSP) LOW BASELINE TEMPLATE

CSP Name | Information System Name

Version #.#, Date

DIGITAL IDENTITY WORKSHEET ATTACHMENT 3

This Attachment Section has been revised to include the Digital Identity template. Therefore, a separate attachment is not needed. Delete this note and all other instructions from your final version of this

The Digital Identity section explains the objective for sele the candidate system. Guidance on selecting the system in NIST SP 800-63, Revision 3, Digital Identity Guidelines.

Introduction and Purpose

This document provides guidance on digital identity serv establishing confidence in user identities electronically p Authentication focuses on the identity proofing process (assertion protocol used in a federated environment to co information (if applicable) (FAL). NIST SP 800-63-3, Digita four Level of Assurance model previously used by federal instead requiring agencies to individually select levels co

NIST SP 800-63-3 can be found at the following URL: NIST

Information System Name/Title

This Digital Identity Plan provides an overview of the sec Name (Enter Information System Abbreviation) in accord

Table 15-2. Information Systematics and Company of the Company of

Unique Identifier	Information Syste
Enter FedRAMP Application Number.	Information System Nar

Digital Identity Level Definitions

NIST SP 800-63-3 defines three levels in each of the comfederal information system's Digital Identity posture. NIS

- IAL refers to the identity proofing process.
- AAL refers to the authentication process.
- FAL refers to the strength of an assertion in a fe authentication and attribute information (if appl

Potential Impacts for Assurance Levels.

Assurance is defined as 1) the degree of confidence in the vet of the individual to whom the credential was issued, and 2) th who uses the credential is the individual to whom the creden

FEDRAMP SYSTEM SECURITY PLAN (SSP) LOW BASELINE TEMPLATE

CSP Name | Information System Name

Version #.#. Date

FedRAMP maps its system categorization levels to NIST 800-63-3's levels as shown in Table 15-3:

FEDRAMP SYSTEM SECURITY PLAN (SSP) LOW BASELINE TEMPLATE

CSP Name | Information System Name

Version #.#, Date

Table 15-3. Mapping FedRAMP Levels to NI

FedRAMP System Categorization	Identity Assurance Level (IAL)	Authenticator Assurance Lev (AAL)		
High	IAL3: In-person, or supervised remote identity proofing	AAL3: Multi-factor required based on hardware-based cryptographic authenticator and approved cryptograp techniques		
Moderate	IAL2: In-person or remote, potentially involving a "trusted referee"	AAL2: Multi-factor required, using approved cryptograp techniques		
Low	IAL1: Self-asserted	AAL1: Single-factor o multi-factor		
FedRAMP Tailored LI-SaaS	IAL1: Self-asserted	AAL1: Single-factor o multi-factor		

Selecting the appropriate Digital Identity level for a system er

right system authentication technology solution for the select

selecting the system authentication technology solution is av-

CSP Name has assessed the potential risk from Digital Identity

to a user's asserted identity. CSP Name has taken into consid

Review Maximum Potential Impact Levels

Table 15-4. Potential Impacts for Assurance Levels

	Assurar	nce Level Impac	t Profile
Potential Impact Categories	1	2	3
Inconvenience, distress or damage to standing or reputation	Low	Mod	High
Financial loss or agency liability	Low	Mod	High
Harm to agency programs or public interests	N/A	Low/Mod	High
Unauthorized release of sensitive information	N/A	Low/Mod	High
Personal Safety	N/A	Low	Mod/High
Civil or criminal violations	N/A	Low/Mod	High

Digital Identity Level Selection

Instruction: Select the lowest level that will cover all potential impact identified from Table 15-4. Potential Impacts for Assurance Levels.

Delete this instruction from your final version of this document.

The CSP Name has identified that they support the Digital Identity Level that has been selected for the Information System Name as noted in Table 15-5. Digital Identity Level. The selected Digital Identity Level indicated is supported for federal agency consumers of the cloud service offering. Implementation the likelihood of the occurrence of the harm and has identifie details of the Digital Identity mechanisms are provided in the System Security Plan under control IA-2.

Table 15-5. Digital Identity Level

Digital Identity Level	Maximum Impact Profile	Selection
Level 1: AAL1, IAL1, FAL1	Low	
Level 2: AAL2, IAL2, FAL2	Moderate	
Level 3: AAL3, IAL3, FAL3	High	

Agenda


- ✓ New schedule for today's classes and mid-term exam
- ✓ Access Control
- ✓ Identification and Authentication
 - ✓ Digital Identity Guidelines
 - Biometrics (quick overview/review)
- Centralized Remote Access Control Technologies

Authentication — Biometrics

Two different categories of biometric factor authentication:

- 1. Physiological ("what you are")
 - Physical attribute unique to a specific individual
 - Less prone to change unless an disfiguring accident
 - Hard to impersonate
- 2. Behavioral ("what you do")
 - · A characteristic of an individual
 - Can change over time
 - Can be forged






Authentication – Biometrics

During identity verification (i.e. authentication) the biometric system scans personal's physiological attribute or behavioral trait and compares the captured data to a record created in an earlier enrollment process

Biometric system

- Must be capable of repeatedly taking accurate measurements of anatomical or behavioral characteristics
- Error types:
 - False negative incorrect rejection of the identity of authorized individual
 - Called a Type I error
 - False Rejection Rate (FRR) is a measurement of the likelihood that biometric device will result in Type I errors
 - False positive incorrect match and identity acceptance of unauthorized individual ("imposter")
 - Called a Type II error
 - False Acceptance Rate (FAR) is a measurement of the likelihood that biometric device will result in Type II errors



Organizations have their own security requirements which will dictate how many Type I and Type II errors are acceptable:

Organizations prioritizing confidentiality would accept a certain rate of Type I errors to achieve no Type II errors
 Calibration of biometric systems would enable lowering Type II error rate by adjusting system sensitivity which will increase Type I error rate

Authentication — Biometrics

Crossover error rate (CER) also called Equal error rate (EER)

- Objective measurement of biometric system accuracy, useful for comparing different biometric system products
- Is a rating, stated as a percentage
- CER is the point at which false rejection rate equals the false acceptance rate: FRR = FAR
- Most important metric in determining a biometric system's accuracy!





Agenda

- ✓ New schedule for today's classes and mid-term exam
- ✓ Access Control
- ✓ Identification and Authentication
 - ✓ Digital Identity Guidelines
 - ✓ Biometrics (quick overview/review)
- Centralized Remote Access Control Technologies

Centralized Remote Access Control Technologies

Use what is referred to as "AAA Protocol" ("triple A")

- Authentication, Authorization, and Auditing (or Accounting)
 - Early traditional AAA Protocols include (more on these and their improvements later...):
 - Password Authentication Protocol (PAP)
 - Challenge Handshake Authentication Protocol (CHAP)
 - Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)

RADIUS – Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service (RADIUS)

TACACS – Terminal Access Controller Access Control System (TACACS)

TACACS+

Diameter – *Is not an acronym*

PAP – Password Authentication Protocol

- All network operating systems support PAP
- PAP authentication requires the calling device to enter the username and password
 - If the credentials match with the local database of the called device or in the remote AAA database then it is allowed to access otherwise denied
 - PAP is considered "less secure" as the password is sent in clear text and is performed only at the initial link establishment
 - It uses a two-way Handshake Protocol
 - It is non-interactive
 - Supports both one-way authentication (unidirectional) and two-way authentication (bidirectional)

CHAP – Challenge Handshake Authentication Protocol

- It is used at the initial startup of the link
- It also performs periodic checkups to check if the router is still communicating with the same host.
- CHAP (3-way authentication) is more secure than PAP (2-way authentication)
 - It uses 3-way handshaking protocol (not like TCP)
 - 1st the authenticator sends a challenge packet to the peer
 - 2nd the peer responds with a value using its one-way hash (MD5) function
 - 3rd the authenticator then matches the received value with its own calculated hash (MD5) value
 - If the values match then the authentication is acknowledged otherwise, the connection will be terminated

EAP – Extensible Authentication Protocol


EAP is not an authentication method like PAP or CHAP, but rather a framework on the access client and authentication server that allows networking vendors to develop and easily install new authentication methods known as EAP methods

- There are ~40 different EAP methods available, including:
 - Lightweight Extensible Authentication Protocol (LEAP), credentials are not strongly protected and easily compromised
 - EAP Transport Layer Security (EAP-TLS), considered one of the most secure EAP standards available
 - The majority of implementations of EAP-TLS require mutual authentication using client-side X.509 certificates without giving the option to disable the requirement
 - EAP Protected One-Time Password (EAP-POTP), EAP Pre-Shared Key (EAP-PSK), EAP Password (EAP-PWD), EAP Tunneled Transport Layer Security (EAP-TTLS), EAP Internet Key Exchange v. 2 (EAP-IKEv2), Tunnel Extensible Authentication Protocol (TEAP), EAP Subscriber Identity Module (EAP-SIM), EAP Authentication and Key Agreement (EAP-AKA), EAP Encrypted Key Exchange (EAP-EKE), EAP Generic Token Card (EAP-GTC), ...

RADIUS - Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service

Network protocol providing:

- Client/server authentication, authorization and audits of remote users
- Single administered entry point, with standardized security and simple way to track usage and network statistics
- Runs in the application layer, and can use either TCP or UDP as transport
- Created by Livingston Enterprises then published as a set of open protocol standards (RFC 2865 and RFC 2866)
- Today:
 - Most Internet Service Providers (ISPs) use RADIUS to authenticate their customers before they are provided access to the Internet
 - Many corporations use RADIUS to provide remote and home user employees to access their network resources



RADIUS - Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service

- The access server and user's software negotiate a handshake procedure and agree on an authentication protocol (PAP, CHAP, or EAP)
 - User provides username and password to the access server via a Point-to-Point protocol (PPP) connection
 - Access server and RADIUS server communicate over the RADIUS protocol
- Once the authentication is properly completed
 - User system is given an IP address and connection parameters, and corporate users are provided a preconfigured profile to control which resources they can access
- User credentials and configurations can be held in LDAP (Lightweight Directory Access Protocol) servers, databases or text files
- Network access servers, the gateways that control access to a network, usually contain a RADIUS client component that communicates with the RADIUS server

RADIUS - Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service

- Uses UDP (connectionless)
 - Requires RADIUS to have more code to detect and correct transmission errors (packet corruption, long timeouts, or dropped packets)
- Encrypts users' password only when transmitted from RADIUS client to RADIUS server
 - Other information is passed in clear text: Username, accounting and authorized services
 - Open invitation for attackers to capture session information for replay attacks
 - Vendors who integrated RADIUS into their products must understand the weaknesses and add additional security capabilities into their products
- Combined authentication and authorization functionality limits flexibility...

TACACS – Terminal Access Controller Access Control System

3 generations

1. TACACS


- Combines authentication and authorization processes
- Uses fixed passwords for authentication

2. XTACACS (Extended TACACS)

Separates authentication, authorization and auditing processes

3. TACACS+

• Is a different protocol than TACACS and XTACACS



TACACS+

- Has 2-factor authentication
 - Allows users to one-time (dynamic) passwords for more protection
- Similar functionality as RADIUS but uses TCP
 - Does not need extra code to deal with transmission problems like RADIUS which supports UDP
- Encrypts all data between client and server
 - Does not have the vulnerabilities inherent in RADIUS
- Users true authentication, authorization and accounting/audit (AAA) architecture that separates the 3 functions to provide network administrators more flexibility in how remote users are authenticated
 - Can work with alternative authentication servers (e.g. Kerberos is used in the organization for authentication then it can be used by TACACS+, alternatively if Active Directory is used for local users then that can be used)
 - Can define more granular user privledges to control over the specific commands users can carry out
- Is a protocol with more Attribute Value Pairs (AVPs) than RADIUS
 - Enabling network administrators to use them to define ACLs filters, user privileges and more...

RADUS versus TACACS+

	RADIUS	TACACS+
Packet delivery	UDP	TCP
Packet encryption	Encrypts only the password from the RADIUS client to the server.	Encrypts all traffic between the client and server.
AAA support	Combines authentication and authorization services.	Uses the AAA architecture, separating authentication, authorization, and auditing.
Multiprotocol support	Works over PPP connections.	Supports other protocols, such as AppleTalk, NetBIOS, and IPX.
Responses	Uses single-challenge response when authenticating a user, which is used for all AAA activities.	Uses multiple-challenge response for each of the AAA processes. Each AAA activity must be authenticated.

TACACS+ is a better choice for corporate networks needing better authentication and control of authorization

Diameter – "twice the radius"

Enhanced AAA protocol providing similar functionality as RADIUS and TACACS+, but with greater flexibility and capabilities

- Consists of 2 portions:
 - 1. Base protocol secure communication among Diameter entities, feature discovery and version negotiation
 - 2. Extensions allowing various technologies to use Diameter authentication, authorization and auditing capabilities
 - Supports interoperability with wireless devices, smartphones, Voice over IP (VOIP), Mobile IP (coordinates transfer or traffic between care-of-address and home IP address)
- Peer-based protocol
 - Not Client/Server (which requires client and server to take turns sending data between them)
 - Either end can initiate communication

Diameter – "twice the radius"

Lookup(example.com)
-> route to Proxy Agent

1. Request
Diameter
Client

1. Request
Proxy Agent

2. Request
3. Answer

- Authentication
 - PAP, CHAP, EAP
 - End-to-end protection of authentication information
 - Replay attack protection
- Authorization
 - Redirects, secure proxies, relays, and brokers
 - State reconciliation
 - Unsolicited disconnect
 - Reauthorization on demand
- Accounting/Auditing
 - Reporting, roaming operations (ROAMOPS) accounting, event monitoring

example.net

2. Request

3. Answer

Lookup(example.com)
->Local process

Diameter
Server

example.com

Diameter Versus RADIUS

	Diameter	RADIUS
Transportation Protocol	Connection-Oriented Protocols (TCP and SCTP)	Connectionless Protocol (UDP)
Security	Hop-to-Hop, End-to-End	Hop-to-Hop
Agent Support	Relay, Proxy, Redirect, Translation	Implicit support, which means the agent behaviors might be implemented in a RADIUS server
Capabilities Negotiation	Negotiate supported applications and security level	Don't support
Peer Discovery	Static configuration and dynamic lookup	Static configuration
Server Initiated Message	Supported. for example, reauthentication message, Session termination	Don't support
Maximum Attribute Data Size	16,777,215 octets	255 octets
Vendor- specific Support	Support both vendor-specific messages and attributes	Support vendor-specific attributes only

Agenda

- ✓ Access Control
- ✓ Identification and Authentication
 - ✓ Digital Identity Guidelines
 - ✓ Biometrics (quick overview/review)
- ✓ Centralized Remote Access Control Technologies