This paper discusses how difficult it is to implement security policies on information systems in large organizations and how conflicts arise in security policies. Policies typically go through the process of 1. security requirements, 2. abstract policies, 3. enforceable policies, and 4. policy enforcement mechanisms. Conflicts can exist in a single security policy called an into policy or between two or more policies. The result of a policy conflict may be contradictory, redundant, or irrelevant. Any three of these categories can ultimately result in policies that are unenforceable and allow users to perform actions they are not allowed to perform or prevent users from performing actions they should be authorized to perform. These conflicts can occur in access control management, network policy, or policy enforcement.
Common approaches to security conflicts are identified and three related scenarios are considered: access control policy, policy enforcement, and network protection. The point is to find conflicts. Only limited references are made to the methods of managing detected conflicts. It is assumed that the security administrator will be informed of every detected conflict, and it is his responsibility to choose the right way to manage the conflict. In large policies, the number of notifications can be large, so tools are needed to automatically manage conflicts, correct policies, and follow specific optimization criteria.
When implementing a security policy, it is common to run into conflicts, contradictions, and other issues that may inhibit the implementation of the policy. There are many different types and categorizations of conflicts, and one major way to distinguish conflicts is whether they are intra-policy conflicts (conflicts that exist within a single policy) or inter-policy conflicts (conflicts that exist in relation to another policy). Each type of conflict can then be further categorized as contradictory, redundant, or irrelevant. Once conflicts can be acknowledged and categorized, having a high-level abstract representation of the policy can help in resolving the issues.
Security policy conflicts can occur when there are inconsistencies or contradictions between multiple security policies, which can lead to security breaches or inconsistent enforcement sequences. The article focuses on how these conflicts can be effectively detected and resolved to ensure the consistency and integrity of network security policies. The main methods include:
(1) Policy analysis: a detailed analysis of existing security policies to identify potential conflicts and inconsistencies.
(2) Prioritization: Determine the priority between different security policies in order to determine which policy should be prioritized for execution in case of conflict.
(3) Policy Consolidation: Consolidate multiple security policies into a single unified policy to reduce the possibility of conflicts.
(4) Automation tools: Use automation tools to detect and resolve security policy conflicts to improve efficiency and accuracy.
When we conduct security reviews, we always ask how often security policies (such as firewall policies and rules) are reviewed. We also ask for evidence of results. This article reveals exactly why we do this: because there is likely to be conflict. There may be intra-policy conflicts (within a single policy) or inter-policy conflicts (between at least two). These conflicts may be contradictory, superfluous, or irrelevant. Without proper scrutiny, these conflicts are inevitable and will intensify over time until the problem is identified. You may not think of redundant conflicts as a big deal, but they can lead to overhead and increase the cost of security management.
Detecting conflicts in security policies is a crucial aspect of maintaining a secure and consistent security posture within an organization.In the context of security conflicts, particularly in the realm of access control policy, policy enforcement, and network protection, it’s crucial to identify and address conflicts effectively. managing security conflicts requires a combination of proactive policy design, automated conflict resolution mechanisms, and ongoing monitoring and optimization efforts. By addressing conflicts systematically and leveraging appropriate tools and techniques, organizations can strike a balance between security requirements and operational needs effectively.
This reading is the conflicts arising in the context of abstract security policies. There are two main categories of SoD, static SoD and dynamic SoD. Static SoD or strong exclusion is built on the concept that given two roles, a user cannot activate both – simply put the “creator” cannot be the “approver”. Dynamic SoD or weak exclusion allows users to perform exclusive roles, just not at the same time. SoD conflict resolution includes revising the policy, restricting user’s access to various roles, etc. While SoD is not a new concept, it certainly presents a challenge for SMEs with various overlapping roles, versus larger organizations with static SoD.
The process a policy usually goes through: 1. Security requirements, 2. Abstract policies, 3. Executable policies (configuration), and 4. Policy enforcement mechanisms. Conflicts can be in a single security policy called intrapolicy or exist between two or more policies. The result of a policy conflict could make it contradict one another, be redundant, or irrelevant. Any three of these categories ultimately may lead to the policy not being enforced and either allowing a user perform an action they were not allowed to or prevent an action a user should have permission to do. These conflicts can happen in access control management, network policies or policy execution.
This paper explores the complexities of implementing security policies in large organizational information systems and highlights the challenges posed by conflicts within these policies. The process of policy development typically encompasses defining security requirements, abstract policies, enforceable policies, and finally, policy enforcement mechanisms. Conflicts can arise within a single security policy, known as an intra-policy conflict, or between two or more policies, resulting in contradictory, redundant, or irrelevant outcomes. These conflicts can significantly impact the enforceability of policies, potentially enabling unauthorized actions or preventing legitimate ones, across areas such as access control management, network policies, and policy enforcement.
To address these conflicts, the paper identifies common approaches and considers three scenarios: access control policy, policy enforcement, and network protection. The focus is on conflict detection, with limited reference to conflict management methods. It is assumed that security administrators will be notified of detected conflicts and will bear the responsibility for resolving them. In larger policies, the number of notifications can be overwhelming, necessitating tools for automated conflict management, policy correction, and optimization based on specific criteria.
Overall, the paper underscores the importance of identifying and effectively managing conflicts in security policies to ensure the integrity and effectiveness of information system security in large organizations.
In this reading, the conflict of separation of duties (SOD) struck me. Access should be spread across multiple users to avoid risk. If the user is inappropriate, this can increase the risk of the individual damaging the company’s reputation. Therefore, multiple access to sensitive information should not be authorized by a single user.
The purpose of the separation of duties is to deter fraud by spreading responsibility and authority for an action or task, thereby increasing the risk of committing fraud by requiring the involvement of multiple people.
Separation of responsibilities is the foundation of access control. An example of separation of responsibilities within an organization is the separation of human resources, payroll accounting, and finance roles to prevent insider threats and reduce access.
Part of the passage introduces different types of conflicts that may arise in security policies, particularly stemming from authorization constraints, with an important constraint being Separation of Duty (SoD). The author emphasizes that the purpose of such constraints is to deter fraud by dispersing responsibility and authority, thereby increasing the risk involved in committing fraudulent acts by requiring the involvement of multiple individuals. The author also notes that while the concept of SoD predates the information age and has been extensively utilized in industries like banking and the military, role-based access control can effectively express this constraint due to its ability to map real-world business rules to the access control model.
While conflicts in security policy are typically resolved within the evaluation semantics of the security configuration language, inexperienced configuration authors may still introduce errors. Misconfigured security enforcement devices can lead to policies enforcing unexpected security attributes. Errors in program source code can result in incorrect runtime behavior. Researchers are actively identifying extreme or unforeseen scenarios that may arise from misconfigurations. Moreover, they are studying conflicts within abstract security policies, where the specifics of policy enforcement mechanisms are not typically considered.
The key takeaway from this chapter for me is that the importance of Separation of Duties (SoD) cannot be overlooked.SoD is a policy rule that ensures that users cannot perform conflicting tasks simultaneously while conducting business processes. It requires security designers to have an in-depth understanding of each business process in order to identify and correct potential policy conflicts.
Resolving these issues may involve policy revisions, limitation of user roles and responsibilities, or fine-tuning of constraints to achieve precise control over the process. There are two forms of separation of duties: static and dynamic. Static SoDs set explicit permissions based on specific roles, specifying the actions that each role can or cannot perform. Dynamic SoD, on the other hand, focuses more on the timeline of actions and requires the system to be able to accurately track the status of each task.
Segregation of duties is a key tool in areas such as finance and manufacturing. In these industries, certain transactions or operations require authorization from another party before they can be executed. By implementing segregation of duties, not only can the risk of fraud be reduced, but potential conflicts of interest can also be avoided.
After reading the article,I find that there are three conflicts mentioned which are contradictory(authorization that make policy inconsistent),redundant (being dominated by another authorization),and irrelevant (not being able to activate due to elements having conflicts in the authorization).It is very important for us to understand each conflicts.If we have good understanding about these conflicts,we can create solutions for theses issues.
This chapter focuses on detecting security policy conflicts. After reading the relevant articles, I noticed that clear delineation of responsibilities is very important to reduce conflicts in security policy. Separation of responsibilities is necessary in all areas of the organization. In fact, many of the frauds and abuses that occur within organizations are caused by the concentration of important information and resources in one hand, lack of oversight, and as mentioned in this article, multiple access to sensitive combinations should be held by multiple users. They can monitor each other, so one user cannot set prices too low or too high for a nominal customer. Separation of responsibilities is a type of access control that requires one or more people to perform a task, essentially creating checks and balances.
A security policy is a set of rules and guidelines that govern security practices within an organization. Conflicts can arise when different policies or rules overlap or contradict each other, leading to confusion, inconsistencies, and potential security breaches.
The complexity and difficulty of implementing information security policies depend on factors such as organizational size, technological environment, personnel awareness and training, regulatory requirements, etc. At the same time, implementing policies may face challenges such as balancing business needs and security requirements, conflicts between user experience and security measures, and resource limitations. Therefore, organizations need to comprehensively consider these factors and take appropriate measures to ensure the effective implementation of information security policies.
The management of security not only ensures the protection of service and adapts to the increasing complexity of system architectures. It also has to follow many regulations promulgated by governments in order to do the business practices. The conflict can be separated into two categories, one is intrapolicy conflicts which exist within a single policy. One is interpolicy conflicts with at least two or more policies. In each policy, there are three subcategories: contradictory, redundant, and irrelevant. The National Institute of Standards and Technology role-based access control model shows the users guide to ensure the separation of duty (SoD) is not violated. SoD constraints are enforced both at the role hierarchy level and user hierarchy level.
An interesting takeaway from this reading is the conflicts arising in the context of abstract security policies, particularly segregation of duties (SoD). There are two main categories of SoD, static SoD and dynamic SoD. Static SoD or strong exclusion is built on the concept that given two roles, a user cannot activate both – simply put the “creator” cannot be the “approver”. Dynamic SoD or weak exclusion allows users to perform exclusive roles, just not at the same time. SoD conflict resolution includes revising the policy, restricting user’s access to various roles, etc. While SoD is not a new concept, it certainly presents a challenge for SMEs with various overlapping roles, versus larger organizations with static SoD.
The key to access control policies, policy execution, and network protection is to find conflicts. There are many different types and classifications of conflict, and one of the main ways to distinguish conflicts is whether they are within policy (in a single strategy) or between policy (in another strategy). Each type of conflict can be further classified as contradictory, redundant, or unrelated. Once conflict can be recognized and classified, it plays a crucial role in resolving conflict.
From my reading, I think the following
1. Remote access security management requires security system designers to select hardware and software components in accordance with security
The security system designer is required to select hardware and software components in accordance with security policies, tasks, and encryption requirements. The goal of network access control is to prevent/reduce zero-day attacks by enforcing security policies throughout the network and using identifiers to enforce access control.
2. When planning a security policy for remote access, be sure to address the following issues: Remote connection technologies Each connection has its own unique security issues. All aspects of the chosen connection should be thoroughly examined. Possible connections include cellular/mobile communications\modems, digital subscriber lines (DSL), integrated services digital networks (ISDN), wireless networks, satellite communications, and cable modems.
3. Transmission protection comes in the form of several encryption protocols, encrypted connection systems, and encrypted network services or applications. Select the appropriate security service based on the needs of the remote connection. Options include VPN, SSL, TLS, SSH, IPsec, and Layer 2 Tunneling Protocol (L2TP). Authentication protection protects data traffic as well as securing all login credentials. Authentication protocols are required as well as centralised remote access authentication systems where necessary. This may include PAP, CHAP, EAP, or its extensions PEAP or LEAP, and TACACS+. When selecting or deploying security controls for network communications, a large number of security control features need to be evaluated based on real-world conditions, capabilities, and security policies.
4. Maintaining control over communication paths is fundamental to ensuring the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of network, voice, and other forms of communication. A large number of attacks have the goal of intercepting, blocking, or interfering with the transmission of data. Fortunately, there are countermeasures that can reduce or even eliminate many of these threats. Tunneling (or encapsulation) is a means of taking a message in one protocol and transmitting it over another network or communication system using a second protocol. Tunneling can be used in conjunction with encryption to provide security for the messages being transmitted; VPNs are based on encrypted tunnelling.
By reading the article. Conflicts can be divided into two categories: (1) intrapolicy conflicts that may exist within a single policy and (2) interpolicy conflicts that may exist between at least two policies. For each category we have the following subcategories: (1) contradictory, (2) redundant, and (3) irrelevant.
The identification of conflicts in security policies has been investigated especially in the scenario of the configuration of computer networks. This area of security sees significant industrial interest;
it is currently one of the most critical components in the protection of an information system from external threats and relies on a protection model that is well understood and adequate to realizing a number of ad hoc solutions.
There are three main approaches to discover conflicts: standard reasoners, ad hoc reasoning methods, and rule-based inferencing.
The standard reasoner is one of the core elements of an ontology-based system.
Standard DL reasoners can answer complex questions and verify structural and nonstructural constraints.
Rule inference reasoning is widely used in knowledge management systems. Some combinations of theorem-proving systems (such as DL ones) and rule inference systems have been proposed to address some limitations of decidable theorem-proving systems.
The implementation of information system security policies in large organizations faces many challenges, among which policy conflict is a particularly prominent problem. Security policy formulation usually goes through a series of processes, including specifying security requirements, formulating abstract policies, refining into executable policies, and establishing policy enforcement mechanisms. However, in this process, conflicts may arise within a single security policy, known as an entry policy, or between two or more policies.
These strategic conflicts may lead to three undesirable consequences: contradiction, redundancy, and irrelevance. In either case, you can end up making security policies ineffective. Specifically, the user may be allowed to perform an action that was not permitted, or may be wrongly prevented from performing an action that should have been authorized. These conflicts may exist in many aspects, such as access control management, network policy and policy implementation, and pose a serious threat to the information security of organizations.
This paper focuses on conflict detection in security policy. A security policy is a set of rules and guidelines established by an organization to ensure the security of its network and information systems. However, in complex systems, different security policies can conflict with each other, leading to security vulnerabilities or unnecessary restrictions. The methods or techniques used to detect these conflicts are introduced. This may include automated tools, manual review processes, or rule-based inspection methods.
Security policy conflict detection is crucial to ensure the security of an organization’s network. Conflicts can lead to security vulnerabilities that make an organization vulnerable to attacks, or can lead to unnecessary restrictions that affect business operations. By effectively detecting and resolving these conflicts, organizations can ensure that their security policies are more consistent, effective, and efficient. By understanding the types of conflicts, detection methods, and solutions, organizations can ensure the effectiveness of their security policies to protect their networks and information systems from potential security threats.
In this reading material, what attract me most is the Policy Enforcement Mechanisms. It correspond to the low-level functions that implement the executable policies. It is convenient in the design and analysis of the system to separate the consideration of the policies (abstract and executable) from the mechanisms responsible for enforcing them, because each has its own weaknesses and threats. Research has proposed multiple approaches for policy specification. Proposals have often been characterized by direct integration with the languages and models of the modern Web scenario.
These models include industry standards such as eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML) , which is interesting because it can be characterized as a mostly abstract policy language but it is also associated with tools that are able to process it directly, which makes it an executable policy.
This chapter describes common methods for identifying security conflicts, considering three related scenarios: access control policies, policy enforcement, and network protection. The focus is on conflict detection. There is limited reference to methods for managing detected conflicts. It is assumed that the security administrator receives a notification for each detected conflict and that it is his responsibility to choose the correct method to manage the conflict. In large policies, the number of notifications can be large, so tools are needed to automate the management of conflicts, make corrections to policies, and follow specific optimization criteria.
This paper discusses how difficult it is to implement security policies on information systems in large organizations and how conflicts arise in security policies. Policies typically go through the process of 1. security requirements, 2. abstract policies, 3. enforceable policies, and 4. policy enforcement mechanisms. Conflicts can exist in a single security policy called an into policy or between two or more policies. The result of a policy conflict may be contradictory, redundant, or irrelevant. Any three of these categories can ultimately result in policies that are unenforceable and allow users to perform actions they are not allowed to perform or prevent users from performing actions they should be authorized to perform. These conflicts can occur in access control management, network policy, or policy enforcement.
Common approaches to security conflicts are identified and three related scenarios are considered: access control policy, policy enforcement, and network protection. The point is to find conflicts. Only limited references are made to the methods of managing detected conflicts. It is assumed that the security administrator will be informed of every detected conflict, and it is his responsibility to choose the right way to manage the conflict. In large policies, the number of notifications can be large, so tools are needed to automatically manage conflicts, correct policies, and follow specific optimization criteria.
When implementing a security policy, it is common to run into conflicts, contradictions, and other issues that may inhibit the implementation of the policy. There are many different types and categorizations of conflicts, and one major way to distinguish conflicts is whether they are intra-policy conflicts (conflicts that exist within a single policy) or inter-policy conflicts (conflicts that exist in relation to another policy). Each type of conflict can then be further categorized as contradictory, redundant, or irrelevant. Once conflicts can be acknowledged and categorized, having a high-level abstract representation of the policy can help in resolving the issues.
Security policy conflicts can occur when there are inconsistencies or contradictions between multiple security policies, which can lead to security breaches or inconsistent enforcement sequences. The article focuses on how these conflicts can be effectively detected and resolved to ensure the consistency and integrity of network security policies. The main methods include:
(1) Policy analysis: a detailed analysis of existing security policies to identify potential conflicts and inconsistencies.
(2) Prioritization: Determine the priority between different security policies in order to determine which policy should be prioritized for execution in case of conflict.
(3) Policy Consolidation: Consolidate multiple security policies into a single unified policy to reduce the possibility of conflicts.
(4) Automation tools: Use automation tools to detect and resolve security policy conflicts to improve efficiency and accuracy.
When we conduct security reviews, we always ask how often security policies (such as firewall policies and rules) are reviewed. We also ask for evidence of results. This article reveals exactly why we do this: because there is likely to be conflict. There may be intra-policy conflicts (within a single policy) or inter-policy conflicts (between at least two). These conflicts may be contradictory, superfluous, or irrelevant. Without proper scrutiny, these conflicts are inevitable and will intensify over time until the problem is identified. You may not think of redundant conflicts as a big deal, but they can lead to overhead and increase the cost of security management.
Detecting conflicts in security policies is a crucial aspect of maintaining a secure and consistent security posture within an organization.In the context of security conflicts, particularly in the realm of access control policy, policy enforcement, and network protection, it’s crucial to identify and address conflicts effectively. managing security conflicts requires a combination of proactive policy design, automated conflict resolution mechanisms, and ongoing monitoring and optimization efforts. By addressing conflicts systematically and leveraging appropriate tools and techniques, organizations can strike a balance between security requirements and operational needs effectively.
This reading is the conflicts arising in the context of abstract security policies. There are two main categories of SoD, static SoD and dynamic SoD. Static SoD or strong exclusion is built on the concept that given two roles, a user cannot activate both – simply put the “creator” cannot be the “approver”. Dynamic SoD or weak exclusion allows users to perform exclusive roles, just not at the same time. SoD conflict resolution includes revising the policy, restricting user’s access to various roles, etc. While SoD is not a new concept, it certainly presents a challenge for SMEs with various overlapping roles, versus larger organizations with static SoD.
The process a policy usually goes through: 1. Security requirements, 2. Abstract policies, 3. Executable policies (configuration), and 4. Policy enforcement mechanisms. Conflicts can be in a single security policy called intrapolicy or exist between two or more policies. The result of a policy conflict could make it contradict one another, be redundant, or irrelevant. Any three of these categories ultimately may lead to the policy not being enforced and either allowing a user perform an action they were not allowed to or prevent an action a user should have permission to do. These conflicts can happen in access control management, network policies or policy execution.
This paper explores the complexities of implementing security policies in large organizational information systems and highlights the challenges posed by conflicts within these policies. The process of policy development typically encompasses defining security requirements, abstract policies, enforceable policies, and finally, policy enforcement mechanisms. Conflicts can arise within a single security policy, known as an intra-policy conflict, or between two or more policies, resulting in contradictory, redundant, or irrelevant outcomes. These conflicts can significantly impact the enforceability of policies, potentially enabling unauthorized actions or preventing legitimate ones, across areas such as access control management, network policies, and policy enforcement.
To address these conflicts, the paper identifies common approaches and considers three scenarios: access control policy, policy enforcement, and network protection. The focus is on conflict detection, with limited reference to conflict management methods. It is assumed that security administrators will be notified of detected conflicts and will bear the responsibility for resolving them. In larger policies, the number of notifications can be overwhelming, necessitating tools for automated conflict management, policy correction, and optimization based on specific criteria.
Overall, the paper underscores the importance of identifying and effectively managing conflicts in security policies to ensure the integrity and effectiveness of information system security in large organizations.
In this reading, the conflict of separation of duties (SOD) struck me. Access should be spread across multiple users to avoid risk. If the user is inappropriate, this can increase the risk of the individual damaging the company’s reputation. Therefore, multiple access to sensitive information should not be authorized by a single user.
The purpose of the separation of duties is to deter fraud by spreading responsibility and authority for an action or task, thereby increasing the risk of committing fraud by requiring the involvement of multiple people.
Separation of responsibilities is the foundation of access control. An example of separation of responsibilities within an organization is the separation of human resources, payroll accounting, and finance roles to prevent insider threats and reduce access.
Part of the passage introduces different types of conflicts that may arise in security policies, particularly stemming from authorization constraints, with an important constraint being Separation of Duty (SoD). The author emphasizes that the purpose of such constraints is to deter fraud by dispersing responsibility and authority, thereby increasing the risk involved in committing fraudulent acts by requiring the involvement of multiple individuals. The author also notes that while the concept of SoD predates the information age and has been extensively utilized in industries like banking and the military, role-based access control can effectively express this constraint due to its ability to map real-world business rules to the access control model.
While conflicts in security policy are typically resolved within the evaluation semantics of the security configuration language, inexperienced configuration authors may still introduce errors. Misconfigured security enforcement devices can lead to policies enforcing unexpected security attributes. Errors in program source code can result in incorrect runtime behavior. Researchers are actively identifying extreme or unforeseen scenarios that may arise from misconfigurations. Moreover, they are studying conflicts within abstract security policies, where the specifics of policy enforcement mechanisms are not typically considered.
The key takeaway from this chapter for me is that the importance of Separation of Duties (SoD) cannot be overlooked.SoD is a policy rule that ensures that users cannot perform conflicting tasks simultaneously while conducting business processes. It requires security designers to have an in-depth understanding of each business process in order to identify and correct potential policy conflicts.
Resolving these issues may involve policy revisions, limitation of user roles and responsibilities, or fine-tuning of constraints to achieve precise control over the process. There are two forms of separation of duties: static and dynamic. Static SoDs set explicit permissions based on specific roles, specifying the actions that each role can or cannot perform. Dynamic SoD, on the other hand, focuses more on the timeline of actions and requires the system to be able to accurately track the status of each task.
Segregation of duties is a key tool in areas such as finance and manufacturing. In these industries, certain transactions or operations require authorization from another party before they can be executed. By implementing segregation of duties, not only can the risk of fraud be reduced, but potential conflicts of interest can also be avoided.
After reading the article,I find that there are three conflicts mentioned which are contradictory(authorization that make policy inconsistent),redundant (being dominated by another authorization),and irrelevant (not being able to activate due to elements having conflicts in the authorization).It is very important for us to understand each conflicts.If we have good understanding about these conflicts,we can create solutions for theses issues.
This chapter focuses on detecting security policy conflicts. After reading the relevant articles, I noticed that clear delineation of responsibilities is very important to reduce conflicts in security policy. Separation of responsibilities is necessary in all areas of the organization. In fact, many of the frauds and abuses that occur within organizations are caused by the concentration of important information and resources in one hand, lack of oversight, and as mentioned in this article, multiple access to sensitive combinations should be held by multiple users. They can monitor each other, so one user cannot set prices too low or too high for a nominal customer. Separation of responsibilities is a type of access control that requires one or more people to perform a task, essentially creating checks and balances.
A security policy is a set of rules and guidelines that govern security practices within an organization. Conflicts can arise when different policies or rules overlap or contradict each other, leading to confusion, inconsistencies, and potential security breaches.
The complexity and difficulty of implementing information security policies depend on factors such as organizational size, technological environment, personnel awareness and training, regulatory requirements, etc. At the same time, implementing policies may face challenges such as balancing business needs and security requirements, conflicts between user experience and security measures, and resource limitations. Therefore, organizations need to comprehensively consider these factors and take appropriate measures to ensure the effective implementation of information security policies.
The management of security not only ensures the protection of service and adapts to the increasing complexity of system architectures. It also has to follow many regulations promulgated by governments in order to do the business practices. The conflict can be separated into two categories, one is intrapolicy conflicts which exist within a single policy. One is interpolicy conflicts with at least two or more policies. In each policy, there are three subcategories: contradictory, redundant, and irrelevant. The National Institute of Standards and Technology role-based access control model shows the users guide to ensure the separation of duty (SoD) is not violated. SoD constraints are enforced both at the role hierarchy level and user hierarchy level.
An interesting takeaway from this reading is the conflicts arising in the context of abstract security policies, particularly segregation of duties (SoD). There are two main categories of SoD, static SoD and dynamic SoD. Static SoD or strong exclusion is built on the concept that given two roles, a user cannot activate both – simply put the “creator” cannot be the “approver”. Dynamic SoD or weak exclusion allows users to perform exclusive roles, just not at the same time. SoD conflict resolution includes revising the policy, restricting user’s access to various roles, etc. While SoD is not a new concept, it certainly presents a challenge for SMEs with various overlapping roles, versus larger organizations with static SoD.
The key to access control policies, policy execution, and network protection is to find conflicts. There are many different types and classifications of conflict, and one of the main ways to distinguish conflicts is whether they are within policy (in a single strategy) or between policy (in another strategy). Each type of conflict can be further classified as contradictory, redundant, or unrelated. Once conflict can be recognized and classified, it plays a crucial role in resolving conflict.
From my reading, I think the following
1. Remote access security management requires security system designers to select hardware and software components in accordance with security
The security system designer is required to select hardware and software components in accordance with security policies, tasks, and encryption requirements. The goal of network access control is to prevent/reduce zero-day attacks by enforcing security policies throughout the network and using identifiers to enforce access control.
2. When planning a security policy for remote access, be sure to address the following issues: Remote connection technologies Each connection has its own unique security issues. All aspects of the chosen connection should be thoroughly examined. Possible connections include cellular/mobile communications\modems, digital subscriber lines (DSL), integrated services digital networks (ISDN), wireless networks, satellite communications, and cable modems.
3. Transmission protection comes in the form of several encryption protocols, encrypted connection systems, and encrypted network services or applications. Select the appropriate security service based on the needs of the remote connection. Options include VPN, SSL, TLS, SSH, IPsec, and Layer 2 Tunneling Protocol (L2TP). Authentication protection protects data traffic as well as securing all login credentials. Authentication protocols are required as well as centralised remote access authentication systems where necessary. This may include PAP, CHAP, EAP, or its extensions PEAP or LEAP, and TACACS+. When selecting or deploying security controls for network communications, a large number of security control features need to be evaluated based on real-world conditions, capabilities, and security policies.
4. Maintaining control over communication paths is fundamental to ensuring the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of network, voice, and other forms of communication. A large number of attacks have the goal of intercepting, blocking, or interfering with the transmission of data. Fortunately, there are countermeasures that can reduce or even eliminate many of these threats. Tunneling (or encapsulation) is a means of taking a message in one protocol and transmitting it over another network or communication system using a second protocol. Tunneling can be used in conjunction with encryption to provide security for the messages being transmitted; VPNs are based on encrypted tunnelling.
By reading the article. Conflicts can be divided into two categories: (1) intrapolicy conflicts that may exist within a single policy and (2) interpolicy conflicts that may exist between at least two policies. For each category we have the following subcategories: (1) contradictory, (2) redundant, and (3) irrelevant.
The identification of conflicts in security policies has been investigated especially in the scenario of the configuration of computer networks. This area of security sees significant industrial interest;
it is currently one of the most critical components in the protection of an information system from external threats and relies on a protection model that is well understood and adequate to realizing a number of ad hoc solutions.
There are three main approaches to discover conflicts: standard reasoners, ad hoc reasoning methods, and rule-based inferencing.
The standard reasoner is one of the core elements of an ontology-based system.
Standard DL reasoners can answer complex questions and verify structural and nonstructural constraints.
Rule inference reasoning is widely used in knowledge management systems. Some combinations of theorem-proving systems (such as DL ones) and rule inference systems have been proposed to address some limitations of decidable theorem-proving systems.
The implementation of information system security policies in large organizations faces many challenges, among which policy conflict is a particularly prominent problem. Security policy formulation usually goes through a series of processes, including specifying security requirements, formulating abstract policies, refining into executable policies, and establishing policy enforcement mechanisms. However, in this process, conflicts may arise within a single security policy, known as an entry policy, or between two or more policies.
These strategic conflicts may lead to three undesirable consequences: contradiction, redundancy, and irrelevance. In either case, you can end up making security policies ineffective. Specifically, the user may be allowed to perform an action that was not permitted, or may be wrongly prevented from performing an action that should have been authorized. These conflicts may exist in many aspects, such as access control management, network policy and policy implementation, and pose a serious threat to the information security of organizations.
This paper focuses on conflict detection in security policy. A security policy is a set of rules and guidelines established by an organization to ensure the security of its network and information systems. However, in complex systems, different security policies can conflict with each other, leading to security vulnerabilities or unnecessary restrictions. The methods or techniques used to detect these conflicts are introduced. This may include automated tools, manual review processes, or rule-based inspection methods.
Security policy conflict detection is crucial to ensure the security of an organization’s network. Conflicts can lead to security vulnerabilities that make an organization vulnerable to attacks, or can lead to unnecessary restrictions that affect business operations. By effectively detecting and resolving these conflicts, organizations can ensure that their security policies are more consistent, effective, and efficient. By understanding the types of conflicts, detection methods, and solutions, organizations can ensure the effectiveness of their security policies to protect their networks and information systems from potential security threats.
In this reading material, what attract me most is the Policy Enforcement Mechanisms. It correspond to the low-level functions that implement the executable policies. It is convenient in the design and analysis of the system to separate the consideration of the policies (abstract and executable) from the mechanisms responsible for enforcing them, because each has its own weaknesses and threats. Research has proposed multiple approaches for policy specification. Proposals have often been characterized by direct integration with the languages and models of the modern Web scenario.
These models include industry standards such as eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML) , which is interesting because it can be characterized as a mostly abstract policy language but it is also associated with tools that are able to process it directly, which makes it an executable policy.
This chapter describes common methods for identifying security conflicts, considering three related scenarios: access control policies, policy enforcement, and network protection. The focus is on conflict detection. There is limited reference to methods for managing detected conflicts. It is assumed that the security administrator receives a notification for each detected conflict and that it is his responsibility to choose the correct method to manage the conflict. In large policies, the number of notifications can be large, so tools are needed to automate the management of conflicts, make corrections to policies, and follow specific optimization criteria.