Which information security objective(s) could be put at risk if the alternative safeguards recommended by the FGDC guidelines are applied? Explain how the objective(s) is put at risk by the mitigation(s).
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Based on the safeguards provided by the guideline, several information security objectives may face some risks. Step 10 tells the users to “change the data” based on the previous questions asked, this safeguard may risk the “Integrity” of the information. This process could potentially alter the original data, which would lead to loss or inaccuracy of the information detail. Ultimately, the data will be less reliable for analysis or decision-making. Step 13 recommends “extent of restrictions” to mitigate the risks. This may refer to methods such as: MFA (Multi-Factor Authentication), restricting access to data or other complex access controls. This could potentially compromise the “Availability” of the data. Strict access controls will make authorized users of the information less accessible or even have no access to the data, legal users may not be able to obtain the information when needed.
Hi Justin! I agree with all your points, and also said that changing the data risks integrity, and restricting the data risks availability. Do you think that changing the data could affect the availability as well?
The three forms of information security objectives are confidentiality, integrity, and availability.
Confidentiality involves maintaining authorized limits on information access and disclosure, including measures to safeguard personal privacy and proprietary information. Failure to uphold confidentiality can result in unauthorized access or disclosure of information, often due to inadequate encryption. Integrity involves protecting against unauthorized information modification or destruction and includes ensuring information authenticity. The loss of integrity is when information is improperly modified or destroyed, which can result in data that is not reliable or accurate. Availability is about making sure that information is accessible and reliable. If there’s a disruption to accessing or using information, it can lead to a loss of availability. This can happen when an information system becomes inaccessible, if there is not a proper recovery plan in place, or if backup procedures do not guarantee timely recovery.
Either all or some of the information security objectives (Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability) could be put at risk in diverse situations if the alternate safeguards recommended by the Federal Geographic Data Committee (FGDC) are applied.
Confidentiality could be put at risk in cases where the alternate safeguards entail inadequate access controls and reduced encryption standards which will lead to exposing sensitive information to unauthorized persons
Integrity could be put at risk in cases where the alternate safeguards have weak change management procedures and inadequate data validation leading to a likely change in the accuracy and completeness of information
Availability could be put at risk in cases where the alternate safeguards come with simplified backup procedures and reduced redundancy as this will greatly impact access to information and systems.
Hi Clement
I agree with your approach by highlighting potential risks associated with alternate safeguards. To build on that, inadequate access controls and reduced encryption could jeopardize confidentiality, potentially leading to data breaches and legal repercussions. For integrity, weak change management and insufficient data validation might undermine data accuracy, resulting in flawed decisions and costly corrections. Additionally, simplified backups and reduced redundancy pose risks to availability, potentially causing system downtime, customer dissatisfaction, and financial losses.
When we apply the alternative safeguards recommended by the FGDC guidelines the information security objectives of confidentiality, integrity, and availability could be put at risk.
Confidentiality will be at risk as Weaker encryption algorithms might allow unauthorized individuals to access sensitive geographic data.
Integrity will be at risk as disaster recovery plans could lead to data corruption and also data loss.
Availability of data means the data accessible and it is reliable but weak disaster recovery planning could result in Data loss.
By selecting alternative safeguards will increase risk of data breaches, unauthorized access leading to high cost recovery measures.
Hey Rohith,
Great point about the potential risks associated with applying alternative safeguards as outlined by the FGDC guidelines. To expand on this, it’s important to consider how these risks can have cascading effects on broader organizational objectives.
For instance, the impact on confidentiality through weaker encryption might not only expose sensitive geographic data but could also undermine the trust of stakeholders who rely on the security of that data. Moreover, the risk to data integrity and the potential for data corruption or loss due to inadequate disaster recovery plans highlights the importance of a holistic approach to risk management. Perhaps investing in more resilient disaster recovery solutions or adopting a layered security approach could mitigate these risks while still aligning with the guidelines.
If alternative safeguards that are recommended by the FGDC are applied it can pose risks to both confidentiality and integrity. If an organization decides to reduce the safeguards because they have determined to make the data available without doing a proper risk assessment or security review it can lead to issues in confidentiality. If the data contains sensitive information, making it publicly available can lead to breaches of information. Integrity is another issue that an organization needs to take into consideration especially if the new safeguards that they have decided to implement change how the data is managed or protected, introducing different vulnerabilities. If the authentication process has been weakened in this new safeguard then it can lead to unauthorized users making changes to the data.
Hi Lily,
I believe you make a great point on credibility and integrity, but I also believe making the sensitive information public but unreliable indicates a risk of availability. Therefore, a holistic approach must be taken when applying the FGDC guidelines.
If the FGDC safeguards are applied they put Availability and Integrity at risk. The FGDC recommends changing the data if the data is internal and found to pose a risk. Changing data then disseminating it affects both Availability and Integrity as now not all the data is available and the Integrity of the data has been compromised. If the receiver of this data hopes to draw a conclusion from it, the wrong conclusions may be made as the data itself has changed. If the organization finds the data is internal and poses a risk they may choose to restrict the data. Restricting the data affects availability of the data as well.
Hi Sarah,
Thank you for your response. I agree that the balance of the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of data can be a very fine line. When two of these objectives become a high priority, it can be very challenging for an organization to determine the best path forward. If you were put into a position where you had the authority to restrict or release certain data, do you think you would be good at determining which to do? Do you also think you would favor the restriction of the data or the release of the data more often than not?
When evaluating the alternative safeguards outlined in the FGDC guidelines, it is important to consider the key security objectives: confidentiality, integrity, and availability. Confidentiality may be compromised by weak encryption or inadequate access control, making sensitive information vulnerable to unauthorized access. Integrity may be compromised if alternative safeguards lack comprehensive data validation or integrity checks, potentially leading to data corruption or tampering. Availability may be compromised if alternative safeguards overlook redundancy and disaster recovery measures, which could result in increased downtime or reduced system availability. Therefore, it is essential to analyze whether an alternative safeguard is truly necessary for the company, especially if its implementation compromises other areas of the organization.
All three information security objectives can be put at risk when applying the safeguards recommended by the FGDC guidelines. This was seen when we used the FIPS 199 security categorizations to determine which safeguards to apply. For example, when applying the restriction of data determined to be extremely sensitive in nature, a loss of availability of that data will occur. If data is determined to have a high impact of risk in both confidentiality and availability, the restriction or the publication of that data will in turn affect either the confidentiality or availability of that data. If the changing of data is applied in order to help publish an alternate form for the public, the integrity of that data will be at risk. These risks balance each other out when applying safeguards to information. It can be a fine line when two or more of the security objectives of confidentiality, integrity, and availability become a high priority.
Hi Charles,
I appreciated how your analysis highlighted a critical challenge in information security. It balances the objectives of confidentiality, integrity, and availability while applying safeguards based on FIPS 199 categorizations. This delicate balancing act is a key consideration in cybersecurity. Such trade-offs are often necessary to protect sensitive data while maintaining system functionality. Your discussion managed to cover the complexity of maintaining a secure and functional information system.
Hello Charles
The write-up effectively demonstrates how applying safeguards, even those recommended by guidelines like FGDC, can inadvertently compromise one or more information security objectives. This highlights the delicate balance between protecting confidentiality, integrity, and availability. I am wondering if there could be a balance scale or percentage for the three objectives (confidentiality, integrity, and availability) that could be applied in diverse cases
Implementing the alternative security measures suggested by the FGDC guidelines may jeopardize the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of geospatial data. Confidentiality may nevertheless be compromised by restricting access or employing data obfuscation techniques, which expose private information to unauthorized parties. Furthermore, these techniques might unintentionally change the data, jeopardizing its integrity. Restricting access could also make data less accessible to authorized users, which could make it more difficult for critical processes that depend on precise and timely geographic data.
All three security objectives could be put at risk if the recommended safeguards are put in place. Specifically Step 10, as step 13 is subjected to the discretion of the decision maker. Step 10 encourages the user to change the data to avoid risk, however, these changes walk the line of interfering with the integrity of the data. If changes are made, the organization should document the changes in the metadata and should cite the authority that permits this change. This ensures that if changes are made, there is a log of what is changed. However, the public data may be needed in conjunction with the newly hidden data, which does dilute the integrity, if only slightly. In addition, there exists the possibility that not all critical information is removed from the data set, as there is always the possibility of human error. Finally, the accessibility of the data may be compromised, as simply changing the data could result in the loss of the data if careful procedures are not in place. Backups and logs should be put in place to ensure that a change in the data does not result in a deletion of the data.
When applying the alternative safeguards recommended by the FGDC guidelines, the information security objectives of confidentiality, integrity, and availability could be put at risk. Confidentiality might be compromised if the data is altered for public use. This process involves modifying the original geospatial data to remove sensitive elements before public release. However, if not done carefully, this alteration could inadvertently reveal patterns or information about the sensitive data it aims to protect. For example, obvious gaps or alterations in the modified data might indicate the presence and nature of the removed sensitive information. Furthermore, overly restrictive access controls might lead to workarounds or unauthorized sharing among those who need the data with a risk of exposing the information to greater risk. Integrity could be affected if the process of changing data for public release introduces errors or inconsistencies in the geospatial information. Availability might be compromised if overly restrictive safeguards make it difficult for authorized users to access necessary geospatial data in a timely manner.
Hello Aaroush,
Your explanation provided great examples of how confidentiality, integrity, and availability could be put at risk if the alternative guidelines provided by the FDGC are followed. Your example of confidentiality is great as it shows the amount of problems that could occur if this process isn’t done correctly. Sometimes certain information should remain confidential especially if it’s clear that the data has been altered or that it has been modified. You also mentioned that overly restrictive access controls might lead to workarounds or unauthorized sharing of data which is a great example of the balance that needs to be maintained when handling this type of data.
The implementation of FGDC safeguards might put the Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability of information at risk. This is why organizations need to weigh out the risk and control implementation since increasing one aspect of CIA might bring down another.
For example, changing the data affects the integrity of data. One organization might think that making data publicly available post a few changes is a good thing, but the same decision might adversely affect its confidentiality and integrity, since the data will now be in an altered form and available to public. This can be the case with maps, photos, aerial views of important facilities.
Another example is implementing heavyweight access control mechanisms, which would reduce the availability of the data for users.
One recommendation by FGDC as a security safeguard alternative is to change the data. This safeguard, while intended to address certain issues, could alter the original data. Such changes could result in the loss of accuracy of critical information, compromising the reliability and trustworthiness of the data. When the integrity of information is compromised, decisions based on that data may be flawed, leading to potentially negative consequences. Therefore, it’s crucial to carefully assess and document any changes to the data, ensuring that integrity is maintained throughout the process.
Applying the FGDC’s alternative safeguards could put the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information at risk. For example, if we change the data to protect confidentiality, it might mess with the data’s integrity by causing errors or inaccuracies. Also, if we set up really strict access controls to keep data confidential, it could make it hard for authorized users to access the data, affecting availability. I think it’s important to carefully balance these safeguards so we don’t end up hurting the security of the data.
I think your example of strict access controls is interesting and resonates with my own answer to this question, however, upon second thought I’d like to add something onto it.
Access Controls need to be commensurate with the level of security the data requires, which can be understood via a risk assessment. Only after that will an organization be able to make the right decision about the strength of access controls to be implemented.
While implementing access controls, an organization needs to take into account – value of information, risk to information, budget, risk tolerance, ease of use, and residual risk at last. Do let me know your thoughts on this!
Using the alternative protections advised by the FGDC policies runs the danger
of compromising the following information security goals:
Confidentiality: Sensitive geographical data may be accessed by illegal users if less
strict alternative security measures are used, therefore causing data breaches.
Integrity: Insufficient security might allow illegal changes to geographical data, thus
undermining their dependability and correctness.
Geospatial data availability may suffer if the alternative protections fall short in
preventing attacks, therefore rendering it unavailable as required.
Ignoring strong security measures might endanger the confidentiality, integrity, and
availability of geographic data, therefore fostering possible security events and data
abuse.